Differentiating Diversities: Moral Diversity Is Not Like Other Kinds

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Diversity is widely celebrated in American society. But from a social psychological point of view, diversity ought to cause a number of problems, such as divisiveness and conflict.

A resolution of this paradox is proposed: There are several kinds of diversity, with different profiles of costs and benefits. In particular, moral diversity is identified as being problematic and even self-contradictory. Three studies of attitudes and desires for interaction among college students confirmed that moral diversity reduces desires for interaction more than does demographic diversity, and that both kinds of diversity are valued more in a classroom than in other social settings. These findings have important implications for discussions of diversity, multiculturalism, affirmative action, identity politics, and immigration policy.

In recent years, diversity has risen to the top of the list of American public goods. Bumper stickers exhort people to "Celebrate Diversity." Universities hold Diversity Awareness Days. Companies require employees to attend diversity workshops. Hiring and admission policies aim to increase the diversity of workplaces and schools. The use of quotas and affirmative action to achieve diversity is often controversial, but there is a general consensus that diversity, in and of itself, is good. Yet work in sociology and social psychology suggests that diversity may have several potentially undesirable effects, and that diversity should be examined carefully before being promoted as a public good. The present study tests the possibility that there are different kinds of diversity, which have different profiles of good and bad effects. Discussions of whether diversity is good or bad, therefore, become similar to discussions of whether cholesterol, television, or shopping malls are good or bad: It depends on the kind and on the context.

The Benefits of Diversity

Diversity in race and national origin has always been a fact of American life and a strength of American society. America's economic and cultural success in

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the 20th century has been credited in part to the drive and creativity of its many waves of immigrants (Takaki, 1998), and there is historical evidence that foreign immigration generally increases the number of eminent individuals in a given society (Simonton, 1997). On a smaller scale, diversity is said to increase creativity in the workplace, and there is some evidence that diverse groups are better at creative problem solving because they have a broader base of experience (Cox & Blake, 1991; McLeod, Lobel, & Cox, 1996).

In educational settings, a recent national survey of American adults commissioned by the Ford Foundation (1999) found that 75% of those surveyed believed that a diverse student body has more positive than negative educational effects. Bowen and Bok (1998) found that majorities of both Black and White respondents favored even more diversity in educational settings than is now in place. A University of Michigan study found that students educated in diverse environments showed more complex thinking, more motivation to achieve, greater intellectual self-confidence and engagement, and the highest level of interest in graduate degrees (Gurin, 1999). There have been even claims that ethnic diversity is good for the health of the United States, since the nation has such a broad behavioral and gene pool to study when looking for the keys to health and longevity (Sunn, 1999).

And finally, diversity is arguably a moral imperative when its promotion has the effect of rectifying past injustices and removing barriers to individual advancement. Even when no formal barriers exist for minority advancement, the lack of minority role models and mentors might be an obstacle that discourages talented individuals from entering a field. To the extent that the achievement of diversity throughout the work world "levels the playing field" for the next generation, diversity becomes closely linked to the basic virtues of liberty, justice, and equality (Ferdman & Brody, 1996; Fowers & Richardson, 1996).

But despite the many claims made about the benefits of diversity, empirical evidence for these benefits is sparse. More troubling, there are empirical and theoretical reasons to worry about costs as well.

The Potential Costs of Diversity

Multiethnic societies have always faced a high risk of dissension and civil war, and few such societies have been fully successful. Yet since the 18th century, the United States has impressed foreign observers with its ability to unite and integrate people from diverse and even mutually hostile backgrounds (e.g., Crevecour, 1782/1997; de Tocqueville, 1835/1945). In the American motto E Pluribus Unum ("out of many, one") the Pluribus has always pointed backward, to the diverse backgrounds of Americans, while the Unum has pointed forward, referring to a common purpose, a common set of democratic values, and a shared future (Schlesinger, 1991).

Beginning in the 1960s, however, American society has seen a major movement away from Unum and toward pluribus. With the rise of identity politics, political correctness, and the multiculturalist movement in the 1980s, many historians and political scientists began to worry about new divisions and hostilities within American society. A variety of books appeared in the 1990s with titles such as The Twilight of Common Dreams (Gitlin, 1995) and Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America (Hughes, 1993). In a widely cited book, The Disunited America, liberal historian Arthur Schlesinger (1991) worried that the cult of ethnicity exaggerates the differences, intensifies resentments and antagonisms, drives ever deeper the awful wedges between races and nationalities. The endgame is self-pity and self-ghettoization" (p. 58).

Recent research and thinking in sociology supports these fears. Since the 1980s, Americans have worried publicly and privately about the loss of a sense of community and of public life (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985). The 1990s saw the rise of several movements in response, such as communitarianism (Etzioni, 1994) and a new interest among social scientists in creating healthy communities (Putnam, 1995). It recently has been recognized that the social capital of a community can be as important for its health as its financial or intellectual capital. Social capital has many forms, but one important form is the dense network of obligations, expectations, and trustworthiness that grows up in stable communities in which people share a common past and an expectation of a common future (Coleman, 1988). Anything that divides people, encouraging them to separate into non-interacting or nontrusting subgroups, reduces the community's social capital.

Research in social psychology offers still more reasons for concern, showing just how easy it is to divide people against each other. Tajfel's (1982; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979) classic research on minimal groups demonstrated that people will divide themselves into groups at the drop of a coin. When Tajfel and his collaborators created trivial similarities and differences among participants (based on having preferred the same abstract painter, or having chosen the same side of a coin in a coin flip), participants quickly formed affectively laden identifications with their fellow "group" members. Even though participants never directly interacted with each other, they liked their group members better, and they behaved spitefully toward "out-group" members in a monetary distribution game.

Other research has examined more meaningful conflicts in which groups are pitted against each other in competing for resources. In their classic "summer-camp" study, Sherif and collaborators (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) randomly assigned boys at a summer camp to two groups. Conflict over resources (playing time on the baseball diamond, prizes won for athletic competition) eventually led to in-group cohesion and out-group hostility. The same affectively laden distinctions that were seen in the Tajfel studies were made far more strongly here between "us" and "them."
These findings demonstrate the affective consequences of arbitrary divisions made by an experimenter. When divisions are made on the basis of socially significant factors such as race, religion, sexual orientation, or country of origin, the resulting intergroup hostility can be far more serious. The most deadly riots in American history, from the draft riots of 1863 to the Los Angeles riots of 1992, have been race riots (Morris & Morris, 1976). Most American street gangs form along racial or ethnic lines (Shelden, Tracy, & Brown, 1997). It seems that people, especially young men, will spontaneously form groups based on racial or ethnic similarity, and groups of young men will actively seek out other groups of young men for competition and conflict (Tiger, 1969).

Different Kinds of Diversity

We might at this point say that diversity, like most interesting things, has both costs and benefits. But there is another, more hopeful possibility: Perhaps diversity is like cholesterol, or like witches in The Wizard of Oz; that is, there is good diversity, and there is bad diversity. Therefore, we might be able to maximize the desirable form while minimizing the undesirable form.

Several organizational behavior researchers have suggested that different kinds of diversity might have different kinds of effects. Jackson, Stone, and Alvarez (1992) distinguished demographic attributes from personal attributes. Demographic attributes are "those that are immutable, that can be readily detected during a brief interaction with a person, and for which social consensus can be assumed (e.g., sex, race, ethnicity, age)" (p. 56). Personal attributes, on the other hand, are "mutable and subjectively construed psychological and interpersonal characteristics (e.g., status, knowledge, behavioral style), which can change as a consequence of socialization processes" (p. 56). One personal attribute that they mentioned, but did not discuss at length, is values, including attitudes of all sorts.

Williams and O’Reilly (1998) and Milliken and Martins (1996) specifically suggested that researchers should examine value diversity along with demographic diversity and other kinds of diversity. However, their reviews of the literature found almost no empirical studies that have examined the effects of value diversity on group performance. The one study that addressed value diversity directly (Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989) found that value congruence between workers and their supervisors was positively correlated with job satisfaction and commitment. A more recent study (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale 1999) found that high value diversity predicted lower team effectiveness, efficiency, and morale, while high informational diversity (i.e., differences in knowledge bases and perspectives) was correlated with higher team effectiveness. However, value diversity in this study referred not to moral values but to work-related values such as what the team’s real task, goal, target, or mission was thought to be.

In the present article, we suggest that the concept of value diversity is valuable, but that it should be reformulated as moral diversity, to focus on the kinds of important values on which people’s worldviews are based. We suggest that the key to resolving the paradox of diversity is to contrast moral diversity with demographic diversity. More precise definitions will allow an examination of this hypothesis.

Demographic Diversity

Demographic diversity can be defined as the state of a group when a substantial percentage of its members (20%, perhaps) falls into categories other than the modal category on each of the principal demographic features. Demographic features are socially marked aspects of identity that one did not choose and that cannot be changed easily. Race, gender, and ethnic or national origin are the three prototypical demographic features that are at stake in modern discussions of diversity, but this definition of demographic diversity admits less prototypical features such as social class, religion, sexual orientation, handicapped status, and age.3

Moral Diversity

Moral diversity can be defined similarly as the state of a group when a substantial percentage of its members (20%, perhaps) does not value the most valued moral goods of a community. Moral goods are social, personal, or spiritual obligations (e.g., justice, social harmony, self-actualization, piety, chastity) to which one appeals to justify or criticize the practices and behaviors of others, and which are felt to be binding on all people (or at least on all people in a particular role or position; Shweder & Haidt, 1993; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Moral goods are experienced as affectively laden self-evident truths or intuitions. People care strongly about them and find it difficult to explain their goodness to someone who does not share their intuition (Haidt, 2001). A simpler but equivalent way of describing moral diversity is as the state of a group when many different ideas of right and wrong are represented, and there is no widespread consensus about which moral goods should be pursued.

Why Moral Diversity Might Be Less Desirable Than Demographic Diversity

The definition of moral diversity reveals it to be a fraternal twin of anomie. Durkheim (1897/1951) argued that people need society to provide a normative

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3 We believe that classical definitions listing necessary and sufficient conditions are not usually desirable in the social sciences. The definition given is meant to describe the prototypical cases well, and the marginal cases less well. People are born into a religion and a social class, but the fact that some people change their religion or social class does not invalidate the definition; it rather makes it clear why religion and social class are nonprototypical demographic features.
order, with regulatory constraints, within which people can set and pursue goals. When the normative order breaks down and there is no moral consensus, the resulting state is known as *anomie*, or normlessness. It is a state in which suicide rates rise and the sense of meaning or purpose in life becomes harder to find. From a Durkheimian perspective, moral consensus is essential for a healthy community, while moral diversity is a threat.

Social psychologists have come to similar conclusions. An enormous body of research demonstrates the importance of similarity, particularly shared attitudes, for interpersonal attraction and cooperation (Byrne & Clore, 1970; Byrne & Nelson, 1965; Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1961, 1978). Interacting with people who hold dissimilar attitudes raises skin conductance levels (Clore & Gornly, 1974), providing a visceral cue that might damage further interactions. Disagreements that challenge one's cultural and moral worldview lead to desires for ostracism and punishment (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). Byrne et al. (1975) noted that “the response to the threat raised by disagreement is to denigrate those who disagree; not only are they rejected, but they are also seen as lacking in intelligence, knowledge, morality, and psychological adjustment” (p. 206).

Rokeach, Smith, and Evans (1960) specifically contrasted race and belief as determinants of liking and found that shared belief always trumped shared race. White participants, even in the segregated South, said they would prefer to be friends with a Black person who shared their beliefs on important issues (e.g., God, communism, and desegregation) than with a White person who held opposing beliefs (Rokeach et al., 1960; see similar findings in Anderson & Cote, 1966). Rokeach and Mezei (1966) replicated these results in a behavioral study. White and Black participants chose to go on a coffee break with discussion group members (confederates) who shared their beliefs but not their race more often than with discussion group members who shared their race but not their beliefs. Subsequent research has demonstrated, however, that the relative magnitude of racial similarity and belief similarity effects depends on other factors, such as the presence or absence of norms about cross-race association and the degree of intimacy of the relationship. That is, shared race matters more for dating, while shared belief matters more for general liking (Hyland, 1974; Insko, Nacoste, & Moe, 1983; Stein, Hardyck, & Smith, 1965; Triandis & Davis, 1965).

Why Wanting Moral Diversity Might Be Incoherent

These findings suggest practical reasons for avoiding moral diversity: If one wants to build cohesive, non-anomie communities, moral diversity is problematic. But there are philosophical arguments that go further, implying that one cannot even coherently want moral diversity. Most philosophical attempts to define morality include, as a necessary feature, that moral rules apply universally (Hare, 1981; Kant, 1785/1959). If one says, “I value gender equality, but others need not value gender equality,” then gender equality is a matter of personal taste. If one says, “We in our culture value gender equality, but people in other cultures need not value gender equality,” then one is treating gender equality as a social convention (Turiel, 1983). But if one sees gender equality as a moral good or a moral truth, then one is committed to saying “I value gender equality, and everyone else should, too, even in other cultures.” The mere act of saying, “I value X, but I would prefer to live in a world where there is diversity with respect to X” is to deny that X is a moral good. Indeed, what would you think of a person who declared, “I value tolerance (or abortion rights, or the Ten Commandments), but I would prefer to live in a world where many people do not”? Such a statement is either incoherent or it trivializes tolerance (or abortion rights, or the Ten Commandments) as a personal taste.

The Present Research

The present experiments were designed to determine whether moral and demographic diversity have different profiles of desirability. In the first two experiments, we examine college student preferences for diversity on 17 issues in three social domains (at the university as a whole, in a small seminar class, and in a roommate) using a within-participants design. In Experiment 1, we surveyed almost all members of a male fraternity; and in Experiment 2, we surveyed a broader and more diverse cross-section of non-fraternity college students. We began with the following hypotheses:

_Hypothesis 1._ Diversity preferences will vary by diversity type such that demographic diversity will be more valued than will moral diversity.

_Hypothesis 2._ Diversity preferences will vary by domain such that diversity of all types will be most desired in the least intimate domain (the university), and least desired in the most intimate domain (roommate). That is, we expect diversity to show the profile of a “Not in my back yard” (NIMBY) issue: a public good that people might support, as long as they do not have to frequent and close contact with it.

*The philosopher Rorty (1993) argued that moral diversity is desirable for the health of a society to ensure that ideas are challenged and moral inquiry is energized. But the kind of diversity that she advocates is primarily a division of methodological labor in which Socratic philosophers question, Aristotelians strive after excellence, and upright Kantians insist on universalizable principles of justice. Redding (2001) argued that scientific psychology would benefit from greater political diversity because the current dominance by political liberals excludes conservatives and conservative ideas, and biases scientific research toward politically motivated conclusions.*
Hypothesis 3. In the intimate setting of a fraternity, admission decisions will select against moral diversity, but not demographic diversity. That is, because attitude dissimilarity leads to repulsion (Rosenbaum, 1986), we expect that demographic diversity stripped of moral diversity will be fully acceptable.

In Experiment 3, we used a between-participants manipulation to look more closely at the features (moral and demographic) of a target person that affect people's desires for interaction in a low-intimacy and a high-intimacy context. We predict that Hypotheses 1 and 2 will again be supported.

The general approach used in these studies is similar to that used by Rokeach et al. (1960) in asking participants about potential interaction partners who varied on demographic factors as well as on morally laden beliefs. However, that work was performed mostly in the 1960s and 1970s, before diversity became a public good. The present research incorporates several new features that make it more relevant for current discussions of diversity and multiculturalism. Most importantly, it moves beyond preferences for dyadic interactions to directly ask students about their ideals for the diversity of the groups in which they live and study. Since college admissions is the most important battleground for debates over diversity and affirmative action, it is important to know what kinds of diversity college students want and where they want it. Second, the present study examines desires for diversity within a college fraternity, an institution often accused of creating pockets of low diversity on college campuses. By surveying almost all members of a real residential group, we were able to find out how desires for different kinds of diversity might shape the creation of such a group. Third, the present study examined a wide variety of attitudes and values, including issues of lifestyle and personal taste. It did not limit itself to the heavily moralized values studied by Rokeach et al.

Experiment 1

Experiment 1 examined male fraternity members' preferences for diversity by having them complete three questionnaires. Participants assessed the following: (a) their own attitudes and demographic features; (b) how variation on those attitudes and demographic features would affect the admission of potential candidates to their fraternity; and (c) how much variation they prefer on those attitudes and demographic features at the university as a whole, in a seminar class, and in a roommate.

Method

Participants. Participants were 32 members of an all-male social fraternity at the University of Virginia (UVA) in Charlottesville, Virginia. All but three

5The second author was a member of this fraternity, and he solicited their voluntary cooperation.

members of the fraternity participated. All participants were undergraduates at UVA, including 13 sophomores, 11 juniors, and 8 seniors. The mean age was approximately 20 years. For ethnicity, 3 participants identified themselves as African American, 28 as Caucasian, 1 as Hispanic, and 0 as Asian American. The religions in which they were raised included 14 reports of Protestant denominations, 9 of Catholicism, 5 of Judaism, and 1 of Greek Orthodox.

Materials. Three questionnaires were stapled together into a packet. The Self questionnaire asked the participant about his own attitudes and activities on 16 items (e.g., “How much do you enjoy participating in athletics?”) using a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). The Self questionnaire then asked about a variety of demographic factors, including the participant's social class, ethnicity, religion, political views, urban/ruralness of hometown, and favorite sports teams.

The Self questionnaire was followed by the Admissions questionnaire, which began,

Each of the following people represents a potential member of your fraternity. For each person, please check whether the characteristics mentioned would make you more likely or less likely to admit the person into your fraternity. If the characteristics would have absolutely no effect on you, then check Indifferent.

Then 43 potential candidates were described who varied on one of the attitudes, traits, or demographic factors that were assessed in the Self questionnaire (e.g., “An individual who is extremely pro-life and thinks that all abortion doctors are murderers”).

The third questionnaire was the Diversity questionnaire, which directly assessed preferences for 17 types of diversity in three social domains, beginning with the least intimate (university) domain. Participants read the following instructions:

If you were considering potential students to come to UVA, how diverse would you want the students to be? For each issue (on a scale of 0 to 9), circle the amount of diversity you would want for each question. A 0 means you want no diversity (Everyone is the same as you), while a 9 means you want maximum diversity (The majority of the people are not like you and are spread out among all possible categories).

Participants were then asked about 17 specific issues, each of which had been assessed on both the Self questionnaire and the Admissions questionnaire (e.g., “the ethnicity of the students,” “the views on abortion of the students”). The
instructions were then repeated, but with the first sentence changed to read “If you were considering what type of students you would prefer to have in a small seminar class (10 people), how diverse would you want the students to be?” The 17 issues were then repeated, with the same 10-point Likert scale. The instructions were then repeated a third time, with the first sentence changed to read “If you were considering a potential roommate, how similar/different from you would you want him to be?” The scale was redefined to be used for a single person by saying “A 0 means you want that person exactly the same as you, while a 9 means you want your roommate being very different from you.” The three versions were always given in this order because it was thought that participants would be most familiar with thinking about diversity at the university as a whole, and would use those ratings as a baseline when thinking about the seminar and roommate versions.

The items on all three questionnaires were chosen to represent three different kinds of issues. The two kinds in which we were most interested were demographics (ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and religion) and attitudes about political/moral issues (abortion, gun control, environmental protection, and affirmative action). In addition, to compare demographic and moral diversity to other factors that might be relevant to fraternity admissions, we asked about a variety of personal tastes (in music and recreation), social assets (social skill level, physical attractiveness), and attitudes about activities that might affect the social interactions of fraternity brothers (views on drinking, hazing, marijuana use, sexual promiscuity, and sexual orientation). We can group these factors together temporarily as social-interactional issues.

Procedure. Each participant was handed the three questionnaires and was asked to fill them out in a room without anyone else present. Upon returning their completed questionnaires, participants were debriefed and asked to avoid discussing the study with other fraternity members.

Results

The results are organized around three questions: (a) What kinds of diversity do participants want? (b) Where do they want diversity? and (c) What factors affect fraternity admissions?

What kinds of diversity do participants want? Table 1 shows the mean preferences for diversity for the 17 kinds of diversity. The table is sorted by declining desire for diversity, averaged across the three domains. This ordering shows that the most valued kinds of diversity are the three demographic factors (SES, ethnicity, and religion), followed by a few social-interactional issues, followed by the political/morality issues. The least valued kinds of diversity are the social-interactional issues involving sexuality and drug use. The fraternity members generally want the people around them, particularly their roommates, to share

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of diversity</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Seminar</th>
<th>Roommate</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Univariate F</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic status</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>6.81</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>25.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>7.03</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>16.13***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>10.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taste in music</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>7.03</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>78.84***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational interests</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>50.05***</td>
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<td>Views on abortion</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>8.44***</td>
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<td>Athletic participation</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>19.84***</td>
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<td>Views on gun control</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>9.78***</td>
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<td>Views on environment</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>9.50***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Views on affirmative action</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>9.21***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical attractiveness</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>4.78</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>4.93***</td>
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<td>Views on hazing</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>5.19</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>8.70***</td>
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<td>Social skill level</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>22.31***</td>
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<td>Sexual promiscuity</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>5.53</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>20.23***</td>
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<td>Views on marijuana use</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>5.66</td>
<td>2.22</td>
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<td>Views on alcohol use</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>5.59</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>27.86***</td>
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<td>Sexual orientation</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>18.05***</td>
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<td>Average of 17 issues</td>
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<td>5.10</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>66.47***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Rated on a 10-point scale (0 to 9). Sorted by declining average desire for diversity. For univariate F tests, n = 32, df = 2.

*Kind of diversity, in a priori conceptualization: D = demographic, M = moral (political/moral), S = social interactional.

**p < .01, ***p < .001.

their attitudes about sex and drugs, but they do not want everyone around them to be like themselves in socioeconomic status (SES), ethnicity, or religion.

Where do they want diversity? Table 1 shows that preferences for diversity varied considerably by domain. A one-way repeated-measures MANOVA was performed on all 17 diversity items, using domain as a within-subjects measure, and a significant overall effect of domain was found, F(34, 90) = 3.65, p < .001. Univariate tests found a significant effect of domain for all 17 items (see Table 1
for $F$ and $p$ values). However the ordering of the domains was unexpected. We had predicted that preferences for diversity would be inversely proportional to the intimacy of the domain (Hypothesis 2), such that diversity would be most valued at the university and least valued in a roommate, with the seminar classroom falling in between. Yet Table 1 shows that diversity was most valued in the seminar classroom, followed closely by the less intimate university domain, and then preferences for diversity dropped off sharply in the roommate domain. This pattern holds for 16 of the 17 items (all but social skill level), and paired-sample $t$ tests show that the difference between the seminar and roommate domains was significant in every case (at $p < .001$, except for attractiveness, which was significant at $p < .05$). Differences between the classroom and university domains were smaller and less frequent. They were significant at $p < .01$ for gun control, affirmative action, marijuana use, alcohol use, and sexual orientation; and they were significant at $p < .05$ for ethnicity, religion, athleticism, environment, and sexual promiscuity.

The interaction of diversity type and domain. To facilitate the analysis of the interaction of diversity type and domain, we reduced the number of variables by creating summary variables for different types of diversity. A principal components factor analysis of the average diversity preferences (averaged across three domains) for each of the 17 items yielded four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, and a scree test confirmed that a four-factor solution was reasonable. These four factors accounted for 70% of the variance, and when rotated, they gave an interpretable solution. We took the three highest loading items from each factor to create the following four subscales, which we labeled as follows: (a) demographics—ethnicity, religion, and SES; (b) political/moral—environment, affirmative action, and gun control; (c) sociosexuality—promiscuity, sexual orientation, and attractiveness; and (d) activities—recreation, athleticism, and social skill level. We note that the first two subscales match our a priori categories, although it is interesting to note that abortion (which we had thought of as a political/moral issue) ended up loading most heavily on the demographics factor (perhaps because the abortion debate is so closely linked to religious ideologies), while attitudes about marijuana and alcohol loaded highest on the political/moral factor.

Figure 1 shows how desires for each of the four diversity types varied by domain. Demographic diversity was valued most highly in all three domains, while diversity in sociosexuality was least valued. Diversity in activities showed the greatest sensitivity to domain, plunging from a relatively high 5.8 in the university domain to 2.9 in the roommate domain. Apparently participants are happy to be at a university where people pursue diverse activities, but they would prefer to share activities with their roommates.

A $3 \times 4$ (Domain $\times$ Diversity Type) repeated-measures MANOVA, where both factors were within-subjects, confirmed the features that are apparent in

Figure 1: There was a significant effect of domain, $F(2, 68) = 129.89, p < .001$; there was a significant effect of diversity type, $F(3, 67) = 39.19, p < .001$; and there was a significant interaction between domain and diversity type, $F(6, 65) = 7.16, p < .001$. To test Hypothesis 1 directly, the repeated-measures MANOVA was performed again as a $3 \times 2$ MANOVA, using only the two focal diversity types: political/moral and demographic. The results confirm that demographic diversity was more desired than was moral diversity, $F(1, 31) = 15.70, p < .001$, supporting Hypothesis 1. The effect of domain was again significant, $F(2, 30) = 28.76, p < .001$, although this time the interaction between domain and diversity type was only marginally significant, $F(2, 30) = 2.69, p = .08$.

Fraternity admissions. Given that fraternity members value different kinds of diversity differently, what kinds of people do they actually want to admit to their fraternity? The Admissions questionnaire presented 43 potential applicants to the fraternity for whom a salient trait was described. Participants were asked to say if the trait would make them more likely to admit the applicant (scored as +1), less likely to admit (scored as -1), or if the trait would make no difference (scored as 0). Table 2 shows how the 43 potential applicants would fare. One-sample $t$ tests compared each mean to 0, to evaluate the null hypothesis that the trait in question did not affect the likelihood of admission. With a more stringent alpha level of
.01 (because of the use of multiple / tests), 22 of the 43 traits exerted a significant effect on hypothetical admissions decisions.

Consistent with widely held stereotypes about fraternities, Table 2 shows that this particular fraternity is a men’s social club, not a political club. Members are looking to admit athletic, socially successful men whose lifestyles will fit in with the current members. Members do not want to admit people who are gay, Afro-centric, or who hold strong religious views. It should be noted further that the fraternity as a whole does not seem to care about potential members’ political/moral beliefs, including whether the applicant is a liberal or a conservative. But are traits valued or feared because they exemplify or threaten a fraternity ideal, or are fraternity members each trying to pick people identical to themselves? If the latter, then the fraternity admissions process would appear to be a diversity-reducing mechanism.

To determine whether fraternity members were trying to admit people who resembled themselves individually, we calculated the correlations between the traits given in Table 2 and the self-ratings on the same traits that participants made in the first questionnaire, in which they were asked for their own views on gun control, abortion, homosexuality, and so forth, as well as for demographic information about themselves. For eight of the traits, no such match was possible (e.g., we did not know how “successful” our participants were with women, and there were no Asian or Buddhist participants). The remaining 35 correlations are given in the far right-hand column of Table 2. All but three of the correlations are positive, indicating that individual fraternity members are more likely to value potential applicants who resemble themselves, both on attitudes and on demographic background. However, a closer inspection reveals that the largest correlations occurred on the political/moral items. Of the nine correlations that were significant at p < .01, six of them were being for or against gun control, being for or against affirmative action, and being politically liberal or conservative. Two of the remaining three correlations were issues with moral overtones for many Americans (being gay or being a regular marijuana user). In other words, if a fraternity member was pro-gun control, he wanted a potential fraternity member to be pro-gun control. However, the fraternity member's social class, religion, and liking for books and sports did not make him more likely to favor someone of his class, religion, or recreational preference. It appears, then, that fraternity members as individuals show an anti-diversity preference primarily on moral issues, but these preferences are overridden by the more important shared preference for athletic, socially successful men who like to drink.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Mean change in likelihood of admission</th>
<th>Correlation of self and change in likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plays many sports, loves athletics</td>
<td>.75***</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always has beautiful women with him, does well with women</td>
<td>.68***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinks a lot and loves to party</td>
<td>.59***</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likes the same basketball team as you</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American from upper middle-class family</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended a public high school</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likes modern rock and often plays it loudly</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likes rap music and often plays it loudly</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very conservative, always votes for the Republican</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American, born in U.S., with no accent</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian from wealthy family who drives a Mercedes</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Into recycling, against anything that damages environment</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinks it is wrong to smoke marijuana</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is extremely pro-choice, thinks women should always have option of abortion</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.42*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hates your favorite football team</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended a private school</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinks premarital sex is immoral</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against minority preferences for University of Virginia (UVA) admission</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.55***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very liberal, always votes for the Democrat</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian from low-income family</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For minority preferences for UVA admission</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.52**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinks hazing is great</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(table continues)
Table 2 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Mean change in likelihood of admission</th>
<th>Correlation of self and change in likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does not drink alcohol at all</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favor of strict gun control</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
<td>.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likes country music and often plays it loudly</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
<td>.38*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not care at all about recycling or environment</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American, born in Korea, speaks with strong accent</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very promiscuous, willing to sleep with any woman</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist who practices the art of meditation</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of National Rifle Association, thinks gun laws should be abolished</td>
<td>-.28*</td>
<td>.62***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smokes marijuana regularly</td>
<td>-.34***</td>
<td>.55***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spends much of his leisure time reading</td>
<td>-.34***</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very against hazing</td>
<td>-.44***</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist who thinks religious people are foolish</td>
<td>-.50***</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wears clothes that are extremely out of the ordinary</td>
<td>-.56***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hates homosexuals, makes constant anti-gay jokes</td>
<td>-.59***</td>
<td>.44*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American who is extremely Afrocentric</td>
<td>-.62***</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexual, but not openly</td>
<td>-.66***</td>
<td>.63***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Jew who wears a yarmulke in public</td>
<td>-.69***</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is extremely pro-life, thinks abortion doctors are murderers</td>
<td>-.72***</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considered “dork” by most people</td>
<td>-.78***</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openly homosexual</td>
<td>-.91***</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born-again Christian who proselytizes to non-Christians</td>
<td>-.97***</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. For likelihood of admission, +1 = participants said trait would increase likelihood, -1 = participants said trait would decrease likelihood. One sample t tests compared each mean to 0. For correlation of self and likelihood, Pearson correlations are listed. N/A = no corresponding trait was available on the Self questionnaire.

* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Discussion

The results confirm Hypotheses 1 and 3, and suggest a modification of Hypothesis 2. Diversity preferences did indeed vary by type (Hypothesis 1). Demographic diversity was the most valued form of diversity, in all three domains, and it did not adversely affect fraternity admissions. Political/moral diversity was less highly desired in all three domains, and individual members in the fraternity admissions process disliked it.

Diversity preferences also varied by domain (Hypothesis 2), but not in the way that we had expected. All kinds of diversity were more highly valued in a seminar class than in the less intimate university setting. This finding supports advocates of diversity who claim that diversity enriches education for everyone. Members of a mostly White and not very liberal fraternity said they want to be exposed to people who are different from themselves in a seminar class. They did not see diversity as a burden or obligation to be spread around the university, but best kept far from themselves. The only item in Table 1 that was not ranked above the midpoint of the scale in the seminar domain was sexual orientation. But given the nature of the scale, a high rating on this item would have meant wanting to be in a class that was mostly comprised of gay students. The fact that the fraternity brothers gave a mean rating of 3.97 when the midpoint of the scale was 4.5 indicates that they were not generally averse to having a few gay classmates, although they were extremely averse to having a gay roommate (M = 0.84, the lowest rating in all of Table 1).

The findings on the Admissions questionnaire confirm, at least at this one fraternity, many of the widely held stereotypes about fraternities: Members value a certain lifestyle, involving drinking, sports, loud music, and the pursuit of women. These values appear to guide fraternity admissions, and members do not want to admit anyone who will interfere with that lifestyle (e.g., born-again Christians, homosexuals, Afrocentric African Americans, teetotalers). In the intimate and highly interactive environment of the fraternity, lifestyle diversity is strongly disliked, while demographic diversity (particularly in matters of race and SES) is not problematic, as long as it does not bring with it cultural diversity. Black and Asian candidates faced no discrimination when they were presented as members of mainstream American culture. The Black upper-middle class candidate was, in fact, one of only five candidates whose description made him significantly more likely to be admitted.

Moral issues showed an unusual pattern of effects. On average, political/moral beliefs had little impact on admissions decisions (most means were near 0 in Table 2, except for the strongly pro-life candidate). Again, the fraternity is a social club, not a political club, and shared activities are more important than are shared political views. However, it was primarily on the political/moral issues that individual members’ self-ratings correlated with their admission decisions.
Liberal members preferred liberal candidates, while conservative members preferred conservative candidates.

It appears to be valuable, then, to distinguish among types of diversity and among domains of interaction. But the group examined in Experiment 1 is an unusual group: all male, and self-selected for compatibility. It might not be representative of the broader college population. Before claims about the valuation of different kinds of diversity can be made, a replication study is needed.

Experiment 2

Experiment 2 was designed to replicate Experiment 1 using a nonfraternity sample that would be more representative of students at the University of Virginia.

Method

Participants. Participants were 39 students in an Introductory Psychology class at the University of Virginia who completed the study in exchange for a half hour of experimental credit. Members of fraternities and sororities were excluded from participation. The 23 women and 16 men included 26 freshmen, 10 sophomores, 1 junior, and 2 seniors, so the mean age was approximately 19 years. For ethnicity, 29 participants identified themselves as Caucasian, 4 as African American, and 6 as Asian or Asian American. The religions the participants were raised with included 14 reports of Protestant denominations, 6 of Catholicism, 4 of Judaism, 2 of Islam, 1 each of Hinduism and Paganism; 9 said “None” and 2 left the question blank.

Materials. The Self questionnaire from Experiment 1 was used again, with several minor changes for a nonfraternity population (e.g., questions about hazing, year of pledging, and who “you hang out with” were dropped). The Self questionnaire was followed by the Diversity questionnaire from Experiment 1, with the omission of questions about “views on hazing.”

Design and procedure. Participants were given the two questionnaires and an informed consent form at the end of one class. They were asked to return the completed forms at the beginning of the next class.

Results

The results are organized around three questions: (a) What kinds of diversity do people want?; (b) Where do they want it?; and (c) How does a nonfraternity population compare to a fraternity population in its preferences for diversity?

What kinds of diversity do participants want? Table 3 shows the mean preferences for diversity on 16 issues across three social domains. The table is sorted by declining average desire for diversity, showing a similar ordering to that shown by the fraternity sample in Table 1. This time, however, the ordering by diversity type is conceptually neater, corresponding almost exactly to the four factors derived from the factor analysis of Experiment 1: Participants wanted the most diversity on demographic variables, followed by activities variables. They wanted less diversity on the morally loaded variables: political/moral attitudes were all grouped together at the midpoint of the 10-point (0 to 9) scale, while items about sexuality and drug use elicited the lowest preferences for diversity. This pattern supports Hypothesis 1 (preference for demographic diversity over moral diversity).
Where do they want diversity? Table 3 shows the same pattern of domain effects that was found in Study 1: Participants wanted the most diversity in a seminar setting and the least in a roommate. This ordering held for 13 of the 16 kinds of diversity (all but physical attractiveness, social skill level, and sexual orientation). A one-way repeated-measures MANOVA using domain as a within-subjects factor found an overall effect of domain, F(4, 32) = 5.13, p < .001. Univariate tests found a significant effect of domain for all 16 diversity types (Table 3). Paired-sample t tests confirmed that the difference between the seminar and roommate domains was significant for all 16 diversity types (all at p < .01), although the differences between the university and seminar domains were only significant for athletics, gun control, environment, and affirmative action (all at p < .05).

The interaction of diversity type and domain. As in Experiment 1, we sought to reduce the number of diversity types by creating summary variables for different types of diversity. A principal components factor analysis of diversity preferences (averaged across three domains) for the 16 items yielded three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. However, a scree test showed a sharp elbow after two factors, which accounted for 59% of the variance. When a varimax rotation was applied to a two-factor solution, two easily interpretable factors were found. The first factor merged activities and demographic variables (loadings in declining order: athleticism, recreational interests, sexual orientation, music, SES, attractiveness, religion, ethnicity, and social skill). The second factor appeared to be a morality factor, mixing political morality with attitudes about drugs and sex (loadings in declining order: abortion, alcohol, gun control, marijuana, environment, sexual promiscuity, and affirmative action). We computed subscale scores for each participant, using the seven highest loading items on each factor (i.e., all items with loadings above .60). Figure 2 shows how preferences for diversity varied across the three domains for each of the two subscale scores. Figure 2 shows the same general picture as did Figure 1: Demographic and activities diversity was most valued, especially in the public setting of the university and the educational setting of a seminar class. Moral diversity was less valued in all domains, although the difference between diversity categories shrank among roommates.

A 2 x 3 (Diversity Type x Domain) within-subjects MANOVA confirmed the effect of diversity type, F(1, 38) = 24.99, p < .001; the effect of domain, F(2, 37) = 80.69, p < .001; and the interaction of diversity type and domain, F(2, 37) = 9.52, p < .001. These findings support Hypothesis 1 (demographic diversity was more valued than moral diversity), and they support the same modification of Hypothesis 2 that was found in Experiment 1: Desires for diversity were highest in a seminar class and lowest in a roommate.

Fraternity versus nonfraternity responses. Differences between samples on individual items can be calculated directly by subtracting cells in Table 3 from the corresponding cells in Table 1. However, to facilitate an overall comparison, we computed subscale scores for the nonfraternity sample using the same four subscales used in Experiment 1 across each of the three domains. We then subtracted the 12 values obtained for the fraternity sample from the 12 values obtained for the nonfraternity sample. Table 4 shows the 3 x 4 table of differences between the samples, where positive numbers indicate that the nonfraternity sample wanted more diversity. Differences between the two samples were small. A 2 x 3 x 4 (Sample x Domain x Diversity Type) repeated-measures MANOVA found no main effect of sample (fraternity vs. nonfraternity), F(1, 68) = 2.24, ns; and only one interaction involving sample, with diversity type, F(3, 66) = 3.39, p < .05.

Independent sample t tests were conducted on each of the 12 pairs of values that went into Table 4, as well as on each of the row and column means. There were no significant differences between the samples on either of the two focal kinds of diversity: demographic and political/moral. The few differences that were found were concentrated in the areas of activities and sociosexuality. In all cases, the fraternity sample wanted less diversity than did the nonfraternity sample, and this difference might explain, in part, why some people seek to live in fraternities in the first place.
Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Differences Between Samples in Preferences for Diversity</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Seminar</th>
<th>Roommate</th>
<th>Row M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demographic</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political/moral</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociosexuality</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.49**</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.96*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1.04*</td>
<td>0.81*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column M</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.62*</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Scores for fraternity sample are subtracted from scores for nonfraternity sample, so positive values indicate that the nonfraternity sample wanted more diversity.

*p < .05.  **p < .01.

Discussion

Experiment 2 confirmed the findings of Experiment 1. Once again, demographic diversity was more valued than was moral diversity (Hypothesis 1). And once again, all kinds of diversity were most valued in the seminar class and least valued in a roommate, supporting a modified version of Hypothesis 2: Diversity preferences varied by domain of interaction, being highest in educational contexts and lower in personal contexts. College students see an advantage to being exposed to people different from themselves in their classes.

Experiment 3

Experiments 1 and 2 established that when they are asked to think directly about how much diversity they want in different contexts, college students make distinctions among diversity types and among contexts. However, by highlighting the issue of diversity, these studies might have activated participants' explicit pro-diversity attitudes. Yet one of the paradoxes of American college life is that despite high levels of support for diversity in theory, social groupings often remain racially balkanized, and segregated in fact (Willis, Reeves, & Buchanan, 1977). Students might endorse diversity in general while choosing to live, eat, date, and spend time primarily with those like themselves.

To examine more directly how different kinds of diversity might affect desires for social interaction, Experiment 3 avoided the use of the word diversity in the main instrument, and instead asked students to say how much they would want to interact with a variety of potential partners, in either an academic or a dating context. Once again, we predicted that demographic diversity would be more valued than would moral diversity (Hypothesis 1), and that diversity in an educational context would be more valued than would diversity in a more intimate dating context (Hypothesis 2, as modified by Experiments 1 and 2). The basic finding that race differences become more important than belief differences as the intimacy of contact increases was well established in the 1960s (Triandis & Davis, 1965), but we thought it worthwhile to revisit this issue to see if times had changed.

Method

Participants. Participants were 248 students (66% female) who were enrolled in an Introductory Psychology class at the University of Virginia. All were undergraduates ranging in age from 17 to 21 years. For ethnicity, 81% of the students identified themselves as Caucasian, 8% as African American, 6% as Asian American, and 5% as "Other"; 3 students reported having one Caucasian parent and another of a different race. By religious background, 55% reported having been raised in a branch of Protestant Christianity, 25% reported Roman Catholicism, 6% Judaism, 4% other religions, and 10% reported "None" or "Atheist."

Materials. Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of two versions (lecture or dating) of a questionnaire that assessed their willingness to interact with different others. The two versions were identical except for the opening vignettes. The lecture version began with the following vignette:

Suppose you are just starting a new lecture class. The workload for the class is very heavy, and the professor suggests that people team up in pairs for the semester so they can share the reading load and the research for the final project. You don’t know anybody in the class, and you’re talking about this with your roommate when your roommate says, “Hey, I know someone in the class who’s really smart, and who might be a good partner for you.” You are interested, so you ask your roommate for more details about the person. How much would each of the following things affect your desire to work with that person?

The dating version provided a similar vignette:

Suppose you are single at the start of a new semester, and you are interested in meeting someone. Your roommate’s boyfriend or girlfriend is coming to UVA for the weekend from William and Mary,

William and Mary is a well-respected college 100 miles from the University of Virginia (UVA). Because many UVA students are in long-distance relationships with students at other Virginia colleges, William and Mary seemed like the best candidate for a potential relationship.
and is bringing along another friend (of the gender to which you are attracted). Your roommate has seen this friend, and tells you that the friend is single and very attractive. You are interested, and so you ask your roommate for more details about the person. How much would each of the following things affect your desire to go out with that person?

Following the vignette, participants were presented with 15 pieces of information (prompts) about the stranger. Each of the 15 prompts addressed one of six social issues, three of which were demographic issues (race, religion, and SES) and three of which were moral issues (attitudes about abortion, attitudes about gay rights, and political orientation). Specifically, the prompts presented the stranger in turn as being pro-choice; pro-life; from a wealthy, upper-class family; from a working-class, blue-collar family; a strong critic of gay rights; a strong supporter of gay rights; African American; White; Chinese American; Baptist; Jewish; Muslim; atheist; a liberal Democrat; and a conservative Republican.

After each prompt, the participant was asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale how each piece of information, taken separately, would affect the participant’s desire to interact with the stranger. The scale ranged from 1 (Would make me very reluctant to work with/date this person) to 4 (Would make no difference) to 7 (Would make me very enthusiastic about working with/dating this person). Finally, participants were asked to identify their own race, ethnicity, religion, political orientation, and stance on abortion and gay rights.

Procedure. The questionnaire was distributed at the beginning of a lecture and was completed and collected within 8 min. At the top of the questionnaire, participants wrote their private, in-class identification numbers, a regular feature of the course, which allowed responses from the present questionnaire to be related to responses from other questionnaires done in class, including the Social Desirability scale (Marlowe & Crowne, 1960).

Results

Overall means. Table 5 shows the means of the desires for interaction, in the two intimacy settings, for all 15 prompts. The reference point for interpreting these numbers is 4, meaning that the prompt makes no difference. Numbers below 4 indicate that, on average, the prompt made participants less interested in interaction. These means are not in themselves very revealing, for they do not take into account whether the participant matched the prompt (e.g., a pro-choice participant wanting to work with a pro-choice stranger) or was different from the prompt (e.g., a pro-life participant wanting to work with a pro-choice stranger). However, the standard deviations, shown in parentheses, are important, for they are direct indicators of how much each prompt mattered. The modal response in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desires for Interaction: Experiment 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic feature</th>
<th>Lecture</th>
<th>Vignette</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>3.95</td>
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<td>3.19</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.14</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<td>Average of all moral features</td>
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<td>0.51</td>
<td>3.81</td>
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Note. Means are rated on a 7-point scale where 1 = very reluctant, 4 = no difference, and 7 = very enthusiastic. For univariate F tests, n = 248, df = 1, 246.

***p < .001.

every case was 4, so a low standard deviation indicates that most participants said the feature “would make no difference,” while a high standard deviation indicates that a larger number of participants thought that the feature mattered, in one direction or the other.

Table 5 shows that the standard deviations were larger in the dating context than in the lecture context for all 15 prompts, and when averaged together, the
difference between contexts was significant, $F_{\text{max}}(2, 123) = 6.25, p < .05$. Merging together the two contexts, standard deviations were larger for the moral features averaged together, than for the demographic features averaged together, $F_{\text{max}}(2, 247) = 1.87, p < .05$. These findings indicate that moral diversity matters more than does demographic diversity (Hypothesis 1), and that diversity matters more in the dating context than in the academic context (Hypothesis 2), although these findings do not indicate whether diversity matters in a desirable or an undesirable way.

Because the main theoretical question is about desires for interaction with people who are different from oneself, we gave each participant diversity points for wanting to interact with those who were different from themselves, on each of the six sets of prompts (race, religion, SES, abortion, gay rights, and political orientation). For example, if a White participant said that finding out that a potential partner was Chinese would make her much more likely (a rating of 7) to want to date the person, then the participant earned 3 diversity points (7 minus the midpoint of the scale, 4). If a liberal participant said that finding out that a potential partner was politically conservative made him slightly less likely (a rating of 3) to want to work with the person, then the participant lost 1 diversity point (i.e., earned -1 points). Participants who fell in between the two categories on a binary feature (e.g., politically moderate on politics or middle-class on SES) were given points based on their ratings for both of the candidates who were different from themselves, but each set of points was divided by 2 so that the number of points one could earn for any set of prompts always ranged from -3 to +3. Similarly, for participants who did not fit into one of the three races or religions that were asked about, they were given points for each of the prompts, but the total number of points was divided by 3.9 The idea in all cases was to quantify the degree to which differences with the self made other people attractive or unattractive as interaction partners.

**Effect of domain and diversity type on desires for interaction.** Figure 3 shows how each of the six sets of prompts affected the diversity points awarded, across the two domains. Two implications of Figure 3 are immediately visible. First, five of the six lines show a downward slope, indicating that participants were less willing to date a person who differed from themselves than they were to collaborate with such a person on a class project. The only exception to this rule was for

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8Participants were asked earlier in the semester to estimate their family’s annual income, averaged over their childhood. The bottom two choices (less than $20,000 and $20,000 to 40,000) were considered low SES; the top two choices ($100,000 to 200,000 and $200,000 or more) were considered high SES, and the two categories in between were considered middle class.

9Because atheism involves the rejection of God and because it is more likely to be self-chosen than is membership in other religions, atheism can be considered a moral position as well as a demographic issue. Desires for interaction with an atheist, therefore, were not included along with desires for interaction with the Baptist, Jew, and Muslim when calculating desires for religious diversity.

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Figure 3. Mean diversity points awarded for six issues, across two domains. Numbers below 0 indicate that partners different from the self were less attractive (Experiment 3). SES. Participants said that SES was irrelevant in the lecture domain, but showed a positive preference for dating a person from a wealthy family. The wealthy dating partner was, in fact, the most attractive of all 15 potential dating partners in Table 5, particularly for women ($M = 4.84$ vs. $4.40$ for men), $t(120) = 2.41, p < .05$. Women at all levels of social class showed a preference for dating a person from a wealthy family, while among men the preference only emerged in the upper half of the SES distribution. There was no significant gender difference in desire to date a person from a blue-collar family.

A one-way MANOVA on the diversity points awarded for each of the six issues, using domain as a between-subjects variable, showed a significant effect of domain for all three of the demographic issues: race, $F(1, 208) = 58.13, p < .001$; religion, $F(1, 208) = 54.56, p < .001$; and SES, $F(1, 208) = 9.01, p < .01$. There were significant effects of domain on two of the moral issues: abortion, $F(1, 208) = 5.12, p < .05$; and gay rights, $F(1, 208) = 7.50, p < .01$. The effect of domain on politics was marginally significant, $F(1, 208) = 2.70, p = .10$.

The second immediately visible implication of Figure 3 is that the three lines for demographic issues all begin approximately at 0 for the lecture condition, while the three lines for the moral issues begin in negative territory. In other words, participants said that demographic differences had no effect on their desire for interaction in the lecture domain, but moral differences appear to matter. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, diversity points were averaged together for the three issues within each diversity type. A $2 \times 2$ repeated-measures ANOVA,
using domain as a between-subjects variable and diversity type as a within-subjects variable, found significant main effects of domain, $F(1, 246) = 59.03$, $p < .001$; and of diversity type, $F(1, 246) = 81.21$, $p < .001$. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported, therefore. The interaction of domain and diversity type was not significant, $F(1, 246) = 0.44$, ns.

It should be noted, however, that SES showed a different pattern from all other issues, since participants showed a positive preference for dating a rich person. SES, therefore, might be functioning more as a self-interest issue than as a diversity issue. If SES is removed from the analysis, leaving demographic diversity composed only of the average of race and religion, then the same $2 \times 2$ repeated-measures ANOVA yielded, as before, significant effects of domain, $F(1, 246) = 91.08$, $p < .001$; and of diversity type, $F(1, 246) = 33.01$, $p < .001$. But now the interaction of domain and diversity type becomes significant, $F(1, 246) = 10.09$, $p < .01$, since the effect of diversity type was bigger in the lecture condition.

Demographic differences in desires for interaction. The analyses in the previous section assessed desires for interaction with diverse others for the participant pool as a whole. However, it would be reasonable to suppose that members of majority versus minority groups might have different attitudes about interacting with people who differ from themselves. To determine whether demographic groups have different profiles of desires for interaction, separate analyses were performed for men and women; and for White, Black, and Asian participants.

A $2 \times 2 \times 2$ repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with gender and domain as between-participants variables, diversity type as a within-participants variable, and diversity points as the dependent variable. There was no main effect of gender, but there were marginally significant interactions of gender with diversity type, $F(1, 241) = 3.31$, $p = .07$ (women made a bigger distinction between diversity types); and with domain, $F(1, 241) = 2.99$, $p < .09$ (women showed a bigger difference between the lecture and dating domains). There was also a significant three-way interaction between gender, domain, and diversity type, $F(1, 241) = 8.71$, $p < .01$ (women were particularly reluctant to date morally different others).

A similar analysis was conducted for race ($3 \times 2 \times 2$, because race had 3 categories: White, Black, and Asian). There was no main effect of race, nor did race interact with diversity type or domain.

It appears, then, that generalizations can be made across demographic groups. Men, women, Whites, Blacks, and Asians all showed the same general profile of desires for interaction with diverse others: All were content to interact with demographically diverse others in the lecture scenario (mean diversity point scores near 0), but all groups were more reluctant to interact with morally diverse others than with demographically diverse others, and all groups were more reluctant to interact with diverse others on a date than in a lecture class (except for the complicated issue of "dating up" in social class). It is also important to note that the overall diversity point scores for all groups were negative. That is, all groups showed some degree of reluctance to interact with those who are different from themselves.

Political differences in desires for interaction. To determine whether liberals and conservatives differed in their desires for interaction, a similar $3 \times 2 \times 2$ repeated-measures ANOVA was performed, with politics (conservative, neutral/undecided, or liberal) and domain as between-subjects factors and diversity type as a within-subjects factor. There was no main effect of politics; however, there was an interaction of politics and diversity type, $F(2, 240) = 10.73$, $p < .001$. This interaction is graphed in Figure 4. Post hoc tests reveal that, for demographic diversity, conservatives wanted less than did liberals ($p < .001$), while neutrals fell in between and did not differ significantly from either group. For moral diversity, however, liberals wanted the least and were significantly lower than neutrals ($p < .01$). Conservatives fell in between and did not differ significantly from either group.

Discussion

The results of Experiment 3 confirm and extend the results of the previous two studies. Even when the word diversity was not used and people were asked
to think only about dyadic interactions, moral differences reduced desire for interaction more than did demographic differences. When thinking about potential partners for dyadic interactions, people did not particularly want to interact with those who are different from themselves. Demographic differences (race, religion, and social class) did not seem to matter either way when participants thought about a potential study partner, but there was a general reluctance, by both liberals and conservatives, to study with a partner who holds diametrically opposed views on political/moral issues, such as abortion and gay rights. In the more intimate domain of a potential dating partner, all differences came to cause even more reluctance or dislike, with the interesting exception that dating upward in social class was generally acceptable or even desirable.

**General Discussion**

In three experiments, moral diversity reduced desires for interaction more than did demographic diversity (Hypothesis 1). In Experiments 1 and 2, participants said they preferred that their university and especially their seminar classes be demographically diverse, while they were less enthusiastic about moral diversity. In fraternity admissions, fraternity brothers were happy to admit people who were demographically different from themselves, although they avoided candidates who had strong moral or political values that differed either from the group as a whole, or from themselves as individuals. In Experiment 3, participants said that demographic differences were not relevant when choosing a study partner, but political/moral differences generally made a candidate less attractive.

The three experiments also showed that diversity matters differently across domains (Hypothesis 2). The inverted U-shaped curves in Figures 1 and 2 indicate that participants saw a special value in diversity in educational contexts. We had predicted that desires for diversity would exhibit the not in my back yard (NIMBY) phenomenon (i.e., “Diversity is good, just not in my back yard”), but we appear to have been wrong. People might not want to room with (Experiments 1 and 2) or date (Experiment 3) people who are very different from themselves, but participants in Experiments 1 and 2 seemed to be saying that exposure to differences in the controlled and safe setting of a classroom was desirable. Even fraternity brothers, who wanted little diversity in sexual orientation at the university ($M = 2.53$ on a 0 to 9 scale) and who wanted none in a roommate ($M = 0.84$), reported wanting to be exposed to gay people in a seminar class ($M = 3.97$). These findings support the claims of Bowen and Bok (1998), and of diversity advocates in general, that diversity contributes to the undergraduate educational experience.

10It is, of course, possible that a seminar class is not considered one’s back yard. It might be a middle distance at which diversity is interesting without being threatening.

Taken together, however, these converging findings indicate that discussions of whether diversity is good or bad might be misleading. There are different kinds of diversity, and diversity is valued differently in different domains. Debates about multiculturalism, affirmative action, and other public policy issues might be improved by explicitly noting the diversity of diversities.

**Limitations of the Present Research**

The present research has demonstrated that college students at UVA want to be exposed to more demographic diversity than moral diversity. This finding should be replicated at other colleges before it can be generalized to American college students more broadly. It would also be of interest to know whether workplaces and professional communities show similar effects. Redding (2001) reviewed evidence showing that research psychologists dislike and discourage political diversity within their ranks, even to the point of discriminating against political conservatives. Since psychology as a field celebrates and encourages ethnic diversity (Fowers & Richardson, 1996), psychologists seem likely to show the moral–demographic split even more acutely than did the college students in the present study.

The present study has also not established that moral diversity is bad. Even if students do not want to interact with morally diverse others, one could still argue that such interactions would be good for them. However, given the theoretical and empirical arguments presented earlier about the ease with which people can be divided and turned against each other, the present findings support the fear that moral differences might be more socially divisive than ethnic differences. There might be benefits from exposing people to moral diversity that they do not want; but it is important for educators, bosses, and university administrators to recognize that policies that promote moral diversity might have some unintended bad consequences.

The present study has a number of methodological limitations. Most importantly, all three experiments involved self-reports about hypothetical interactions. Since some of the interactions involved politically sensitive subjects such as race, there is reason to worry that participants were influenced by political correctness or by self-presentational concerns. However, since 58% of the White students in Experiment 3 reported that finding out that a potential date was Black would make them more reluctant to go out on the date, it appears that self-presentational concerns were not overwhelming. Furthermore, participants’ responses on the Social Desirability scale (Marlowe & Crowne, 1960; filled out several weeks earlier, and matched by an in-class code number) showed little or no correlation with either the moral or the demographic diversity points awarded in Experiment 3. Therefore, we have no reason to suppose that people were dishonest in their answers to our questions. It remains to be seen, however, whether their consciously reportable
attitudes would drive their behavior in an actual interaction, for it is widely found that people have ambivalent, unconscious, or dual attitudes about race (Devine, 1989; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).

Implications for Social Policy Issues

The present findings have a number of implications for current debates over multiculturalism, diversity, bilingual education, affirmative action, and immigration policy. In each of these debates, liberals push for the laudable goals of helping poor, marginalized, or oppressed people or groups with policies that are intended to increase the ethnic and racial diversity of schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, and even of the nation. Conservatives are often accused of racism for their opposition to such policies, but it is worth considering the possibility that conservatives are alarmed not by ethnic and racial diversity per se, but by the moral relativism of multiculturalism and by the moral diversity caused by immigration without assimilation. Conservatives are more likely than are liberals to believe in absolute truth and to value shared traditions (Hunter, 1991). And conservatives might well be correct that some sense of shared identity, values, and purpose is essential for the health of a multietnic democracy. As Shafranske and Malony (1996) said, “Belief in a common vision of reality, or rather a shared, social construction of reality, may be a far more potent social glue than the color of one’s skin, cultural heritage, or gender” (p. 564). If this is true, then it might be possible to balance out increases in demographic diversity with decreases in moral diversity. For example, a university-wide or company-wide celebration of ethnic diversity could be balanced by an effort to build group pride or to highlight shared values. A high rate of immigration into the United States could be balanced by a greater effort to teach civics and American history to all children. Such a balanced approach would be akin to trying to raise levels of high-density lipoprotein (HDL; “good” cholesterol) while lowering levels of low-density lipoprotein (LDL; “bad” cholesterol). Such an approach might even lower the blood pressure and heart-attack risk of the perpetually angry soldiers of the culture wars. Recognizing the difference between moral and demographic diversity might be an important first step.

References


Age and Work-Related Outcomes: The Moderating Effects of Status Characteristics

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This study examines the extent to which 2 status characteristics—pay level and part-time vs. full-time employment—influence the effectiveness of age as a predictor of work-related attitudes and behaviors. Using a sample of 157 registered nurses, hierarchical regression was used to determine whether pay level or employment classification (part-time vs. full-time) moderated the relationship between chronological age and the following outcomes associated with the process of voluntary turnover: job satisfaction, organizational commitment, withdrawal cognitions, perceived alternatives, search behavior, and actual turnover behavior. Findings indicate that the effects of age on work attitudes and behaviors are moderated to some extent by both status characteristics. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

As the population ages, it is increasingly important to understand the effects of chronological age on employee attitudes and behaviors. By 2005, the youngest of the baby boomers will be turning 40, and nearly 40% of the population of the United States will be 45 years or older (Fullerton, 1993). Furthermore, the aging baby boomers are healthier and better educated than were previous cohorts, but are less prepared financially for retirement, suggesting that they will continue to participate actively in the workforce as they age (Besl & Kale, 1996; Hansson, DeKoeckkoek, Neece, & Patterson, 1997). The absolute number of older adults in the workforce is expected to increase, even as labor force participation rates level off, because the population of older adults is increasing. Given these trends, it is not surprising that managers and researchers alike are interested in how age impacts the careers, work life, and overall effectiveness of employees (Warr, 1994).

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