Once the atomic genie had been let out of the bottle at Hiroshima--to borrow the oft-quoted phrase--strategists, state leaders, and the world public all struggled to come to terms with the new invention. Bernard Brodie, one of the earliest professional nuclear strategists, declared that with the advent of atomic weapons the primary purpose of military forces was no longer to fight wars but to prevent them. In many ways Brodie was proved right; deterrence became the single most important objective of nuclear strategic forces. Even the Strategic Air Command, in whose authority the bulk of American nuclear weapons power was placed, had for its motto "Peace is our Profession." Others argued that atomic and nuclear weapons should be used--that they were a wasting asset--particularly in the years when there was an American monopoly and a growing Cold War conflict.
During the Cold War several states developed nuclear technology--but just as significant was the development of delivery systems. The order to bomb Hiroshima had taken weeks to be carried out, but by the 1960s with the dual developments of thermonuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, the possibility of global armageddon was only ever a matter of minutes away. Our objective this week is to try to come to terms with the inherent paradox in a weapon capable of destroying and killing on an unparalleled scale being used to maintain peace. We will also be looking at how nuclear strategy is made and who makes it.
Finally, we'll be looking at the issue of what some of the ramifications of this enhanced level of threat were. What were some of the cultural and social effects of the all-too-real fear of armageddon?
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