

***GENDER DIFFERENCES IN CITIZEN-LEVEL DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP:
EVIDENCE FROM THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS***

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Gender Differences in Citizen-level Democratic Citizenship: Evidence From The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

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The growth of women's movements around the world has had an important impact on scholarship on politics and citizenship. Whereas it once seemed unremarkable to most scholars of politics that women and men still acted and certainly were treated differently as citizens and subjects in most countries of the world, gender has increasingly been incorporated into the study of politics. The growth of a scholarly literature investigating the gender basis of law and policy, the state, political recruitment, and political behavior and orientations at both the mass and elite levels has been impressive, to say the least.

Research on gender and mass-level political behavior and orientations has usually sought to determine the degree to which men and women differ in rates and occasionally types of political participation, in their political attitudes, and in candidate and party preferences. Most often, this research has relied heavily on a demographic model, hypothesizing that women are generally less active in and knowledgeable about politics than men and that they diverge from men in key issue attitudes because of education differences and different social roles revolving around the family for women and occupation for men. Even with the tendency for scholars to be more successful in publishing research showing "differences" and "effects" rather than null findings (even when the null findings defy conventional wisdom), much of the evidence finds modest gender differences in political participation and orientations in established electoral democracies at best, and more often, no differences. Moreover, models that test conventional wisdom about the sources of gender differences, focusing primarily on education, employment, and parental status, offer some explanatory power, but often less than scholars have expected.

One problem is that these discussions are often overly universalized and stereotypic, assuming that women everywhere tend to have the same domestic-centered roles, and that because women are regarded as especially embedded in the "private" world, what happens in the larger world of politics and the economy is unlikely to have specific and important gender-specific effects on women. This approach views gender differentiation largely as a function of some very specific aspects of women's personal lives: their levels of education, their family and employment status. Yet more and more research is showing that taking the political and economic context into account in understanding the gender basis of citizenship orientations and behavior is crucial. Research on the gender basis of electoral choice demonstrates that the degree to which gender has an impact on choice depends on the political context, even in fully consolidated, stable democracies (Sapiro and Conover 1997). Likewise, historical research shows how the structure of the state -- even apart from laws and policies specifically aimed at transforming women's rights -- has gender-specific impacts on the performance of citizenship at the mass level (Mettler 1998).

Perhaps more importantly, the profound regime changes around the globe beginning in the late 1980s generally characterized as "democratization", the apparent free-fall of citizen trust and conventional political participation in the more established democracies, and the resulting re-emergence of serious investigation of the nature of democratic citizenship have increasingly combined with

¹ Authorship is listed alphabetically.

questions about the relationship of gender to citizenship to support revitalized interest in the gender basis of citizenship. Is it true that women, along with men, are becoming more disillusioned with their politics just as they are achieving greater equality in some of them? As for the emerging democracies, what, if any, are the gender-differentiated impacts, especially given the strongly gender egalitarian lines of the official ideologies of the communist regimes of the 20th century? Even in the earliest, more optimistic period of change in Eastern Europe, reports suggested that "democratization" was maintaining and even enhancing gender inequality, perhaps not to the degree that it did when men but not women achieved democratic rights in the 18th and 19th century transformations, but nevertheless, creating a pattern that worried feminist activists worldwide (Einhorn 1993, Gal and Kligman 2000). Considering the evidence of comparative history, political theory, and public opinion research, it is clear there is no particular necessary relationship between the treatment of women and conceptions of democracy (Sapiro 1998).

A major problem with probing the impact of gender on citizenship orientations is that there is little comparative research and, especially, little comparative research that explicitly and empirically takes account of the institutional and contextual differences that might shape the gender basis of citizenship.² Here, we build on this tradition to engage in comparative investigation of the gender basis of citizen-level aspects of democratic citizenship, including political knowledge, political engagement, and satisfaction with electoral democracy.

Methods

The data used in this analysis are drawn from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), a unique resource for engaging in comparative research on the nature of citizenship orientations.³ CSES is a collaborative program of cross-national research among election studies conducted in over fifty consolidated and emerging democracies. The goals of this program of research are threefold: to illuminate how electoral institutions constrain the beliefs and behaviors of citizens to condition the nature and quality of democratic choice as expressed through popular elections; to understand the nature of political and social cleavages and alignments; and to shed light on how citizens, living under diverse political arrangements, evaluate democratic institutions and processes. To this end, collaborating election studies, coordinated through a subset forming the planning committee, designed and implemented both a ten-minute common module to be integrated directly into each country's regular election study, and a macro-data instrument to be completed by each national election study and integrated with the micro-level data. Any of the world's national election studies was welcome to participate as long as it followed the guidelines of implementation. The target time period for this first round of CSES was 1996-2000.

Many aspects of these data make them attractive for comparative study of the nature of citizenship orientations. First, the project incorporates both micro-level survey data and macro-level data on the political and electoral systems, thus facilitating research that can truly take account of the political systems and institutional framework in which citizens live. Second, because this project is a collaboration among on-going national election studies, the conceptualization and design take advantage of a tremendous amount of comparative knowledge and expertise, as well as ensuring scholarly awareness

²Among the available comparative studies are Christy 1987, Inglehart 1981, Jennings 1983, Jennings and Farah 1980. Some of the most important pieces of work to consider the impact of electoral systems or context on the gender basis of politics are Rule and Zimmerman 1994; Banaszak and Plutzer 1993, Welch and Studlar 1990. See also Beckwith 1980.

³Further information on CSES, as well as the data, can be found at <http://www.umich.edu/~nes/cses/cses.htm>.

and negotiation of the cross-national cultural differences that make "large-N" comparative research so treacherous.⁴ Third, participation in the project is open to any country that can mount the study, thus while it is restricted to "electoral democracies," it is not otherwise restricted by region or type of system. The drawbacks of the data derive from some of these same aspects of their construction. Although the planning committee and research meetings of the collaborators devoted extensive effort to agreeing on the details of the instruments, their administration, and submission of the data, the collaborators are independent, autonomous national election studies and their participation is voluntary. The execution of the individual studies and the details of their data deposits are not precisely uniform. We will note some of the most important deviations along the way.

Fourteen countries form the basis for our analyses: nine "consolidated" electoral democracies (Australia, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United States), and five emerging democracies formerly part of the Soviet Union and its East European satellites (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine).⁵ We have expanded the country basis of this study by "undoing" the unification of Germany. Because part of the point is to consider the impact of the history of democratization, we consider the states of the former East and West Germany as two separate units.

Our dependent variables capture three important individual-level bases of democratic citizenship, corresponding to its knowledge, attitudinal, and behavioral aspects. More specifically, we tapped *political knowledge*, indicating the degree to which individuals can be considered part of an informed citizenry; *satisfaction with electoral democracy*, indicating the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of their electoral system of governance; and *political engagement*, or the degree to which they act as part of that electoral system. Let us describe each of these dependent variables further.

Political knowledge is constructed from a set of three questions asked in each country⁶, with the number of correct answers summed to form the measure. The individual national election studies were instructed to develop a set of three political knowledge questions of their choosing that could be coded "correct/ incorrect/ don't know", and constructed so that there would be one "easy" question (that about two-thirds of the respondents would answer correctly), one "hard" question (that about one-third of the respondents would answer correctly), and a question that about half the respondents would answer correctly.⁷ Because the questions and the raw distributions varied across countries, we standardized the sum of correct answers around a mean of zero in each country to facilitate comparison. Standardizing within each country means that individuals' values on the political knowledge measure represents their

⁴This is not at all to say that these problems are resolved; simply that the conceptualization and implementation take account of extensive discussions at each turn among collaborating studies.

⁵We originally omitted countries currently available through CSES only if they had what we considered fatal missing data flaws on our key variables. We then examined the remaining set with an eye toward theoretical coherence. The resulting group of countries, divided between a regionally and systemically diverse set of advanced industrial consolidated democracies and the emerging democracies of the FSU and Eastern Europe was serendipitously attractive.

⁶The Japanese survey contained only two questions.

⁷"Don't know" (DK) was treated as an incorrect answer. One limitation of these data is that not all countries specified "DK" in the conventional manner; in some countries "DK" was not distinguished from "not ascertained" (NA). In checking the marginals, we concluded that the vast majority of the "NA" notations were in fact "don't know" responses. In the national data files in which NA and DK were not distinguished, we treated NA notations as DK responses, thus exchanging major inaccuracy and data loss for minor inaccuracy.

levels of knowledge relative to the average for their country.⁸

Satisfaction with electoral democracy, the attitudinal facet of our investigation, was built from a factor analysis⁹ of responses to the following three questions:

In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where one means that the last election was conducted fairly and five means that the last election was conducted unfairly?¹⁰

Some people say that political parties in [country] care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in [country] don't care what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that political parties care about what ordinary people think, and five means that they don't care what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?

Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where one means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and five means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself?

Each of these variables was recoded so that high values indicate greater satisfaction. The analysis produced only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one, strongly suggesting these questions do capture a common underlying attitude. The resulting variable is simply the sum of the three responses weighted by their factor loadings (again, high values represent greater satisfaction). This new variable is modestly correlated with responses to the more general question: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]" ($r=.344$). By limiting our measure to the questions more specifically focused on parties and elections, we have developed an arguably cleaner operationalization of attitudes toward the *electoral* basis of the political system.

Political engagement, the behavioral component of the analyses, is constructed from three questions:

Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?

During the past twelve months, have you had any contact with [a Member of Parliament/a Member of Congress] in any way?

⁸Because of the way the knowledge questions are constructed, we could not derive aggregate comparisons across countries from the original data. While our other measures allow us to ask whether people in one country are more satisfied with their electoral democracy or more engaged on average than those in another, norming the knowledge responses within country means we cannot ask whether people are more knowledgeable about their political system in one country than in another.

⁹Specifically, a principle components analysis without rotation.

¹⁰This variable was missing for Australia, and is therefore represented with an imputed value, computed in the following manner: This variable was regressed on several other theoretically relevant attitudinal variables within a subsample composed of the data for the United States and New Zealand, the two most similar systems available here. The resulting regression coefficients were used to impute values for respondents in the Australian subsample.

Did you cast a ballot?

The questions do not constitute a measure of activity, but *engagement* or involvement: a connection with a political party, communication with a public official, and participation in the basic act of voting. Each variable is coded so that a higher value indicates engagement. The factor analysis produced only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one, and the political engagement variable is the sum of the three responses weighted by their factor loadings.

Our first task is to explore the direct and indirect impacts of gender on these three aspects of democratic citizenship. Because of the limitations of these data, however, we are not in a position to develop a full micro-level model explaining these three orientations. Instead, we explore what might be described as a basic, core model, considering the comparative effects of individuals' position in the social structure, indicated by a set of critical demographic characteristics we can expect to have a bearing on people's relationship to the political system and governmental actions and policies. *Gender* is, of course, the primary independent variable of interest here. Each of the others, *age*, *education*, *marital status*¹¹, *labor force participation*, and *employment in the public sector*¹², are plausible candidates as aspects of people's life situations that shape their relationship to government and politics, and are also themselves linked to gender in ways that make them important to include as control variables in order to sort out the specific effects of gender. These independent variables are arranged such that being female, older, more educated, married, in the labor force, and being employed in the public sector rather than being employed in the private sector or not in the labor force are coded "high."

In addition, much of the analysis includes one attitudinal variable, in which respondents were asked to assess the state of their economy: "What do you think about the state of the economy these days in [country]? Would you say that the state of the economy is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?" Assessments of the economy, of course, are likely to be central elements in people's assessments of how well their political systems are working, and also to affect their political engagement.¹³ Positive assessments of the economy are coded "high."

Our models are estimated with ordinary least squares, with each dependent variable in turn regressed on the specified set of independent variables, first as a single model, then with respondents in each country split by gender. The single model regression analysis allows us to examine the direct effects of gender on democratic citizenship controlling for the other predictors. There are two basic means of delving further into the impact of gender on democratic citizenship in comparative analysis. In one, we preserve the individual level of analysis by partitioning the sample by gender and rerunning the analysis using the remaining variables in the original model to predict citizen orientations. In this way we can consider whether different variables affect, for example, political knowledge for women and men, and compare the overall explanatory value of these variables for women's and men's democratic citizenship. Conventional hypotheses for example, predicting that family roles are especially important for women's citizenship should lead us to expect marital status to be a stronger predictor for women than men. The underlying question in this analysis is whether the models explaining knowledge, satisfaction, or engagement are the same for women and men.

¹¹Marital status is not included in the Japanese data file.

¹²Public employment is not included in the Japanese data file.

¹³Current economic perceptions were not included in the Australian data file. They were therefore imputed based on the relation between retrospective economic perceptions and current economic perceptions in two similar countries, the United States and New Zealand.

Another strategy for further exploring the impact of gender on democratic citizenship in comparative analysis, and our second task in this paper, examines cross-national differences in the impact of gender on democratic citizenship by transforming the question into a macro-level problem. In this case we seek to explain *cross-national variations in the effect of gender differences* using the political, cultural, legal, economic, and social structural characteristics of the countries as predictors. We explain and pursue this strategy in the second half of this paper.

The Impact of Gender on Democratic Citizenship: The Micro-Level Model

Political Knowledge

We begin with the relationship of gender to an informed citizenry. To what degree does gender help shape political knowledge, and the conditions under which it is gained? Most previous research finds women less informed about politics than men, and analysis of the data from this sample of countries present the same conclusion. In every country under consideration here, regression analysis employing the basic demographic model shows that gender has a statistically significant effect on knowledge, resulting in less political knowledge among women than men, although the magnitude of the effects varies across the countries. As Table 1 shows, The impact of gender is nearly four times as great in Japan as in Australia, with the other countries distributed in between.

The simple array of results does not offer an obvious explanation for the differences among the countries; that will have to await direct analysis. Although the countries appearing at the extreme ends of the table offer little surprise with respect to relative gender differentiation of knowledge either at the low end (Australia, New Zealand, United States) or the high end (Japan, Ukraine, the Germanies), the overall distribution requires something more sophisticated than the "eyeball method" for explanation. One caveat in interpreting these results is important. A test of political knowledge does not simply test individuals' possession of knowledge; it also tests their confidence that they have the knowledge and their willingness to answer the questions, which in many cases, depends on their propensity to guess. Not surprisingly, some research (in the United States) shows that the tendency to respond "don't know" is not distributed randomly. Women and other people with lower status or lower education are more likely than men and people with higher status or higher education to respond "don't know" under similar circumstances. Thus the man who guesses correctly gets a positive score for knowledge, while the woman who would have guessed correctly but shies away from guessing gets no score for knowledge. Research looking at the relationship between gender and answering "don't know" to surveys of political attitudes shows that the gender differences are greatest at the lowest levels of subjective competence. They disappear among the most competent (Rapoport 1982). Because "don't knows" are crucial to the coding of the political knowledge questions, to understand the differences among countries in gender differentiation of knowledge, we would have to take account of whether there would be any important cross-national differences in the degree to which there might be gender differentiation in the degree to which those with lower levels of political knowledge would be willing to answer knowledge questions, either because of the specific framing of the question or for cultural reasons.

Table 1 about here

Are the models of political knowledge similar for women and men? Although we have found that gender affects political knowledge even while controlling for age, education, marital status, labor force participation, and public employment, understanding the gender basis of political knowledge requires examining whether these forces have different effects on women and men. Table 2 presents the results of the partitioned regressions with each country in the order in which the countries emerged from the

original model, ranging from those with the smallest to greatest impact of gender on political knowledge.

Table 2 about here

The most striking result is that with relatively few exceptions, the within-country analyses show that the models predicting political knowledge are quite similar, at least when we use this basic demographic model. Age and education are generally linked to political knowledge, and labor force participation generally is not. Let us look more closely, however, to see some of the differences that emerge.

We would expect age to be related to political knowledge simply because the length of time one lives in a political system, the more one should know about it.¹⁴ The primary exceptions should be in countries that have experienced major disjunctures that would render past learning obsolete, or for social groups that are inhibited from acquiring relevant political information. We see hints of both phenomena in the results.

In every country but six¹⁵, political knowledge increases with age for both men and women. Age is unrelated to political knowledge in only three countries, all of which experienced radical regime changes in recent years (the fall of communist regimes in Romania, Hungary, and Poland). In three others age is positively related to political knowledge for men but not for women, including the Czech Republic, Spain, and Japan. In the countries in which age affects both men's and women's knowledge, the effects are quite similar except, perhaps, in Ukraine, where the impact for men is almost twice that for women. Only in the United States is there any hint that age might have more impact on the political knowledge of women than men.

It would be surprising if education did not have a positive effect on political knowledge and the results conform to this expectation. Education contributes to creating an informed citizenry among both men and women. Moreover, the impact of education is very similar in all countries except Japan, where its effect is about three-and-one-half times greater for men than for women. Thus, in Japan, in which the gender differences in political knowledge are the greatest, neither education nor life experience provides the kind of added value of political knowledge they do for men.¹⁶

We have included marital status in these models for two reasons. First, it is an indicator of social integration that has been found to be related to political involvement in the past,¹⁷ and second, it is an indicator of involvement in a social institution that tends to perpetuate gender differentiation of social roles and resources. Social scientists have conventionally tended to ignore family roles, including marriage, as an important determinant of men's mass-level social and political orientations and behavior, especially in secular industrialized societies, focusing instead on their jobs and occupations as central. Meanwhile, they have assumed that family positions and roles are central to women's social and political

¹⁴There are, of course, different kinds of knowledge, some of which is more likely to depend on experience in the system, and some of which might be more dependent on formal schooling, including how recently one was taught the information. For further discussion of political knowledge and age, see Jennings and Niemi 1981.

¹⁵This discussion uses $p < .10$.

¹⁶We must note, of course, that the impact of age on men in Japan is very small, and included here only by using our unconventionally permissive test of statistical significance.

¹⁷For a review of the literature, see Stoker and Jennings 1995.

lives.¹⁸ Past research suggests that traditional family roles inhibit women's citizenship. Thus, we would expect marital status to have less effect on men than women. When it does help shape political knowledge, we would expect uniformly positive effects on men, but mixed effects on women depending on the context.

As Table 2 shows, the effects of marital status varies across countries, and the gender differences do not conform to conventional expectations. Being married (or partnered) has no effect on men's or women's knowledge in the Czech Republic, East Germany, and Ukraine. It has positive effects on political knowledge for men and women in the Netherlands, Poland, and Britain. It has an impact on men's but not women's political knowledge only in Hungary, in that case positive effects, but the difference in the coefficients is quite small. Marital status affects women's but not men's political knowledge in six countries, but these effects differ in direction. In Australia, the United States, Norway, Spain, and West Germany marriage has positive effects, while in New Zealand it has negative effects.¹⁹ Finally, marriage has negative effects on men and positive effects on women in terms of political knowledge in Romania. Put another way, marriage has positive effects on men's knowledge in 4 out of 14 countries, positive effects on women's knowledge in 9 out of 14 countries, and negative effects on men and women in one country each. In general, where marriage is related to political knowledge it has positive effects, but much more often for women than men. More analysis is necessary to determine what causes the country differences.

Studies of women's political orientations and behavior have generally assumed, and only occasionally found, that being in the labor force brings women in closer contact with politics and government, which would lead to the hypothesis that employed women, and those more generally in the labor force, would be more knowledgeable than women who are privatized and "at home."²⁰ Of course, men and women who are not in the labor force for other reasons (whether they are students, retired, or disabled) would have a different relationship to government and politics from most homemakers, excepting those who are impoverished, because in most countries they tend to have relatively great dependence on government. Thus, the implications of employment status for political knowledge are not as clear-cut as they may seem at first. At the same time, if we focus specifically on people who are employed in the *public* sector, we would expect that information about government and politics would be both more accessible and more salient, thus leading to a positive effect of public employment on political knowledge. Of course the impact of this variable may be especially murky in the countries that are just undergoing the process of inventing a substantial formal private sector.

Labor force participation, in the main, has relatively little impact on political knowledge for women or men. Only in the United States, Spain, Britain, and West Germany does it have any effect, and the resulting patterns are cryptic indeed. In Spain, Britain, and Germany labor force participation affects men but not women, but in Spain and Britain it has the expected integrating effect, while in Germany labor force participation has a negative effect on political knowledge.²¹ In the United States labor force

¹⁸One of the best discussions of this difference in the gender differentiation of models used by social scientists is Feldberg and Glenn (1979), which describes these as the "job" versus "gender" models; this discussion has been readapted and defined as the "job" versus "family" model by Sapiro (1999, 441).

¹⁹In Norway and Germany this finding is dependent on the more inclusive definition of statistical significance; otherwise, we would say marital status has no effect on knowledge in either country.

²⁰Discussion of the privatization of women, and empirical analysis of the impact of this on their political orientations and behavior may be found in Sapiro 1983.

²¹Whether the effects in Germany are related to the relative geographic concentration of

participation has statistically significant positive effects on women's but not men's political knowledge, but the difference in the coefficients is slight enough that any claim of a gender difference is suspect. Thus, the most important conclusion remains the lack of impact of labor force participation in most places on political knowledge.

The impact of public employment is also small compared to the results for age and education. In 6 of the 13 countries where we have data, public employment has no effect on women or men. Only in Australia and Spain is public sector employment positively related to political knowledge for both women and men. In two countries (Romania and Hungary)²² men and not women employed in the public sector are more knowledgeable, while in New Zealand, Poland, Great Britain, and West Germany, women's and not men's knowledge is boosted by public employment.

In summary, in the countries under examination here, roughly the same models predicting political knowledge apply for men and women. There are some notable differences -- for example, the lack of effect of age and education on Japanese women compared with Japanese men in a society that has been known for being especially traditional with respect to gender differentiation of public and private spheres. Marriage is more likely to affect women's than men's political knowledge, but not as traditional gender-based hypotheses would have it, by decreasing their knowledge. Finally, examination of the R^2 coefficients shows that while the explanatory power of these very basic models varies across the countries, from very small in Japan to moderately powerful (by political science standards) in the case of New Zealand, the United States, and Romania, overall the explanatory power of the model is similar for women and men in most countries.

Satisfaction with Electoral Democracy

There has been relatively little investigation of women's attitudes toward democracy and democratization, although there is a large and diverse literature on the impact of democratization on women and gender. Historical research has been very consistent in concluding that democratization and the development of electoral democracy has not been a gender-neutral phenomenon. In nearly every country in which major developments toward electoral democracy were made up through World War II, most political rights and privileges, indeed most civil rights and privileges, were withheld from women until after -- usually long after -- they were extended to men. History also shows that the withholding of equal rights and privileges alone does not seem to have provoked significant dissatisfaction with political regimes or the pace of change among women. Political feminism, or dissatisfaction with these gender-based inequities, is more complicated than that. As in other cases, such as class and race, "mere" inequality or differentiation based on social categorization is not sufficient to cause dissatisfaction with the system as a whole. Nevertheless, women have not had as much reason to be satisfied with the institutionalization of democracy as men.

Although formal rights and privileges have tended to be extended equally to men and women in democratizing countries since World War II, research continues to show that the process of developing democracy and citizenship does not work equally for women and men. It thus tends to enhance inequality, if not to the same degree as in the older democracies. Moreover, women's continuing responsibility for children and elderly family members, their own economic disadvantage in the labor market, and other related factors make them more dependent on the welfare state. Given the nearly global

unemployment in the former East Germany, thus boosting the salience of government and politics in that region, would be interesting to pursue.

²²Both of these depend on the $p < .10$ standard.

decrease in trust in government, and dissatisfaction with the functioning of welfare states, as well as the reduction in their coverage, women would seem to have special reason for dissatisfaction with their governments and political systems relative to men.

Thus, we turn to assessments electoral democracy. Does gender affect the degree to which citizens in electoral democracies are satisfied with those electoral systems? Does gender mediate the sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with electoral systems and processes?

Once again we begin with a demographic model, this time supplemented with respondents' assessments of how well their economy is functioning, presumably one of the major criteria people use to determine whether their political systems are working well. Thus, we will examine the impact of gender on satisfaction with electoral democracy, controlling for age, education, marital status, employment, public employment, and satisfaction with the economy. The results appear in Table 3.

Table 3 about here

Gender has no direct effect on satisfaction with electoral democracy in most of the countries under investigation here. In two countries, Romania and Britain, women were less satisfied than men, other things equal, and in two countries, Hungary and the United States, women were more satisfied than men. As nicely symmetrical as these results are (one early democracy in the English political tradition at both ends, and one democratizing Eastern European country), these results suggest idiosyncratic reasons for these differences, perhaps based specifically on the substantive outcomes of recent elections, rather than a systematic pattern.

Although gender does not have direct effects on satisfaction with electoral democracy in most places, are the models predicting satisfaction different for men and women? Table 4 displays the results of this analysis. As usual, the major conclusion to draw is that gender does not distinguish the roots of political satisfaction very much. While satisfaction with the economy is a significant part of the model for both women and men in nearly every country, the demographic variables have impact in many fewer places, and their effects are much more varied than was the case for political knowledge. The demographic model, as we might expect, is simply not as useful for understanding satisfaction with democracy as it is for understanding political knowledge, especially considering that the analysis of satisfaction with electoral democracy includes the added assessment of the economy variable. Nevertheless, there is one interesting pattern of gender difference. In six countries -- Romania, Britain, Czech Republic, Poland, West Germany, and the United States -- marital status is significantly related to satisfaction with democracy for women but not for men, although the relationship is inverse in one of those (the Czech Republic).²³ In no country is men's marital status linked to their satisfaction with democracy. Thus, although the rationale for including marital status was related both to the social integration function and to the relative economic disadvantages single women face, the pattern of results does not suggest a clear picture of the dynamics.

Table 4 about here

Political Engagement

Women have generally been found to be less active in politics at the mass level than men,

²³This is also the one country included in the list because of the more relaxed test of statistical significance.

although in some countries the differences have become small and are even disappearing with respect to some kinds of political activities. It is important to emphasize that the differences do depend on what kind of political activity we are discussing. In the United States in the early 1990s, for example, Schlozman, Burns, and Verba (1994) found no significant gender differences in voting, protest activity, serving on a local board, or working in a campaign, but they did find gender differences in making campaign contributions, working informally in the community, contacting officials, and political organizational membership. Earlier research in the United States tended to find more gender differences. The existence and magnitude of gender differences in political participation varies cross-societally. Carol Christy's study of fourteen countries in the 1950s through 1970s suggested that gender differences in participation decreased with economic development, a hypothesis we can re-explore in the macro-level phase of this research.

We assessed the impact of gender on political engagement using the basic demographic model supplemented with satisfaction with the state of the economy. As Table 5 shows, in half of the countries gender has no direct effect on political engagement, and in half women are less engaged than men, all things held equal. This is the first time we see what appears to be an easily recognizable difference between those countries in which democratic citizenship is gender differentiated. The countries in which gender differentiates engagement include all of the emerging democracies in the sample (including East Germany) as well as West Germany and Japan, the country in this sample that is probably most marked by gender differentiation in social and economic life. The list looks roughly consistent with Christy's earlier conclusions about economic development and political participation.

Table 5 about here

Once again, we have partitioned the sample by gender to investigate the models for gender differences. As usual, the gender similarities far outweigh the differences. Age and education are significantly linked to engagement in most countries, and in roughly similar ways for men and women.²⁴ Marital status is generally linked to political engagement in roughly the same way for men and women; it has positive effects for both in six countries: Norway, New Zealand, the United States, Britain, Germany, and Poland.²⁵ In these countries, the social integration functions of marriage seem to affect the political engagement of men and women similarly. In four other countries (Australia, Spain, Ukraine, the Czech Republic) marital status has no effect on either men or women. In two other countries the effects are clearly gender differentiated. In both the Netherlands and Romania marriage is, once again, positively related to political engagement for women. In contrast, marital status has no impact on Dutch men, while marriage is associated with *decreased* political engagement among Romanian men.

Turning to economic variables, labor force participation has little or no direct effect on men's or women's political engagement in most countries, which is also true to a lesser degree of public employment. In the relatively few countries in which public employment is associated with political engagement, the effects tend to be different for women and men. In Britain men but not women are more politically engaged if they are employed in the public rather than private sector, while in Hungary, Poland, and possibly New Zealand, women but not men are more politically engaged if they are employed in the public sector. Satisfaction with the economy is another matter. It tends to have more

²⁴One exception may be Japan, where age does not appear to increase political engagement as much for women as for men.

²⁵We also note that the coefficients for marital status are almost the same in Hungary, but because the standard errors are different, the coefficient for women is statistically significant while the one for men is not.

impact on men than women in the countries in which gender does not directly affect political engagement (Norway, New Zealand, Britain, Australia); otherwise, it tends to have little, if any, impact on men's or women's political engagement. Thus, in the main, gender does not differentiate the individual-level roots of political engagement, at least considering this expanded demographic model.

Conclusions: The Impact of Gender on Individual-level Citizenship

Our first step toward comparative analysis of the gender basis of citizen-based aspects of democratic citizenship revealed gender differentiation in political knowledge in all the countries under investigation, gender differentiation in political engagement in half the countries, and gender differentiation in satisfaction with electoral democracy in a smaller number of countries. Women, all other things equal, were less knowledgeable than men in all the countries under consideration. Where we found gender differentiation in engagement, women were less engaged. The results were more mixed with respect to satisfaction with democracy; showing women more satisfied in some countries, and less satisfied in others.

These preliminary results amply demonstrate that more systematic analysis is necessary to detect an underlying pattern of explanation. In the case of political engagement, the figures strongly suggest that economic and political development are linked to the emergence or suppression of gender differentiation, but neither the sporadic appearance of gender differences in political satisfaction, nor the pattern in the *force* of gender in differentiating political knowledge can be explained without further analysis incorporating characteristics of the political, social, and cultural systems, including indicators of the status and treatment of women.

As for our separate comparison of the models for men and women, the results reconfirm those found by other scholars engaging in similar exercises. While some differences appear in the details, the most important conclusion is that, at least with respect to this basic model, it works very similarly for men and women. Most importantly, this analysis lays to rest some aspects of the conventional wisdom repeated endlessly by scholars in the absence of empirical evidence. If it were true, as many claim, that women's citizenship is particularly diminished because they are not integrated into the labor force as much as men, or because they are more integrated into the family, we would expect to find notable effects of labor force participation and marriage, especially on women. Instead, we find little relationship between employment and any of these measures of citizen-level democratic citizenship, either for men or women. Marital status has similar effect for men and women more often than not; even where marital status has more impact on women, marriage tends, more often than not, to enhance citizenship.

Of course the details of the analysis suggest many further directions for research at the micro-level that would be better carried out in more detailed fashion with data that are richer with respect to each of the countries under investigation. But our next task takes us to a different level of analysis. Having explored the impact of gender on democratic citizenship in a range of countries, how can we explain the cross-national variation in the direct effects of gender?

Explaining Cross-National Variation in the Impact of Gender: Macro-Level Analysis

Why is there cross-national variation in the direct effects of gender on democratic citizenship? In order to answer that question, the estimated coefficients for gender for each country in the micro-level now become the three dependent variables in our analyses, and are regressed on a set of political, cultural, economic, and social structural characteristics that could

plausibly help explain the variation across countries. Our estimates of within-country gender differences are obtained after controlling for a variety of other individual-level differences, so in this analysis we are modeling the remaining, systemic difference gender makes. Because this phase explores cross-national variation after those individual effects have been considered, the appropriate predictors are indicators of macro-level phenomena.

Methods

The literature on gender politics suggests a few plausible explanations of cross-national variation in the impact of gender on democratic citizenship orientations. One would revolve around the impact of economic development. Conventional theories of modernization long argued that one of the key social effects of development, the growth of urbanization, science and technology, and secularization, would be the growing equality of men and women. In other words, the impact of gender on such things as education, employment, and participation in social and political life would diminish. In a slightly different vein, studies of development show that given traditional gender-based norms in most societies, the fruits of development tend to be extended to men before women historically. This would mean that early phases of development might actually increase gender equality, which would be attenuated and perhaps erased only at later stages (Kabeer 1994; Sapiro 1998).

We include three indicators of *Economic Development*: the real gross domestic product per capita (PPP\$) as an indicator of societal wealth,²⁶ the percent of male workers employed in the service sector,²⁷ and the number of scientists and engineers in research and development per million people as an indicator of the development of science and technology in each country.²⁸ Lest it seem odd to use *male* workers as the indicator of the development, in every country the percentage of women workers in the service sector is much higher than the percentage of male workers and does not vary as much cross-nationally regardless of its total size; we understand the percentage of male workers in the service sector as a better indicator of the relative size of that sector, relatively unaffected by the degree of gender segregation in the labor force or the status of women's employment as such.

It is also plausible that a country's degree of political development and democratization would shape the impact of gender on democratic citizenship. But it is also likely that these effects could be very uneven and contingent on a wide variety of features of the political situation. Democratization presumably incorporates ever larger portions of the citizenry into political processes of deliberation and decision-making. At the same time, however, conventional definitions of democratization and political development have rarely normatively incorporated

²⁶ Taken from Freedom House Table of Social and Economic Indicators, <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/table4.htm>>.

²⁷ Measured from 1992-97. We use men and not women because women tend to be much more concentrated in the service sector, so men in the service sector is a harder test. Figures are from the World Bank, <<http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2000/pdfs/tab2-4.pdf>>. There is no figure from this time period available for Ukraine. The figure here is an overestimation calculated from the total service sector employment listed in the *CIA Factbook*.

²⁸ Measured from 1987-97. From *2000 World Development Indicators*

women to the same degree as men; that is, even where women have the rights of citizenship their incorporation is often not viewed as essential in the same way as men's (Sapiro 1998). It could even be that rising levels of democratization would provoke increasing dissatisfaction on the part of those left behind, including women, but that these effects would depend on political mobilization. Unfortunately we do not have the ability in this study to consider all these possibilities, but we do test for basic relationships between political development and the impact of gender on democratic citizenship.

Political Development includes four variables. The first is the number of years the country has been an electoral democracy is defined according to the introduction of general male suffrage, indicated by the first year in which parliamentary elections were held leading to an unbroken period up to the present. General male suffrage (which ignores the de facto or de jure exclusion of small minorities such as the situation in the United States) is the indicator rather than the date at which electoral rights were extended to the majority of the population because until very recently basic definitions of democracy were male-based. Further, this allows us to construct a separate variable that specifically measures the length of time that women were incorporated into the electorate, regardless of whether that was at the same time as men or not. An interruption of less than a decade due to invasion and direct control by an external power (e.g. the situation for West European countries occupied by Germany during World War II) does not count as an interruption for our purposes. For countries with more than a century of electoral democracy, democracy is represented as beginning in 1900.

The second variable in the *Political Development* cluster indicates whether the country has had an authoritarian period in the 20th century, again not including brief experiences imposed by invading forces. This offers another indicator of a country's historical experience with democracy and self-rule. Because the former Soviet Union countries and satellites share a common distinctive authoritarian period, we indicate which countries were part of the FSU.²⁹ Finally, we include a measure of each country's civil liberties³⁰, an important element of democratic development, ranging from 1 to 4 with high values representing greater protection of freedom.

Another aspect of the political system, not itself an indicator of political development or democratization, has often been attributed with impacts on women's political incorporation, especially as elected officials: proportional representation (Rule and Zimmerman 1994). Thus we include a dichotomous indicator of whether a country has some *proportional representation system*.

We also included two clusters of variables focusing specifically on gender-based situations. The first, *Women's Social Resources*, include aggregate-level indicators of gender-based employment and education patterns which reflect not the education or employment of specific women in these samples, but the general degree of gender equality in each country.

²⁹ Once again we maintain the distinction between the former East and West Germany.

³⁰ From Freedom House Table of Countries,
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/table1.htm>.

Specifically, these variables are the number of females to males in the third level of education³¹ and female employment as a percent of the labor force.³² It is important to note that our sample of countries contains relatively literate and well-educated populations by world standards, which means that to find real variation in education we had to set the standard quite high.³³

Our final cluster of variables considers *Women's Political Context*. Even if social resources are distributed fairly equitably, equal political representation is not guaranteed, and it is reasonable to hypothesize that women's relative basic political orientations and resources are responsive to the context of their representation in politics and the responsiveness of the political system to them as citizens. We include additional measures of women's actual descriptive and policy representation in the system. The percentage of female members in the lower house of parliament³⁴ expresses women's descriptive representation. The presence of a gender quota system for women's candidacies (here including *either* a formal or informal system imposed by law or one self-imposed by any party that has representation in parliament) points to a formal institutional commitment to women's incorporation into governance positions, while the level of parental leave benefits is one indicator of policy representation.³⁵

Finally, in our search for cultural indicators that may be supposed to have an impact on gender equality and differentiation, we include a measure of the percentage of the population that identifies as Roman Catholic or Orthodox. These denominations are generally associated with greater restrictions on women (including in leadership positions within their own religious institutions and conservative gender norms).³⁶

Initially, we regress our measure of gender differences in satisfaction with electoral democracy, political knowledge and political engagement on each of these indicators separately. With only fifteen cases, we cannot include them all in a single analysis. In order to sort out the separate influences of these characteristics more clearly and build more reliable characteristics, we created several scaled variables representing the different general explanations we have identified. The three economic development indicators – GDP per capita, percent of male workers in the service sector, and number of scientists and engineers – were standardized and summed to create a global *Economic Development* measure ($\alpha = .885$). The indicators measures of *Political Development* – years of electoral democracy, presence of an authoritarian period in

³¹ From *1990 United Nations*.

³² From *2000 World Bank Development Statistics*.

³³ We explored other possibilities, more related to reproduction and health, such as the birthrate among women 15-19 and maternal mortality, but these provided no explanatory leverage at all.

³⁴ From *1997 Interparliamentary Union*.

³⁵ Parental leave benefits are coded into three categories: 0 = parental leave with no pay, 1 = parental leave with less than 90% of pay, and 2 = parental leave with at least 90% of pay. There are many policies we could consider using as indicators, but for many obvious ones there is very little variation in this particular sample, especially given the impact of the European Union. Parental leave, however, points to support for the ability of women to balance employment and family responsibilities.

³⁶ With a broader sample of countries we also would have defined this variable as percentage Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Islamic, or, to account for the case of Israel, Orthodox Judaism.

the last century, whether the country was part of the former Soviet Union, and degree of civil liberties – scaled reliably as well ($\alpha = .919$). Female employment and education were standardized and added together to create a scale representing *Women's Social Resources* ($\alpha = .697$). And the measures of women's descriptive and policy representation were standardized and summed to form a measure of *Women's Political Context* ($\alpha = .654$). We regress the gender differences in the components of democratic citizenship on each of these scales separately, and then estimate a multivariate model with gender difference regressed on each scale simultaneously along with the dichotomous indicator of proportional representation and the measure of percent of the population that is Catholic or Orthodox.

Our small data set poses some problems for ordinary least squares regression. A well-known assumption of OLS is that the error term is distributed normally, which implies that the slope estimates are distributed normally. This assumption allows for inference based on the traditional t-test (the conditional mean or slope divided by the conditional variance or standard error). Even if this assumption is violated, we rely on the central limit theorem, which states that as the sample size increases, OLS estimates will be normally distributed even if the error is not. A sample of 15, however, is generally not large enough to invoke the central limit theorem. Nor is it large enough to detect deviations from normality among the errors reliably (Greene 1993). This problem, of course, is common in cross-national research at the macro-level and is the source considerable methodological discussion and debate about adequate solutions (Janoski and Hicks 1994). Consequently, rather than relying on the normality assumption in our models, we rely on the bootstrapping approach to statistical inference.

In practice, this means that 1000 separate samples are drawn from our data and the relevant model is estimated with each sample. The resulting 1000 slope estimates are arrayed sequentially, and the endpoints of a 90% confidence interval are the estimated coefficients located at the 5th and 95th percentiles.³⁷ The point estimate, however, is the estimate obtained from the original 15 cases. Such bootstrap inferences have been found to perform at least as well as parametric inference (e.g., normal OLS), and often better (Mooney 1996). Our results, consequently, report confidence intervals rather than standard errors. The 90% confidence level was chosen to acknowledge the limited amount of information available in our small data set.

Two of our dependent variables, representing the differences between women and men in knowledge and engagement, range from negative (women are less knowledgeable and less engaged) to, effectively, zero. Thus, in the models reported below, a *negative* and statistically significant coefficient represents a characteristic that is associated with *greater differences* between women and men, with women worse off, as the level of the characteristic increases. A positive and statistically significant coefficient generally represents a characteristic that reduces gender differences, by bringing women up to the same level as men, as the characteristic increases. In the case of satisfaction with democracy, the dependent variable ranges from negative (women are less satisfied) through many cases of no relationship, to one or two that are

³⁷ More specifically, the confidence intervals are recovered via the bias-corrected percentile method, which Efron (1987) recommends. When the observed value of the slope is equal to the median of the bootstrap distribution – that is, when there is no bias – the percentile method and the bias-corrected percentile method will yield the same result.

positive, where women are more satisfied than men. Thus, a positive and statistically significant coefficient represents a characteristic that renders women equally or possibly more satisfied than men.

Analysis of Cross-National Variation of the Impact of Gender

The early phase of this analysis showed that the impact of gender on subjective democratic citizenship depended on the particular aspect and it varied by country. Tables 7 through 9 examine the degree to which our individual macro-level indicators help explain the cross-national variation in the impact of gender on political knowledge, satisfaction with electoral democracy, and political engagement, respectively. Our main conclusions are that the models are quite different across the different aspects of democratic citizenship, and more specifically, that a wide range of these country characteristics are useful for helping to understand cross-national variation in the impact of gender on political knowledge and engagement, but not satisfaction with democracy.

The predictors we have chosen have little bearing on variation in gender difference in satisfaction with democracy. This may not be surprising given that at the individual level we found that in most countries gender has no direct effects on satisfaction with democracy. Only two variables emerge as statistically significant in this macro-level analysis. Gender differences are smaller – or women are even more satisfied than men – in countries with larger service sectors and in those in which at least some represented political party has installed a gender quota for women's candidacies. But certainly, we see no impact of women's equality in social resources or political context on their relative satisfaction with electoral democracy compared with men.

Our earlier analysis revealed that after taking the basic socio-demographic model into account, gender had an effect – but a variable one -- on political knowledge in all countries in our sample such that women were less knowledgeable than men. Table 7 suggests that a wide range of phenomena suggested in the literature on gender politics do indeed help to account for cross-national variation in this impact. In terms of *economic development*, the larger the size of the service sector, which tends to be among the most gender-integrated sectors of the labor force, the smaller the gender impact. With respect to *political development*, three out of four of our indicators play a role. The knowledge gap is smaller where the democratic history is longer, where there has not been a recent history of authoritarianism, and where civil liberties are higher. Of course education has an impact on political knowledge among both men and women in all countries at the individual level, but Table 2 shows that in addition, the gender integration of higher education is linked to the cross-national variation in gender difference in political knowledge. Thus far these results are intuitively pleasing. In contrast, women's incorporation into politics at the elite level has no impact, and both the presence of generous parental leave benefits – an indicator of special policy responsiveness to women – and proportional representation are related to higher levels of gender differentiation in knowledge.

The case of political engagement looks much like political knowledge in many respects, although there are important differences. Many aspects of both economic and political development close the gender gap in political engagement, including GDP per capita, size of the

service sector, years of electoral democracy, absence of recent authoritarian history or association with the former Soviet Union, and presence of civil liberties guarantees. Although education tends to encourage political engagement at the individual level, neither women's employment nor education at the macro-level have any bearing on cross-national variation in the impact of gender. This is the first case in which we see women's representation in parliament having an impact; as many feminist have argued, greater representation of women at the elite level appears associated with women's political engagement at the mass level. More surprising, given the findings of research on women's representation, the presence of a proportional representation system is associated with *greater* gender differences in engagement. Finally, women's engagement in politics is lower in the more Catholic and Orthodox societies even though this variable had no impact on either political knowledge or satisfaction with democracy.

Tables 7-9 about here

The normal practice of social scientists investigating a research problem that calls for sorting through multiple possible predictors of a phenomenon of interest is to turn to multivariate analysis. That, of course, is problematic in relatively small-N comparative research such as this. Thus we turned to the scales created on the basis of these individual indicators in order to engage in multivariate investigation and attempt more systematic means of comparison of the success of a model based on these scales as predictors in helping to explain these different aspects of democratic citizenship. Tables 10-12 display the results of the multiple regression analysis.

Only *Economic Development* holds up as a significant predictor of satisfaction with democracy at the bivariate level, and even that washes out in the multivariate analysis. *Political Development* is a significant predictor of political knowledge at the bivariate level (along with PR, which is the same individual item discussed earlier), and *Political Development* remains a significant predictor of gender equality in political knowledge in the multivariate analysis. Although the scales of *Economic Development* and *Political Development* as well, of course, as the individual items, PR and percent Catholic or Orthodox are significantly related to gender differences in political engagement at the bivariate level, none emerge in the multivariate analysis as statistically significant. At the same time the percentage of variance explain in the last two models – 34% and 41%, respectively – suggest that we have tested the limits of our ability to use these methods of small-N research to simulate more conventional and familiar means of analysis confidently.

Tables 10-12 about here

Conclusions: The Impact of Gender in Cross-National Perspective

Single-country studies of the impact of gender on political orientations and behavior are extremely useful for many purposes. All too often, however, they are used to make broad generalizations about the nature of gender and its impact. Gender politics scholars have long argued that gender effects should not be understood in terms that are any more universalistic than are the effects of other kinds of group membership. Recent scholarship has increasingly emphasized the ways in which the impact on gender, even within one country depends very much

on the context (Sapiro with Conover 1997). Students of comparative politics have long argued that it is important to take account of the variation in both cultural and institutional contexts to understand the impact of gender on citizenship orientations and behavior. By *cultural* and *institutional* contexts we mean the differences we find at the macro-level that shape the nature and impact of gender. This is different from saying, for example, that education affects the likelihood that people will participate in politics, that women tend to have less education than men, and so are less likely to participate, and that women's participation will vary cross-nationally because their levels of education differ.

There is an interesting literature exploring the impact of gender on political orientations and behavior cross-nationally (Jennings and Farah 1980, Christy 1987; Davis and Robinson 1991). Most of it, however, reaches conclusions about the cross-national variation extremely informally, using the "eyeballing" method to try to extract meaning from the patterns of difference. Only rarely do we find explicit, systematic empirical attention to both micro- and macro-level phenomena.

Our research proceeded at two levels. The first involved the "parallel play" of investigating the utility of a socio-demographic model for isolating the impact of gender on political knowledge, engagement, and satisfaction with democracy. After accounting for such things as education, age, and in the case of satisfaction and engagement, satisfaction with the economy, we found that gender has effects on these political variables, but the effects depend on both the country and what, exactly the question is. We did not expect to find universals, and we did not find them. We also did further analysis by partitioning the country samples by gender to see whether the socio-demographic models worked the same way for men and women. Although they did in broad terms, it is also clear that the utility of these models depends on the country, and, indeed, they occasionally work differently for women and men.

Although we noted some interesting findings in the details of the results, we do not believe these data are adequate for probing the micro-level models much further and, indeed, some of the results may well be most useful in pointing toward questions that should be explored with richer individual-level data in a more limited number of countries. But the overall patterns in the differential impact of gender *can* be further explored, albeit with the difficulties of taking into account small-N quantitative research.

Thus, the second phase of this study selected macro-level variables suggested by the literature on gender politics (and variables that were actually available and varied across the countries in our sample) to see whether we can account for the types of cross-national variation we found. Both our ability to explain cross-national variance and the particular variables that contributed significantly to that explanation depended, again, on what the question is. Clearly this analysis was least successful in the case of satisfaction in democracy, as we might expect, and relatively more successful with political knowledge and engagement. In both the latter cases political development – specifically, democratization – helped to close the gap in knowledge and engagement. This makes sense to us given the particular sample we have. Until very recently, democratization and the benefits of political development were nearly universally extended to men first; this would mean that longer experience with the democratization process would be required to close the gap, especially in political engagement. Certain aspects of economic

development were also important, most notably the development of a service sector – in other words, not just the transformation of the economic system in terms of wealth, but in terms of its functions.

Variables associated specifically with the status of women were relatively unimportant in our results. We are especially intrigued that women’s incorporation into the political elite is linked to growing equality in political engagement more generally, but had no bearing on either of the other dependent variables. Despite the “good press” proportional representation has had in the literature for women’s presence in parliaments, it is inversely related to equality in political knowledge and engagement. And our cultural variable – religion – also drove only political engagement.

Interpreting the larger significance of this study must take account of some of its limitations. It is not based on a sample of all electoral democracies (electoral democracy being the defining requirement for being part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems), but primarily of the most economically developed plus countries formerly part of the “Soviet bloc.” This truncates some of the variance in both micro- and macro-level variables we would have if a wider sample of countries, for example, from Latin America, were included. Second, because of the nature of these particular data, we were limited primarily to a socio-demographic model at the individual level. But that forms the core of the models most often discussed in the literature on gender politics.

Despite these limitations, this study underscores xxxx points. Understanding the impact of gender on political orientations and behavior requires attending not just to micro-level phenomena, but to the macro-level as well, which implies the need for cross-national research – if we needed any more reason than already exists. As this study has shown, the significance of macro-level research is not just in exploring the direct impact on characteristics of women’s or men’s behavior or situation as, for example, when research suggests that PR increases the number of women in elected office. Macro-level variables can also be indicators of phenomena that moderate the relationship among micro-level variables, as when we find that the impact of gender on political knowledge is lower in more democratized countries. The distinction can be subtle, but it is theoretically important. This study adds more evidence that it is wrong to theorize about the impact of gender on politics simply in terms of conventional wisdom and stereotype. In country after country, for example, we find that labor force participation does not have an impact on political knowledge or engagement, although in some places it does (more often on men than women). Finally, it is clear that we cannot analyze the impact of gender on political orientations and behavior as a universal. It depends on what, exactly is the question, and what, exactly are the countries and conditions in which people are living.

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**Table 1:
Impact of Gender on Political Knowledge**

| | |
|---|--------|
| Australia | -0.149 |
| New Zealand | -0.215 |
| United States | -0.231 |
| Romania | -0.262 |
| Norway | -0.300 |
| Netherlands | -0.320 |
| Hungary | -0.357 |
| Czech Republic | -0.363 |
| Poland | -0.379 |
| Spain | -0.401 |
| Great Britain | -0.433 |
| East Germany | -0.437 |
| West Germany | -0.491 |
| Ukraine | -0.561 |
| Japan | -0.572 |
| <p><i>Notes: bold=p<.05 italics=p<.10</i> Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, controlling for age, education, labor force participation, public employment, and marital status. In this and all subsequent tables, <i>AEast Germany</i> and <i>AWest Germany</i> refer to the regions defined in this fashion before unification.</p> | |

Table 2: Political Knowledge: Gender Differences

| Variable | Australia (-.149) | | New Zealand (-.215) | | United States (-.231) | | Romania (-.262) | | Norway (-.300) | | Netherlands (-.320) | | Hungary (-.357) | |
|----------------|----------------------|-------------|------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. |
| Constant | -1.34 | -1.45 | -1.43 | 0.04 | -1.63 | -2.33 | -0.15 | -1.35 | -0.97 | -1.14 | -1.47 | -1.67 | -0.44 | -0.85 |
| Age | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.23 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Education | 0.25 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.23 | 0.36 | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.38 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.24 | 0.21 | 0.20 | 0.10 |
| Marital | -0.05 | 0.15 | 0.04 | -2.22 | 0.01 | 0.18 | -0.20 | 0.19 | -0.02 | <i>0.13</i> | 0.16 | 0.23 | 0.208 | 0.12 |
| Labor F. | -0.11 | 0.00 | -0.03 | 0.070 | 0.14 | 0.16 | -0.09 | 0.11 | -0.10 | -0.03 | 0.06 | 0.00 | -0.02 | -0.10 |
| Pub Emp | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.04 | 0.10 | 0.10 | -0.09 | <i>0.20</i> | 0.04 | 0.03 | -0.02 | 0.10 | -0.05 | <i>0.14</i> | 0.17 |
| R ² | .147 | .082 | .152 | .197 | .159 | .205 | .183 | .245 | .091 | .063 | .134 | 0.089 | .098 | .057 |

| | Czech Rep. (-.363) | | Poland (-.379) | | Spain (-.401) | | Great Britain (-.433) | | East Germany (-.437) | | West Germany (-.491) | | Ukraine (-.561) | | Japan (-.572) | |
|----------------|-----------------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. |
| Constant | -0.74 | -0.85 | -0.62 | -1.03 | -0.75 | -0.86 | -1.36 | -1.79 | -0.29 | -1.13 | -0.16 | -1.07 | -0.82 | -1.41 | -1.24 | -0.45 |
| Age | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | <i>0.01</i> | 0.01 | 0.01 | <i>0.01</i> | 0.00 |
| Education | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0.27 | 0.22 | 0.27 | 0.29 | 0.13 | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.27 | 0.26 | 0.07 |
| Marital | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.29 | 0.24 | 0.06 | 0.22 | 0.11 | 0.17 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.22 | 0.00 | 0.11 | na | na |
| Labor F. | -0.05 | -0.10 | 0.03 | -0.01 | 0.24 | 0.07 | 0.20 | -0.01 | -0.13 | -0.01 | -0.25 | -0.08 | -0.05 | -0.07 | 0.47 | -0.08 |
| Pub Emp | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.05 | 0.21 | 0.19 | <i>0.28</i> | 0.10 | 0.11 | -0.15 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 0.06 | 0.17 | na | na |
| R ² | .087 | .057 | .126 | .115 | .150 | .087 | .127 | .132 | .044 | .058 | .074 | .071 | .057 | .095 | .063 | .011 |

Notes: **Bold**= $p < .05$; *Italics*= $p < .10$. Entries under the country names are the regression coefficients for the direct effects of gender on political knowledge, taken from Table 1. Tables complete with standard errors available from the authors.

Table 3:
Impact of Gender on Satisfaction with Electoral Democracy

| | |
|---|--------------|
| Romania | -.136 |
| Great Britain | -.103 |
| Czech Republic | -.070 |
| Spain | -.066 |
| Poland | -.044 |
| West Germany | -.042 |
| New Zealand | -.022 |
| Japan | -.016 |
| Netherlands | -.014 |
| Norway | .008 |
| East Germany | .036 |
| Australia | .059 |
| Ukraine | .069 |
| Hungary | <i>.094</i> |
| United States | .101 |
| <p><i>Notes: bold=p<.05 italics=p<.10</i> Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, controlling for age, education, labor force participation, public employment, marital status, and satisfaction with economy.</p> | |

Table 4: Satisfaction with Electoral Democracy: Gender Differences

| Var | Roman. (-.136) | | Britain (-.103) | | Czech (ns) | | Spain (ns) | | Poland (ns) | | West Germany (ns) | | New Zealand (ns) | | Japan (ns) | |
|----------------|----------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. |
| Constant | 0.19 | -0.37 | -0.99 | -1.04 | -1.77 | -1.48 | -1.04 | -1.15 | -1.69 | -1.65 | -0.40 | -0.81 | -1.42 | -1.62 | -2.08 | -1.37 |
| Age | <i>-0.01</i> | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | <i>0.01</i> | <i><0.01</i> | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | <0.01 | 0.01 | <i>0.01</i> |
| Education | 0.05 | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.03 | -0.03 |
| Marital | -0.13 | 0.21 | 0.01 | 0.10 | -0.01 | <i>-0.13</i> | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.16 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.01 | 0.06 | na | na |
| Labor F. | -0.06 | -0.17 | -0.07 | -0.11 | -0.09 | -0.03 | 0.07 | -0.04 | 0.06 | -0.09 | -0.09 | 0.03 | -0.05 | -0.01 | 0.68 | <i>0.15</i> |
| Pub Emp | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.10 | -0.09 | -0.05 | 0.05 | -0.09 | -0.13 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.04 | -0.03 | na | na |
| Satis. Econ | 0.18 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.53 | 0.42 | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 0.03 | 0.18 |
| R ² | .047 | .038 | .078 | .071 | .250 | .165 | .048 | .064 | .095 | .072 | .058 | .055 | .119 | .118 | .045 | .028 |

| | Netherlands (ns) | | Norway (ns) | | East Germany (ns) | | Australia (ns) | | Ukraine (ns) | | Hungary (.094) | | USA (.101) | |
|----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|
| | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. |
| Constant | -0.76 | -0.61 | -0.48 | -0.74 | -1.03 | -0.79 | -1.18 | -1.25 | -1.32 | -1.54 | -1.17 | -1.41 | -0.99 | -1.04 |
| Age | <i><-0.01</i> | <-0.01 | 0.00 | <i><0.00</i> | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | <0.01 |
| Education | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.10 | 0.12 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.13 |
| Marital | -0.07 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.08 | -0.10 | 0.16 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.10 |
| Labor F. | -0.07 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.05 | -0.01 | 0.11 | -0.10 | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.31 | 0.01 | -0.12 | -0.07 | -0.11 |
| Pub Emp | 0.01 | -0.02 | <i>0.11</i> | 0.01 | 0.14 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.20 | <i>0.25</i> | 0.07 | <i>0.11</i> | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Satis. Econ | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.14 | 0.19 | 0.35 | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.16 | 0.27 | 0.21 | 0.39 | 0.52 | 0.20 | 0.18 |
| R ² | .069 | .042 | .041 | .060 | .114 | .048 | .048 | .045 | .019 | .042 | .114 | .179 | .078 | .071 |

Notes: **Bold**= p<.05; *Italics*=p<.10 ns=not statistically significant. Entries next to the country names are the regression coefficients for the direct effects of gender on satisfaction with electoral democracy taken from Table 3.

**Table 5:
Impact of Gender on Political Engagement**

| | |
|---|---------------|
| Norway | 0.008 |
| New Zealand | 0.002 |
| United States | -0.022 |
| Great Britain | -0.027 |
| Australia | -0.028 |
| Netherlands | -0.034 |
| Spain | -0.059 |
| Ukraine | <i>-0.108</i> |
| East Germany | -0.115 |
| Czech Republic | -0.127 |
| Japan | -0.132 |
| Hungary | -0.139 |
| West Germany | -0.148 |
| Poland | -0.251 |
| Romania | -0.251 |
| <p><i>Notes: bold=p<.05 italics=p<.10</i> Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, controlling for age, education, labor force participation, public employment, marital status, and satisfaction with economy.</p> | |

Table 6: Political Engagement: Gender Differences

| Variable | Norway (ns) | | New. Zealand (ns) | | USA (ns) | | Britain (ns) | | Australia (ns) | | Netherlands (ns) | | Spain (ns) | |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. |
| Constant | -1.71 | -1.14 | -0.54 | -0.70 | -2.54 | -2.54 | -1.06 | -1.25 | -0.38 | 0.18 | -1.34 | -1.67 | -0.62 | -0.73 |
| Age | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | < 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | < 0.01 |
| Education | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.06 | 0.16 | <i>0.04</i> | <i>0.04</i> | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| Marital | 0.15 | <i>0.12</i> | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.13 | -0.08 | -0.04 | 0.06 | 0.15 | -0.03 | 0.01 |
| Labor F. | <i>0.14</i> | 0.11 | -0.01 | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.11 | -0.05 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.01 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.07 | 0.02 |
| Pub Emp | 0.10 | -0.10 | 0.00 | <i>0.08</i> | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.15 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.01 | -0.04 | 0.01 | 0.03 |
| Satis. Econ | 0.18 | <i>0.08</i> | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.12 | <i>0.06</i> | 0.14 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.11 |
| R ² | .075 | .043 | .034 | .051 | .150 | .162 | .048 | .049 | .027 | .003 | .062 | .070 | .018 | .014 |

| | Ukraine (-.108) | | East Germany (-.115) | | Czech Rep. (-.127) | | Japan (-.132) | | Hungary (-.139) | | West Germany (-.148) | | Poland (-.251) | | Romania (-.251) | |
|----------------|-----------------|-------------|----------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|----------------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|
| | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. | Male | Fem. |
| Constant | -0.93 | -0.92 | -1.05 | -1.20 | -0.64 | -1.07 | -1.45 | -1.04 | -1.63 | -2.00 | -1.14 | -1.12 | -1.87 | -2.49 | -0.61 | -1.07 |
| Age | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Education | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.19 | 0.14 | <i>0.06</i> | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.15 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.18 | 0.16 |
| Marital | 0.15 | 0.05 | 0.13 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.05 | na | na | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.35 | 0.24 | 0.34 | 0.27 | -0.21 | 0.26 |
| Labor F. | 0.09 | 0.03 | -0.11 | 0.10 | -0.18 | -0.01 | -0.03 | 0.03 | -0.07 | -0.07 | 0.13 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.09 | 0.05 | 0.07 |
| Pub Emp | -0.05 | 0.10 | -0.06 | -0.03 | <i>0.16</i> | <i>0.18</i> | na | na | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.09 | 0.11 | -0.01 | 0.21 | 0.06 | 0.12 |
| Satis. Econ | 0.13 | <i>0.10</i> | 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.07 | -0.04 | -0.07 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.06 |
| R ² | .021 | .014 | .109 | .053 | .042 | .056 | .130 | .063 | .112 | .101 | .081 | .062 | .129 | .137 | .070 | .079 |

Notes: Bold= p<.05; *Italics*=p<.10 ns=not statistically significant. Entries next to the country names are the regression coefficients for the direct effects of gender on political engagement, taken from Table 5.

Table 7: Satisfaction with Democracy

| | Coefficient | 90% CI (min) | 90% CI (max) |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Economic Development | | | |
| GDP per Capita | .0000 | .0000 | .0000 |
| % Male workers in service sector | .0036 | .0003 | .0060 |
| Scientists/Engineers per million population | .0000 | .0000 | .0001 |
| Political Development | | | |
| # Years of electoral democracy (male suffrage) | .0005 | -.0002 | .0013 |
| Authoritarian History | -.0541 | -.1096 | .0041 |
| Former FSU | -.0226 | -.0940 | .0412 |
| Civil Liberties (1=low, 4=high) | .0260 | -.0047 | .1179 |
| Women's Social Resources | | | |
| Females per 100 males in third level education | .0006 | -.0013 | .0026 |
| Female employment as % of labor force | .0033 | -.0065 | .0103 |
| Women's Political Context | | | |
| % Women in lower house of parliament | .0009 | -.0016 | .0032 |
| Parental leave benefits (0=low, 2=high) | -.0106 | -.0439 | .0351 |
| Gender quota | .0752 | .0212 | .1212 |
| Proportional Representation | | | |
| Proportional Representation | -.0515 | -.1262 | .0302 |
| Religiosity | | | |
| % Catholic or Orthodox | -.0007 | -.0016 | .0002 |

Dependent variable represents the difference by gender in satisfaction with electoral democracy. The first column of data contains the bivariate OLS regression coefficients. The last two columns contain the bootstrapped confidence intervals. **Bold** indicates $p < .10$.

Table 8: Political Knowledge

| | Coefficient | 90% CI (min) | 90% CI (max) |
|--|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| Economic Development | | | |
| GDP per Capita | .0000 | .0000 | .0000 |
| % Male workers in service sector | .0037 | -.0022 | .0098 |
| Scientists/Engineers per million population | .0000 | -.0001 | .0001 |
| Political Development | | | |
| # Years of electoral democracy (male suffrage) | .0013 | .0001 | .0022 |
| Authoritarian History | -.1503 | -.2359 | -.0686 |
| Former FSU | -.0477 | -.1483 | .0455 |
| Civil Liberties (1=low, 4=high) | .1192 | .0887 | .2100 |
| Women's Social Resources | | | |
| Females per 100 males in third level education | .0035 | .0007 | .0063 |
| Female employment as % of labor force | .0041 | -.0126 | .0270 |
| Women's Political Context | | | |
| % Women in lower house of parliament | .0022 | -.0042 | .0065 |
| Parental leave benefits (0=low, 2=high) | -.0760 | -.1147 | -.0175 |
| Gender quota | .0370 | -.0721 | .1481 |
| Proportional Representation | | | |
| Proportional Representation | -.1471 | -.2419 | -.0081 |
| Religiosity | | | |
| % Catholic or Orthodox | -.0006 | -.0022 | .0012 |

Dependent variable represents the difference by gender in political knowledge. The first column of data contains the bivariate OLS regression coefficients. The last two columns contain the bootstrapped confidence intervals. **Bold** indicates $p < .10$.

Table 9: Political Engagement

| | Coefficient | 90% CI (min) | 90% CI (max) |
|--|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| Economic Development | | | |
| GDP per Capita | .00001 | .00000 | .0000 |
| % Male workers in service sector | .0061 | .0034 | .0086 |
| Scientists/Engineers per million population | .0000 | .0000 | .0001 |
| Political Development | | | |
| # Years of electoral democracy (male suffrage) | .0015 | .0011 | .0021 |
| Authoritarian History | -.1309 | -.1696 | -.0974 |
| Former FSU | -.1163 | -.1727 | -.0644 |
| Civil Liberties (1=low, 4=high) | .0510 | .0188 | .1500 |
| Women's Social Resources | | | |
| Females per 100 males in third level education | .0002 | -.0027 | .0026 |
| Female employment as % of labor force | -.0040 | -.0123 | .0050 |
| Women's Political Context | | | |
| % Women in lower house of parliament | .0033 | .0007 | .0060 |
| Parental leave benefits (0=low, 2=high) | -.0265 | -.0569 | .0120 |
| Gender quota | .0323 | -.0300 | .0999 |
| Proportional Representation | | | |
| Proportional Representation | -.1045 | -.1455 | -.0626 |
| Religiosity | | | |
| % Catholic or Orthodox | -.0014 | -.0028 | -.0004 |

Dependent variable represents the difference by gender in political engagement. The first column of data contains the bivariate OLS regression coefficients. The last two columns contain the bootstrapped confidence intervals. **Bold** indicates $p < .10$.

Table 10: Satisfaction with Democracy

| | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Multivariate |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| Economic Development | .039 | | | | | | .076 |
| Political Development | | -.026 | | | | | .060 |
| Women's Social Resources | | | .013 | | | | .031 |
| Women's Political Context | | | | .021 | | | .055 |
| Proportional Representation | | | | | -.052 | | -.105 |
| Percent Catholic/Orthodox | | | | | | -.001 | .000 |
| R ² | .16 | .03 | .05 | .02 | .03 | .03 | .20 |

Dependent variable represents the difference by gender in satisfaction with electoral democracy. Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients. * indicates $p < .10$ using bootstrapped standard errors.

Table 11: Political Knowledge

| | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Multivariate |
|------------------------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|--------------|
| Economic Development | .017 | | | | | | -.079 |
| Political Development | | -.077 | | | | | -.137 |
| Women's Social Resources | | | .047 | | | | .033 |
| Women's Political Context | | | | -.014 | | | .007 |
| Proportional Representation | | | | | -.147 | | -.036 |
| Percent Catholic or Orthodox | | | | | | -.001 | .000 |
| R ² | .06 | .26 | .04 | .07 | .24 | .05 | .34 |

Dependent variable represents the difference by gender in political knowledge. Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients. * indicates $p < .10$ using bootstrapped standard errors.

Table 12: Political Engagement

| | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Bivariate | Multivariate |
|------------------------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Economic Development | .061 | | | | | | .021 |
| Political Development | | -.072 | | | | | -.033 |
| Women's Social Resources | | | -.006 | | | | .005 |
| Women's Political Context | | | | .017 | | | .028 |
| Proportional Representation | | | | | -.105 | | -.065 |
| Percent Catholic or Orthodox | | | | | | -.001 | .000 |
| R ² | .40 | .58 | .07 | .05 | .28 | .27 | .41 |

Dependent variable represents the difference by gender in political engagement. Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients. * indicates $p < .10$ using bootstrapped standard errors.

Table A1: Country Data

| Country | Economic Development | | | | Political Development | | |
|----------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| | GDP per Capita | % Male workers in service | Scientists/Engineers per million | Years of electoral democracy | Authoritarian History | Former Soviet Union | Civil Liberties Rating |
| Australia | 20210 | 63 | 3357 | 99 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| New Zealand | 17410 | 56 | 1663 | 99 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| United States | 29010 | 63 | 3676 | 99 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Romania | 4310 | 29 | 1387 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Norway | 24450 | 59 | 3664 | 99 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Netherlands | 21110 | 62 | 2219 | 99 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Hungary | 7200 | 50 | 1099 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Czech Republic | 10510 | 43 | 1222 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Poland | 6520 | 38 | 1358 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Spain | 15930 | 52 | 1305 | 23 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Great Britain | 20730 | 59 | 2448 | 99 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| West Germany | 21260 | 51 | 2831 | 50 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| East Germany | 21260 | 51 | 2831 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Ukraine | 2190 | 32 | 2171 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Japan | 24070 | 55 | 4909 | 53 | 1 | 0 | 3 |

| Country | Women's Resources | | Women's Political Context | | PR | Religiosity | |
|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| | Female to male education | Female % of labor force | % Women in parliament | Parental leave benefits | Gender quota system | PR system | % Catholic or Orthodox |
| Australia | 111 | 43 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 26 |
| New Zealand | 100 | 45 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 |
| United States | 120 | 46 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28 |
| Romania | 92 | 45 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 76 |
| Norway | 113 | 46 | 39 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Netherlands | 80 | 40 | 31 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 34 |
| Hungary | 96 | 45 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 68 |
| Czech Republic | 123 | 47 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 42 |
| Poland | 127 | 46 | 13 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 95 |
| Spain | 100 | 37 | 25 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 99 |
| Great Britain | 98 | 44 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 23 |
| West Germany | 89 | 42 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 34 |
| East Germany | 89 | 42 | 26 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 34 |
| Ukraine | 98 | 49 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 90 |
| Japan | 63 | 41 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |

Table A2: Country Indices

| Country | Economic Development | Political Development | Women's Social Resources | Women's Political Context |
|----------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Australia | 0.81 | -1.03 | 0.18 | -0.37 |
| New Zealand | -0.02 | -1.03 | 0.19 | -0.39 |
| United States | 1.26 | -1.03 | 0.94 | -0.91 |
| Romania | -1.46 | 0.83 | -0.05 | -0.68 |
| Norway | 0.94 | -1.03 | 0.73 | 1.33 |
| Netherlands | 0.47 | -1.03 | -1.22 | 1.09 |
| Hungary | -0.79 | 0.81 | 0.07 | 0.48 |
| Czech Republic | -0.83 | 0.80 | 1.19 | -0.81 |
| Poland | -1.10 | 0.81 | 1.14 | -0.12 |
| Spain | -0.31 | 0.22 | -1.12 | 0.25 |
| Great Britain | 0.44 | -0.71 | -0.04 | -0.59 |
| West Germany | 0.32 | 0.07 | -0.63 | 0.93 |
| East Germany | 0.32 | 0.80 | -0.63 | 0.93 |
| Ukraine | -1.22 | 1.46 | 0.78 | -0.40 |
| Japan | 1.17 | 0.05 | -1.55 | -0.74 |
| Mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Minimum | -1.46 | -1.03 | -1.55 | -0.91 |
| Maximum | 1.26 | 1.46 | 1.19 | 1.33 |