I believe that there is an irreducible eugenic element in our moral thinking, although the word "eugenic" and its cognates now have a negative connotation, and some other terminology might be more appropriate. This element cannot be brought under broader concepts of harm and care, and is not well-explained by implausible "total view" theories of utilitarianism. There is a tendency to want the most healthy children possible - and to make favourable/adverse moral judgment when this appears shared/not shared by other parents. The conjecture that our moral thinking contains an irreducible eugenic element is the simplest solution to many of the thought experiments that involve Derek Parfit's non-existence problem. For example, we make moral judgments in cases where no one has been harmed or helped (in the sense that no one has been made worse or better off than they otherwise would have been, but for some action). A simple example is the widespread moral intuition that it is wrong, in the context of IVF, to choose an embryo with the genetic potential for deafness. It is incoherent to say that the resulting person has been harmed. As long as a child has come into existence less healthy, or more healthy, than a different child who might have come into existence, that is enough for moral judgments to be made. It is contrived, and untrue to human psychology, to attempt to bring this under more general ideas of harm and care. As a further conjecture, this eugenic element may belong under a more general idea of nurturance that is specific to children, but it does not belong under a broad heading of care for others.

I'm not well-placed at the moment to carry out empirical research to test this, but perhaps someone else could take up the challenge I'm making.

Russell Blackford
School of Philosophy and Bioethics
Monash University