Examining the Bonding Effects of Party: A Comparative Analysis of Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. and Confederate Houses

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This paper examines whether political parties influence Congressional roll-call voting. Rather than focusing on contemporary evidence, my approach is historical: analyzing voting behavior in the U.S. and Confederate Houses during the Civil War. The U.S. and Confederate cases provide a unique opportunity for a comparative analysis because the two legislative systems were nearly identical in all facets, except that a strong two-party system was in place in the U.S. while a party system did not exist in the Confederacy. Thus, using vote-scaling techniques developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991, 1997), I examine how roll-call voting in a party system (the U.S. House) differs from roll-call voting in a similar nonparty system (the Confederate House). My results indicate that voting in the U.S. House was considerably more predictable than voting in the Confederate House. Moreover, from additional tests, I conclude that these voting differences were due not to differences in the structure of preferences, but rather to the existence (or nonexistence) of political parties. In the U.S. House, party had a significant, independent effect on vote choice, after controlling for members’ personal preferences. No such effect existed in the party-less Confederate House.

1. Introduction

Recent research by Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991, 1997) has shown that Congressional roll-call voting has been highly predictable across much of American history. With rare exceptions, a simple spatial voting model explains nearly 85 percent of individual vote choices. This high degree of spatial accuracy results from the high degree of ideological stability that members of Congress exhibit across issue areas. That is, a member’s stance on one or two issues provides a strong indicator of his positions on a host of other issues.

Why are members of Congress so ideologically stable? Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 35) contend that political parties induce stability by struc-

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1998 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston. I am deeply indebted to Keith Poole for all of his help and encouragement during the writing of this paper. I also thank Lee Alston, Sarah Binder, Joe Cooper, Doug Dion, Brian Gaines, Tim Groseclose, Michael Herron, Keith Krehbiel, Jim Kuklinski, Peter Nardulli, Tim Nord, Dave Rohde, Howard Rosenthal, Brian Sala, and seminar participants at Caltech, Carnegie Mellon University, Harvard University, Michigan State University, Ohio State University, Stanford University, SUNY-Stony Brook, UCLA, University of Houston, University of Illinois, University of Wisconsin, and Yale University for their very helpful thoughts and suggestions. Finally, Chuck Finocchiaro provided excellent research assistance throughout the length of this project.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 4, October 1999, Pp. 1144–1165 ©1999 by the Midwest Political Science Association
turing the legislative agenda to bond party members together: “political parties, either through the discipline of powerful leaders or through successful trades, function as effective logrollers . . . to map complex issues (to bundle diverse economic interests) into a low-dimensional space.” They find that a simple spatial model fails to explain Congressional roll-call voting during only two periods in American history—the Era of Good Feelings (1816–1824) and the early 1850s—which coincide with the respective collapses of the First and Second American Party systems.

Despite Poole and Rosenthal’s conjecture and recent theoretical work by Rohde (1991, 1994), Cox and McCubbins (1993, 1994), and Aldrich (1995), this view of parties as “bonding mechanisms” is not accepted by all. Krehbiel (1991, 1993) has noted that members’ preferences are highly correlated with their party affiliations, and argued that “preferenceship” rather than partisanship is responsible for the high degree of structure in Congressional vote choice. Thus, the extent to which party influences roll-call voting, independently of members’ preferences, is an open question and has been the focus of an intensive debate in recent years (see Aldrich and Rohde 1998; Krehbiel 1998a, 1998b, 1999; Snyder and Groseclose 1997; Hager and Talbert 2000; Sinclair 1998; Herron 2000; Nokken 2000).¹

This paper extends the debate, incorporating new roll-call data and a comparative theoretical approach. Specifically, I examine a part of American legislative history ignored by Poole and Rosenthal: voting in the Congress of the Confederate States of America. Examining Confederate roll calls provides a unique way to study the bonding effects of party comparatively, because the Confederate Congress was nearly identical to the U.S. Congress in all facets, except that a strong two-party system flourished in the U.S. Congress while a party system did not exist in the Confederacy. Thus, a natural experiment in comparative statics emerges: by comparing vote-based scalings of the U.S. and Confederate Houses during the same period, I can examine how roll-call voting in a party system differs from roll-call voting in a similar non-party system. If parties truly act as bonding mechanisms to structure members’ vote choices, as partisan theorists contend, then the U.S. House should exhibit a higher degree of spatial stability than the Confederate House. Moreover, separate vote-based scalings should be able to attribute this difference directly and independently to party.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the party-bonding thesis, as well as a theoretical critique. Section 3 discusses the composition of the Confederate Congress in more detail, drawing comparisons and contrasts to the U.S. Congress. Sections 4

¹This partisanship-preferenceship debate has extended beyond the literature on Congressional voting and into more general studies of Congressional organization. For a summary, see Krehbiel (1999).
and 5 investigate the question of partisan bonding by examining roll-call voting in the U.S. and Confederate Houses using vote-scaling and other techniques. Section 6 concludes.

2. Partisanship, Preferenceship, and the Structure of Roll-Call Voting

To argue that parties play an important role in affecting roll-call voting outcomes, one must establish first that parties “matter” to office-seeking politicians. Partisan theorists contend that parties matter because ambitious office seekers view party membership as a valuable electoral asset (Schlesinger 1966; Arnold 1990). That is, party membership is a public good: it is an ideological label, reputation, or “brand name” that all party members can use to communicate with their constituents (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 109–112; Aldrich 1995, 48–50). In short, because voters are uncertain about candidates’ issue positions and are unwilling to incur the costs of becoming informed, they require informational “shortcuts” in order to participate (Downs 1957, 96–100). Party labels provide such a shortcut, communicating “a verbal image of the good society and the chief means for constructing such a society” to voters that they can easily understand, retain, and act upon (Downs 1957, 96; see also Aldrich 1995, 289–290). Without the benefit of party labels, office seekers would have to expend a great deal of time and resources to disseminate their positions to voters—a costly and inefficient process. Therefore, office seekers have a direct electoral interest to affiliate with parties.

While party members welcome the public-good benefits associated with party affiliation, they also have incentives to “free ride” by establishing policy positions that are contrary to their party label when it is in their individual electoral interests to do so. As in all collective-action scenarios, however, too much individual defection will reduce the provision of the public good: if party members become too individualistic, voters will no longer view party labels as reliable heuristics to evaluate candidates for office (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 40).

To solve this collective-action problem, party members create a party leadership, whose purpose is to preserve and foster the party’s reputation (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 132–133). Party leaders ensure that the party label remains a credible signal to voters by constructing an internal organization around the distribution of private electoral benefits (Aldrich 1995, 278). Specifically, party leaders make committee assignments and set the legislative agenda, powers that can be used to help determine policy outcomes and, therefore, affect members’ electoral fates. In exchange for parceling out favorable committee assignments and positions on the party calendar, party leaders hold members to support the party agenda, groups of issues impor-
tant to different sets of party members (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 156–157, 249–251; Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 35). Policy “logrolls” are thereby created, which provide all party members with a consistent stream of benefits over time and, in doing so, strengthen the party’s collective reputation. To prevent defection, party leaders build enforcement mechanisms into the organizational structure. If a member fails to support the party’s agenda, especially during key votes, he may not receive a preferred committee assignment (or may have his assignment taken away) and may not have his pet projects considered on the floor (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 44; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 258). Such events would reduce a member’s ability to provide for his constituents, thereby reducing his probability of being re-elected.3

While a partisan model seems reasonable on its face, Krehbiel (1991, 1993, 1998a, 1998b) contends that verifying party’s independent influence on Congressional voting behavior is more difficult than it appears. He points to the high correlation between members’ party affiliation and their own personal (or constituency) preferences and asks:

In casting apparently partisan votes, do individual legislators vote with fellow party members in spite of their disagreement about the policy in question, or do they vote with fellow party members because of their agreement about the policy in question? In the former case, parties as groups are significant in a potentially policy-relevant way. That is, their partisan behaviour may well result in a collective choice that differs from that which would occur in the absence of partisan behaviour. In the latter case, however, parties as groups are surely less policy-relevant in terms of the difference they make relative to a nonpartisan baseline. Thus, the apparent explanatory power of the variable, party, may be attributed solely to its being a good measure of preferences. (Krehbiel 1993, 238)

Krehbiel maintains that an observational equivalence problem exists: the same policy outcomes could be produced by members either voting their own preferences or voting in response to party pressure. Going further, he argues that a preferenceship story is as believable as a partisanship story and

2 While not an advocate of the partisan model, Krehbiel (1998a, 197) summarizes its logic nicely: “parties . . . use institutional prerogatives to bring about coordinated action in lawmaking. Coordinated collective action in lawmaking results in majority-party-favored laws that help to maintain a brand name. The brand image resonates with the electorate. The electorate responds to the party’s brand image by voting to keep the party’s candidates in the majority. And the cycle repeats itself.”

3 This is one variant of the strong-parties thesis. In addition to parties being important for electoral and collective action considerations, Aldrich (1995), for example, contends that parties promote the achievement of collective choices that party members prefer.
constructs a theory of legislative organization on pure preference grounds, with vote choice determined on a strictly majoritarian basis (Krehbiel 1991, 1998b). From his theory, Krehbiel is able to generate predictions that comport well with observed legislative outcomes, casting doubt on the validity of partisan theorists' claims.

While this partisanship-preferenceship dilemma seems intractable, Krehbiel himself suggests a solution: "At the most basic level, if parties are empirically significant, then politics should be significantly different with parties from what it is without them . . . a partisan legislature's . . . final policy choices should be different [from a nonpartisan one]. . . . Otherwise, the significance of parties would be difficult or impossible to corroborate or falsify" (1993, 240). In effect, Krehbiel is calling for a "natural experiment" to resolve the dilemma: if two nearly identical legislative systems can be found, one with party and one without, then the partisanship-preferenceship issue can be tested directly. Following Krehbiel's research design, I identify such a case in American history: the U.S. and Confederate Congresses during the American Civil War. After the Southern states seceded from the Union in 1860–61, they established an independent American nation and governmental structure based on the U.S. model. In fact, the U.S. and Confederate Congresses were nearly identical in all institutional respects, except that a strong party system was in place in the U.S. Congress, while a party system did not exist in the Confederate Congress. Thus, the Civil War Congresses provide the basis for a natural, comparative-statics experiment to examine whether party affects roll-call voting ceteris paribus, using the U.S. Congress as the test group and the Confederate Congress as the control group.

In the next section, I discuss the institutional origins and design of the Confederate Congress in more detail and examine its similarities to (and one major difference from) the U.S. Congress. Then, in the following two sections, I apply scaling techniques to analyze roll-call voting in the two legislatures, in an effort to untangle the partisanship-preferenceship dilemma.

3. THE ORIGINS AND DESIGN OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS

After the election of Republican Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency in November 1860, the seventy-year American union of free and slave states disintegrated. South Carolina was the first state to secede in December 1860, followed by Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana in January 1861, and Texas in February 1861 (Wooster 1962, 11–101; Thomas 1979, 38–56). On February 3, 1861, representatives from these states convened in Montgomery, Alabama, to create the Confederate States of America.4 Within five days, a temporary governmental structure and provi-

4The Texas delegation did not arrive in Montgomery until mid-February and, thus, did not participate in the construction of the Provisional Constitution (Thomas 1979, 56).
sional constitution were adopted (Lee 1963, 60–72). With the completion of these immediate tasks, the Montgomery Convention became the Provisional Congress, a unicameral body whose primary task was to construct a permanent Constitution and governmental structure (Thomas 1979, 58–66).

3.1 Structure, Organization, and Membership of the Confederate Congress

After receiving a preliminary draft from the constitution committee and debating for several weeks, the Provisional Congress unanimously adopted a Permanent Constitution on March 12, 1861. The Permanent Constitution closely resembled the U.S. Constitution, apart from specific slavery and states’ rights protections and the inclusion of several institutional innovations. This is not surprising, given that the Confederate leaders saw themselves as the true heirs of the Founding Fathers and their (presumed) conception of limited government (Lee 1962, 62, 149; McKitrick 1967, 117; Thomas 1979, 37).

With regard to the structure of Congressional institutions, the Permanent Confederate Constitution maintained the integrity of the U.S. Constitution. Section 2 of Article I established a House of Representatives, composed of members elected directly by district-level contingents for two-year terms, with state-level representation based on population. Section 3 of Article I established a Senate, composed of members elected every six years by state-level legislatures, with each state receiving the same level of representation (two members).

Confederate leaders once again used the U.S. Congress as a blueprint to design the internal organization of their Congress. First, they created a standing committee system in each chamber to conduct legislative business. Moreover, fourteen of fifteen Confederate House committees, twelve of thirteen Confederate Senate committees, and three Joint committees were carried over from the U.S. Congress. Second, they derived most of their legislative rules of procedure directly from the rules of the U.S. Congress.

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3Four additional states seceded and joined the Confederacy after the attack on Fort Sumter: Virginia in April 1861 and Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee in May 1861. Two states, Missouri and Kentucky, never officially seceded, but did elect rump governments that were recognized by the Confederate government (Thomas 1979, 93–95).

6The major institutional changes included a line-item veto and greater appropriations powers for the president, floor-level representation for Cabinet members, a single six-year term for the president, and provisions prohibiting protective tariffs and federal funding for internal improvements.

7As DeRosa (1991, 17) states, “the Confederate framers contended that they were seceding on behalf of the U.S. Constitution, not against it.”

Written by Vice President Alexander H. Stephens over the course of one evening, the Confederate rules deviated from U.S. rules in only one major respect: procedures for cutting off legislative debate were somewhat weaker in the Confederate system (Yearns 1960, 34–35; Dion 1997, 102). Otherwise, just as in the United States, the Speaker of the Confederate House and the President of the Confederate Senate presided over legislative proceedings in their respective chambers, and all important rules of procedure for each chamber, such as rules governing the order of precedence for motions, division of the question under debate, and the regular order of chamber business, were copied directly from U.S. House and Senate rules.9

The Confederate Congress was also rich in members who possessed U.S. Congressional experience. Forty-five of the 106 House seats (42 percent) and thirteen of the twenty-six Senate seats (50 percent) in the 1st Confederate Congress were held by individuals who had served previously in the U.S. Congress (Martis 1994, 66). Further, the Confederate leadership had served considerable time in the U.S. Congress: Stephens, the President of the Senate, had served seven terms in the U.S. House from Georgia, while Thomas S. Bocock, the Speaker of the House, had served eight terms in the U.S. House from Virginia. Three former Speakers of the U.S. House also served in the Confederate Congress: Howell Cobb of Georgia, Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia, and James L. Orr of South Carolina (Warner and Yearns 1975). Consequently, legislative inexperience was not a problem that afflicted Confederate Congressional proceedings.

In terms of constitutional structure, internal organization, and legislative experience, then, the Confederate Congress was quite similar to its U.S. counterpart. Indeed, as Nichols (1963, 221) contends: “It can be safely guessed that a visitor at Richmond, familiar with Washington, might have thought himself present at sessions of a federal Congress.”

3.2 Partisanship in the Confederate Congresses

While the U.S. and Confederate Congresses appeared to be mirror images in most respects, there was one major difference between the two legislatures: party structure. That is, a strong two-party system prevailed in the United States, while a distinct party system was lacking in the Confederacy. I briefly note the causes of this difference, before focusing on the consequences (as they relate to roll-call voting) in the following sections.

In the United States, party politics remained vibrant throughout the war, as the line of cleavage shifted from slavery to the broader issues of civil liberties and Federalism (Silbey 1977, 70–81). In their effort to manage the war,

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9A complete listing of Confederate House and Senate rules can be found in the Confederate Journal, vol. II, pp. 15–18 and vol. V, pp. 37–43, respectively.
Republican leaders attempted to centralize decision making, drawing power away from the states. In turn, as Baker (1979, 151) contends, “Democrats defined themselves [during the war] as an opposition party limiting centralized power,” challenging Republican efforts to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, extend emancipation, conscript citizens, eliminate slavery, and create a national currency (Baker 1979, 146–153; Richardson 1997, 90–101, 232–247). Thus, a distinct, ideological polarization existed in the United States during the war, producing an environment that allowed a vibrant two-party system to continue (Bensel 1990, 228–229).

In the Confederacy, a competitive party system never emerged (Potter 1960; McKitrick 1967; Alexander and Beringer 1972; Beringer 1972). This partisan void can be explained in part by contextual events in the decade prior to the Civil War. That is, during the 1850s, ideology was more important than party affiliation in the South, as Southern MCs formed a single-issue coalition on the issue of slavery (Potter 1976, 228–241). After secession, this coalition disintegrated, since slavery rights were guaranteed under the new Confederate Constitution. However, there was no partisan “reversion point” for members of the new Confederate government, as the old lines of partisan cleavage from the Democrat-Whig era were no longer active: protective tariffs and federal funding of internal improvements, issues that defined partisan conflict during the 1830s and 1840s, were constitutionally prohibited in the Confederate Constitutional Convention (DeRosa 1991, 91–95; Davis 1994, 245, 254–255). Thus, when the Confederate government began operating, a true basis for a party system was not present. Consequently, while the Confederacy would face some of the same questions regarding central state authority that the U.S. did—whether to suspend habeas corpus, whether to conscript its citizens, whether to impress property—a mechanism (the party system) was not in place to divide the membership, issue by issue, quickly and easily. Members would have to establish positions on each of these issues on the fly, with stable ideologies and party organizations requiring time to develop.

4. A COMPARISON OF SPATIAL STRUCTURE: U.S. AND CONFEDERATE HOUSES

Having compared the U.S. and Confederate Congresses in terms of institutional and partisan makeup, I now examine the structure of roll-call voting in each legislature. Using the W-NOMINATE vote-scaling procedure developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1997), I generate various spatial “fit” statistics to evaluate the degree of ideological stability in each legislature, which I then use for comparison across the two legislatures. This will allow me to examine whether roll-call voting in a party system (the U.S. Congress) differs from roll-call voting in a similar, nonparty system (the
Confederate Congress). For simplicity, I focus strictly on the U.S. and Confederate Houses and do not analyze the U.S. and Confederate Senates.

Before presenting the fit statistics, however, I address some preliminary issues regarding the scalings. In particular, I investigate whether the U.S. and Confederate results are indeed comparable, by examining the dimensionality of voting and the substantive content of the issue space within the two legislatures.

4.1 Dimensionality of Voting

Poole and Rosenthal (1991, 221) contend that across American history only “1.5” dimensions are necessary to explain all the behavior that can be accounted for by a simple spatial model. One dimension is usually sufficient, correctly predicting 83 percent of individual vote choices on average. While a second dimension adds significant leverage in some Congresses, it typically yields only 3 percent of additional explanatory power. Moreover, a higher dimensional spatial model never significantly improves upon a one- or two-dimensional model: voting is either low dimensional or “spatially chaotic” (in which voting is trivially explained by an $N$-dimensional model, where $N$ is equal to the number of members).

The 37th and 38th U.S. Houses—the Civil War Congresses—were largely one-dimensional: only 2.6 and 1.9 percent of added classification leverage accrues from adding a second dimension. Similarly, the 1st and 2nd Confederate Houses, which ran concurrently with the 37th and 38th U.S. Houses, were also largely one-dimensional: only 3.2 and 2.2 percent of classification leverage accrues from adding a second dimension. Moreover, in both legislatures, significant classification gains do not accrue from adding higher dimensions.

An examination of cutting-line angles on individual votes supports the unidimensional claim. A cutting-line separates the predicted “yea” and “nay” voters on a given roll call, and its angle identifies which ideological dimension is responsible for determining a given outcome. For example, angles of $90^\circ$ indicate a first-dimension vote, that is, members’ positions on the first dimension drive the voting outcome. Likewise, angles of $0^\circ$ or $180^\circ$ indicate second-dimension votes. Angles in the range between $0^\circ$ to $90^\circ$ and $90^\circ$ to $180^\circ$ suggest that both dimensions, to some extent, influence vote choice, with angles from $50^\circ$ to $130^\circ$ signifying that the first dimension is predominant. Most votes in both the U.S. and Confederate Houses were primarily one-dimensional. Over 81.8 and 63.4 percent of votes in the 1st and 2nd Confederate Houses and 74.5 and 79.4 percent of votes in the 37th and 38th U.S. Houses, respectively, fell between the $50^\circ$ and $130^\circ$ range. In addition, $90^\circ$ is modal in all four Houses.
4.2 The Substantive Content of the Issue Space

While a simple spatial model best accounts for roll-call voting in both the U.S. and Confederate Houses, the substantive content of the issue spaces in the two legislatures may have been different. To make system-level comparisons valid, the floor agendas in the two legislatures needed to have been sufficiently similar.

Based upon an examination of the substantive details of all roll-call votes cast during the war, I find that “central-state authority” was the primary dimension of political conflict in both the U.S. and Confederate Houses. That is, as both nations mobilized for war, both legislatures faced the same question: to what degree should governing authority be taken away from states and transferred to the central government? Representatives in both nations therefore had to determine what sort of balance to maintain between protecting civil liberties and allowing the central government discretion to run the war effort as it saw fit (Silbey 1977, 70–81; Bensel 1990, 135–146; Rable 1994, 113–114, 144–146). Contentious debates raged over the preferred degree of balance in both legislatures: 58.1 and 58.7 percent of all roll-call votes in the 1st and 2nd Confederate Houses and 62.2 and 60.7 percent of all roll-call votes in the 37th and 38th U.S. Houses, respectively, dealt with central-state authority questions. Moreover, in both the U.S. and Confederate Houses, the same five issues—conscription, habeas corpus, slavery, impressment, and war financing—constituted the bulk of all central-state votes.

An examination of vote types across the two legislatures also supports my similarity-of-issue-space claim. If the U.S. and Confederate Houses had different behavioral norms, for example, different proportions of final-passage, amendment, and procedural votes could have been generated, which could affect the “shape” of the issue spaces and make a comparative analysis problematic. In fact, these fears are unwarranted. The 1st Confederate House

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10To code U.S. House votes, I used a combination of Clausen, Peltzman, and Poole-Rosenthal issue codes, as well as my own substantive determination based on a reading of the Congressional Globe. For Confederate House votes, no issue codes were available; thus, I coded all votes myself based on a reading of the Confederate Journal. In total, there were 730 recorded roll calls in the 1st Confederate House, 440 in the 2nd Confederate House, 638 in the 37th U.S. House, and 600 in the 38th U.S. House.

11These differences in vote proportions across concurrent Houses were not significant, using a standard difference of proportions test ($p < .12$ and $p < .24$, respectively).

12In total, conscription, habeas corpus, slavery, impressment, and war financing made up 58.7 and 60.3 percent of all central-state votes in the 1st and 2nd Confederate Houses and 60.7 and 60.5 percent of all central-state votes in the 37th and 38th U.S. Houses.

13I constructed the vote-type data for both the U.S. and Confederate Houses through a reading of the Congressional Globe and the Confederate Journal.
and the 37th U.S. House were similar in their percentage of final-passage votes (20.8 and 22.3), amendment votes (28.4 and 25.1), and procedural votes (50.8 and 52.6), with none of the differences being significant (p < .52, p < .17, and p < .50, respectively). Likewise, the 2nd Confederate House and the 38th U.S. House were also similar in their percentage of final-passage votes (25.9 and 24.7), amendment votes (28 and 24.8), and procedural votes (46.1 and 50.5), with none of the differences being significant (p < .65, p < .26, and p < .16, respectively).

4.3 Scaling Results

Having shown that the dimensionality and content of voting in the U.S. and Confederate Houses are indeed comparable, I now examine the structure of roll-call voting in the two legislatures. As mentioned previously, I use the Poole-Rosenthal W-NOMINATE program to scale the entire set of roll calls in each House to generate individual ideal-point estimates for all members. I then generate three sets of fit statistics—vote classification percentages, aggregate proportional reductions in error, and geometric mean probabilities—using a simple spatial model with sincere, probabilistic voting and compare the results across the two legislatures to determine whether there are significant differences (that may or may not be attributed to party).14

Vote classification results are presented in Figure 1. In addition to presenting the War Congresses—the 37th and 38th U.S. Houses and the 1st and 2nd Confederate Houses—I also include the final two pre-secession U.S. Houses (the 35th and 36th) to serve as a baseline.

The results in Figure 1 indicate that the spatial model fits the U.S. Houses much better than the Confederate Houses. A one-dimensional spatial model applied to the 37th and 38th U.S. Houses correctly classifies 83.5 and 85.7 percent of individual vote choices, respectively, which compare favorably to (a) vote classifications from the 35th and 36th Houses of 81.1 and 84.7 percent and (b) an average vote classification of 83 percent across all of U.S. Congressional history. Roll-call voting in the U.S. House during the war, therefore, was highly predictable, typical both of the immediate pre-secession years and general historical trends. Predictability in the Confederate House, however, was considerably poorer, as a one-dimensional spatial model applied to the 1st and 2nd Confederate Houses correctly classifies only 68.1 and 73.3 percent of individual vote choices, respectively. Moreover, these U.S.-Confederate classification differences (15.4 percent and 12.4 percent) prove to be significant (p < .0001 in both cases).

Two additional methods for assessing spatial fit are used to serve as a validity check on the vote-classification results. First, I focus on the aggregate

14See Poole and Rosenthal (1997) for a more detailed description of the W-NOMINATE estimation technique.
proportional reduction in error (APRE), which indicates how classification results from a simple spatial model improve upon classification results from a naive benchmark, such as a model that predicts all members to vote identically. A higher APRE signifies a greater degree of improvement. The one-dimensional APREs of 0.521 and 0.631 for the 37th and 38th U.S. Houses are exceptional given that a one-dimensional spatial model, on average, produces

\[ \text{APRE} = \frac{\Sigma (\text{Naive Errors} - \text{Spatial Errors})}{\Sigma \text{Naive Errors}} \]
an APRE of 0.489 across U.S. Congressional history. The one-dimensional APREs for the 1st and 2nd Confederate Houses, however, are poor relative to both the U.S. House average and the 37th and 38th U.S. Houses: 0.105 and 0.275, respectively.

A final method for assessing spatial fit is the geometric mean probability (GMP), which evaluates spatial results based on the types of vote-classification errors that are produced. The GMP is distance-sensitive, imparting higher penalties to errors far from the cutting line and lower penalties to errors close to the cutting line. A higher GMP, therefore, results from votes breaking down consistently along spatial lines. Again, the one-dimensional GMPs of 0.708 and 0.740 for the 37th and 38th U.S. Houses are quite solid given that a one-dimensional spatial model, on average, produces a GMP of 0.682 across U.S. Congressional history. The one-dimensional GMPs for the 1st and 2nd Confederate Houses, on the other hand, are quite low: 0.555 and 0.6, respectively.

4.4 Analysis

Based on classification percentages, APREs, and GMPs, there was a significant difference in roll-call voting in the two-party U.S. House relative to the no-party Confederate House, as spatial fits for the U.S. House were considerably better than spatial fits for the Confederate House. Furthermore, the spatial fits for the two Confederate Houses were far worse than the U.S. House average over time.

Given that the U.S. and Confederate legislative systems were nearly identical except for party structure, these spatial fit differences could be due to the existence (or nonexistence) of party. On this note, I find that the Confederate results are comparable to spatial fit results from the two other periods of “partisan instability” in U.S. history: the Era of Good Feelings (14th–18th Houses) and the post-Whig, pre-Republican interim in the early 1850s (32nd House). While both of these periods were considered one-party rule, rather than no-party rule, the contexts were sufficiently similar—the lack of a viable minority party prevented the majority party from exercising strong leadership, resulting in a weak partisan agenda and factionalism in the chamber—to justify comparison to the Confederate case (see Potter 1976; Jenkins 1998).17

16For each roll call, the W-NOMINATE procedure generates vote-choice predictions for all MCs, which represent their likelihoods of voting for the respective “yea” and “nay” alternatives. The log-likelihood is the natural log of the likelihood. The geometric mean probability is the exponential (or anti-log) of the average log-likelihood: GMP = exp [log-likelihood of all observed choices/N], where N is the total number of choices.

17By 1816, the Federalist party had collapsed and the Democratic-Republicans ruled until the Presidential election of 1824. In the early 1850s, the Whig party disintegrated, and the Democrats took the reigns of power until the Republicans emerged in the middle of the decade.
Spatial fit results for the set of unstable partisan Houses are presented in Table 1. Each of these Houses fall squarely in the realm of "spatial chaos," well short of the U.S. House average in each of the spatial fit categories. Moreover, the Confederate Houses are quite poor when compared to some of the poorer-fitting U.S. Houses. The fit for 1st Confederate House, in particular, is atrocious and can be considered objectively as the worst fitting House in American history: its 68.1 percent correct vote classification, 0.105 APRE, and 0.555 GMP are worse than any of the U.S. House results.

5. Party Effects on Roll-Call Voting: A Further Examination

While the spatial fit results presented in the prior section are consistent with a "party-effects" story, my ability to draw definitive causal inferences from them is tenuous. To reiterate, Krehbiel (1993) has suggested that party affiliation and members’ personal preferences tend to be highly correlated, leading to "observational equivalence" in vote choice. Determining which element drives a given member’s voting decision is therefore problematic. While I find that voting in the U.S. House was considerably more predictable than voting in the Confederate House and that the state of political parties constituted the only structural difference between the two legislatures, an argument could be made that Confederate House members’ "chaotic" voting behavior resulted from their diffuse set of preferences across issue areas (relative to U.S. House members), rather than the absence of a party system to structure the agenda.

In this section, I attempt to address the "behavioral" aspect of the partisanship vs. preferenceship debate more directly in order to validate the
party-bonding argument. My approach takes two forms. First, I produce some very particular scalings to compare Northern House members to Southern House members both before and after secession. Second, I investigate the independent effects that party had on roll-call voting in the U.S. House, relative to the Confederate House, using a statistical technique developed by Snyder and Groseclose (1997).

5.1 Examining Stability with Sectional Scalings

To determine if the poor spatial fits from Confederate scalings were due to Southern House members possessing different preference structures rather than to the absence of parties, I examine vote choice in the U.S. House prior to secession. If the structure of Northern and Southern preferences was fundamentally different (on the same issues) during the war, then in all likelihood the structure of Northern and Southern preferences should have been different prior to the war as well. In spatial terms, the intraregional predictability of vote choice should have been similar before and after secession, ceteris paribus. To examine this, I divide the final two pre-secession U.S. Houses (the 35th and 36th) into Northern and Southern contingents and scale them separately. I then compare the Northern results to those from the 37th and 38th U.S. Houses and the Southern results to those from the 1st and 2nd Confederate Houses to examine the predictability of vote choice by region both before and after secession.

Results from the sectional scalings are presented in Figure 2.18 As the figure indicates, vote choices for both Northern and Southern House members were highly predictable prior to secession: a one-dimensional spatial model correctly classifies 82.1 and 85.1 percent of Southern votes and 83.4 and 86.2 percent of Northern votes in the 35th and 36th U.S. Houses, respectively. Both Northern and Southern House members, therefore, exhibited predictable voting patterns at a time when a two-party system was in place. After secession, as I have discussed, a different story emerged. In the North, members’ vote choices remained highly predictable: 83.5 and 85.7 percent correct classification from a one-dimensional model in the 37th and 38th U.S. Houses. In the South, however, members’ vote choices became much less predictable: 68.1 and 73.3 percent correct classification from a one-dimensional model in the 1st and 2nd Confederate Houses. Since the only meaningful difference between the pre- and post-secession periods involved a change in party structure, with the North maintaining a party system and

18I have coded the thirteen states that were represented in the Confederate Congress as “Southern” in the scalings of the 35th and 36th U.S. Houses. Two additional slave states—Delaware and Maryland—were not represented in the Confederacy; thus, for coding purposes I have labeled them “Northern” in the pre-secession scalings.
the South operating without a party system, these results lend support to Poole and Rosenthal's (1997, 6) contention that "parties are obviously an important constraining influence" on members' vote choices.

5.2 Assessing the Independent Effects of Party

To establish a more direct link between party and roll-call voting in the U.S. and Confederate Houses, I employ a simple procedure developed by Snyder and Groseclose (1997) to estimate the extent to which party, after
controlling for members’ preferences, affects vote choice. The procedure requires two separate sets of vote-based scales. First, using W-NOMINATE, I create a measure of members’ personal preferences by scaling only “lopsided” or “free” roll calls—those votes in which fewer than 35 percent or more than 65 percent of voting members vote yea. Snyder and Groseclose contend that on these votes party leaders recognize in advance what the outcome will be and therefore do not bribe or pressure members to vote in a given direction. Instead, members are allowed to vote as they wish. Second, I create a measure of “party-induced” preferences by scaling roll-call votes that are “close”—those roll calls in which 35 to 65 percent of voting members vote yea. Snyder and Groseclose assume that these votes are prime candidates for party pressure, given that the cost of swinging outcomes is relatively low. I then regress the close-vote scores (members’ party-induced preferences) on the free-vote scores (members’ personal preferences) and a dummy variable to account for party affiliation or, in the Confederate case, past party affiliation, whenever that can be determined. The dummy variable indicates whether party significantly affects vote choice, independently of members’ personal preferences, on those roll calls that are most susceptible to party pressure.

Thus, using the Snyder-Groseclose method I can test the partisanship-preferenceship question directly. As Krehbiel suggests: “significant party behaviour is behaviour that is consistent with known party policy objectives but that is independent of personal preferences” (1993, 240). If indeed party independently affects members’ vote choices and leads to greater stability of member preferences, then the party variable should be significant in the U.S. House regressions, but not significant in the Confederate House regressions (since parties did not exist in the Confederacy). Alternatively, if preferences completely drive members’ vote choice, with party playing no independent

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19Rather than using W-NOMINATE, Snyder and Groseclose apply a different scaling technique—the linear factor model—developed by Heckman and Snyder (1997). These scores are highly correlated with W-NOMINATE on the first and second dimensions.

20The 65 percent threshold is not theoretically driven. Rather, Snyder and Groseclose (1997, 8) contend that for most Congresses “such roll-calls are probably lopsided enough to safely assume that party pressures on voting were minimal.” In addition, a 65 percent threshold allows for some variance in the data, which is necessary to produce valid scalings. I adopt the 65 percent standard, except for the 37th U.S. House, in which I use a 75 percent standard because, in that House, Republicans outnumbered Democrats 114 to 52.

21Former party affiliations for Confederate House members were obtained from Alexander and Beringer (1972) and Martis (1994). A small number of Confederate MCs had not held political office at any level prior to serving in the Confederate Congress and therefore had no past party affiliations. These members were dropped from the analysis. In total, there were sixty-four former Democrats and thirty-four former Whigs (and 8 unknowns) in the 1st Confederate House and fifty former Democrats and forty former Whigs (and sixteen unknowns) in the 2nd Confederate House.
role, then I should not uncover significant partisan effects in either the U.S. or Confederate House regressions.

Regression results from the 35th–38th U.S. Houses and the 1st and 2nd Confederate Houses appear in Table 2. In each of the six Houses, members’ free-vote scores are significant (p < .001) predictors of their close-vote scores, indicating that members’ personal preferences correspond well to their party-induced preferences. The results from the party variable, however, differ between the U.S. and the Confederacy. In the U.S., both before and after secession, party provides significant (p < .001) explanatory power beyond that of members’ personal preferences. In the Confederacy, past partisanship is not a significant, independent predictor of vote choice. These results therefore support a partisanship story, rather than a pure preferenceship story.

I further investigate the existence of party effects by examining the subset of members from the 35th and 36th U.S. Houses who would later serve in the 1st Confederate House. If party mattered in the U.S. House, as I have argued, then these members should have been pressured as well. Otherwise, they may have been indicative of a different type of legislator who would populate the Confederate House: one who voted based on his

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*Note: White-corrected standard errors appear in parentheses below OLS coefficients.

*Dependent Variable:
Close-vote score = Members’ W-NOMINATE scores on “close” votes.

*Independent Variables:
Free-vote score = Members’ W-NOMINATE scores on “free” or lopsided votes.
Party = 1 if Democrat, 0 if Republican for the U.S.;
               = 1 if former-Democrat, 0 if former-Whig for Confederacy
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
own preferences only. In total, seventeen Democrats from both the 35th and 36th U.S. Houses would later serve in the 1st Confederate House, and I separate them from the rest of their Democratic colleagues (labeled Non-Conf Dem) with an additional dummy variable (labeled Conf Dem). Results from these new regressions appear in Table 3. In both the 35th and 36th U.S. Houses, I find that party was an independent and significant ($p < .001$) determinant of vote choice for both sets of Democrats, as those members who would later serve in the Confederate House were not immune to party pressure. These results provide additional support for the party-bonding thesis.

In summary, these free-vote/close-vote results are important for two reasons. First, they offer causal evidence that political parties act as bonding mechanisms to structure roll-call voting. In the U.S. House, party appears as a significant predictor of vote choice, after controlling for members’ personal preferences. In addition, predictability of vote choice is higher when party is a significant predictor (U.S. House versus Confederate House). Second, these results provide an answer to Krebsiel’s “observational equivalence” problem, since the two competing determinants of vote choice—members’ personal preferences and partisanship—can be measured separately. Results suggest

| Table 3. Investigating Party’s Effects on Future Confederates |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
|                                        | 35th House | 36th House |
| Free-Vote score                        | 0.590***   | 0.706***     |
|                                        | (0.051)    | (0.038)      |
| Conf Dem                               | 0.399***   | 0.221***     |
|                                        | (0.073)    | (0.065)      |
| Non-Conf Dem                           | 0.413***   | 0.149***     |
|                                        | (0.047)    | (0.039)      |
| Constant                               | -0.043     | -0.225***    |
|                                        | (0.035)    | (0.025)      |
| $R^2$                                  | 0.895      | 0.924        |
| $F$-statistic                          | 490.51     | 670.92       |
| $N$                                    | 222        | 199          |

*Note: White-corrected standard errors appear in parentheses below OLS coefficients.

Dependent Variable:
Close-vote score = Members’ W-NOMINATE scores on “close” votes.

Independent Variables:
Free-vote score = Members’ W-NOMINATE scores on “free” or lopsided votes.
Conf Dem = Democrat who served later in the Confederate House.
Non-Conf Dem = Democrat who did not serve in the Confederate House.

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
that when a two-party structure exists, both personal preferences and partisanship independently affect vote choice.

6. Conclusion

This paper examines whether political parties act as bonding mechanisms to produce stability in Congressional roll-call voting. Rather than focus on contemporary evidence, I take a historical approach: analyzing voting behavior in the U.S. and Confederate Houses during the Civil War. The U.S. and Confederate cases provide a good basis for a comparative analysis, because the two legislative systems were nearly identical in all regards, except one: party structure. While a strong two-party system was in place in the U.S. throughout the war, a party system did not exist in the Confederacy. These conditions are ideal for a natural experiment in comparative statics: by comparing W-NOMINATE scalings of the U.S. and Confederate Houses during the same period, I examine how roll-call voting in a party system differs from roll-call voting in a similar nonparty system.

Results from a simple spatial model are consistent with a party-bonding story: voting in the U.S. House was considerably more predictable than voting in the Confederate House. Moreover, using three different sets of spatial fit statistics, I found that the two Confederate Houses were comparable to the worst-fitting U.S. Houses in history (which coincided with the two periods of partisan instability in the U.S.).

I also present more causal evidence of party’s effect on Congressional roll-call voting. First, using separate regional scalings of the U.S. House prior to secession, I show that voting in both the North and South was highly predictable. This finding refutes suggestions that the structure of Southern preferences was fundamentally different from the structure of Northern preferences prior to the war, which led to U.S.-Confederate spatial differences during the war. Second, using a procedure developed by Snyder and Groseclose (1997) to address the “observational equivalence” issue raised by Krehbiel, I uncover more direct evidence to support the party-bonding thesis. I find that party, independently of members’ personal preferences, was a significant predictor of vote choice both before and after secession in the two-party U.S. House, while former party labels had no impact on voting in the no-party Confederate House. Moreover, I find that both party and members’ personal preferences were instrumental in explaining vote choice in the U.S. House cases. This latter finding suggests that in order to understand Congressional voting in a party-based system (like the U.S. House during the Civil War era or more modern Houses), one must examine members’ personal preferences as well as pressures from party leaders.

*Manuscript submitted September 14, 1998.*

*Final manuscript received April 2, 1999.*
REFERENCES


