Pearl Harbor and The Tokyo Trials
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1.  Ibis Communications, Attack at Pearl Harbor, 1941 (visited April 19, 1999)

2.  See Wu Tianwei, Failure of the Tokyo Trial (visited April 19, 1999)

3.  See, e.g., Mark Willey, Pearl Harbor: Mother of All Conspiracies (visited April 19, 1999); Pearl Harbor! December 7, 1941 USS Arizona Burning! (visited April 19,1999)

4.  See, e.g., Larry W. Jewell, The Myths of Pearl Harbor (last modified Dec. 7, 1996); Takeo Iguchi, Discovery of Documents regarding Pearl Harbor Attack: Is Reassessment Required Why Japan was Treacherous? 3 (Nov. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citing M. Sudo, Shokun (January 1992)).

5.  Laws of War: Opening of Hostilities (Hague III), October 18, 1907 [hereinafter Hague III].

6.  Id.

7.  Id. at art. I.

8.  See Iguchi, supra note 4, at 2.

9.  See Iguchi, supra note 4, at 10. The initial delay in the delivery of the message was due to the decision of Foreign Minister Togo that the termination of negotiations should be informed to Secretary of State Hull in Washington, D.C. instead of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. Id. at 8.

10.  Stanley Weintraub, Long Dayís Journey into War: December 7, 1941 11 (1991). The decision was formally reapproved on December 1, 1941 in a meeting at which Emperor Hirohito was present and gave his consent. Id. at 15.

11.  Walter Lord, Day of Infamy 14 (1957).

12.  Weintraub, supra note 10, at 12.

13.  Lord, supra note 11, at 22.

14.  Fourteen-Part Message, reprinted in Jewell, supra note 4.

15.  Iguchi, supra note 4, at 10.

16.  Id. at 11.

17.  See R.J. Butow, Marching Off to War on the Wrong Foot: the Final Note Tokyo Did not Send to Washington, 63 Pacific Historical Review 67-79 (1994). Professor Butow discovered the English version of the unsent declaration of war in microfilm in the Japanese Foreign Ministryís Historical Archive but it was unsigned. Professor Takeo Iguchi then discovered the Japanese version complete with the signature of Mr. Kase who, when confronted with this version, admitted his authorship. See Iguchi, supra note, at 11.

18.  See Iguchi, supra note 4, at 10.

19.  See Weintraub, supra note 10, at 13.

20.  See Iguchi, supra note 4, at 8.

21.  Id.

22.  See Laws of War: Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899; Laws of War: Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, October 18, 1907 [hereinafter Hague I].

23.  See id. at art. 1-8.

24.  Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, August 27, 1928.

25.  Id. at art. I.

26.  Id. at art. II.

27.  U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4.

28.  Edwin L. Beach, Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor 31-32 (1995).

29.  Iguchi, supra note 4, at 5.

30.  See id. at 7.

31.  See Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 231-41 (1961).  Although the test outlined by McDougal and Feliciano was not explicitl adopted at the time of teh attack on Pearl Harbor, it was widely accepted in the post-World War II era and appears to fit well with the unvoiced ideas of signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

32. See Carlos Porter, Japan was Provoked into a War of Self Defense (last modified May 16, 1998)

33.  John J. Stephan, Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japanís Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor 123 (1984).

34.  Id. at 123.

35.  See id. at 135.

36.  "While war [with the U.S.] was a gamble, the Japanese national psyche as cultivated throughout the 1930ís would not allow humiliation." Weintraub, supra note 10, at 12.

37.  Id.

38.  Weintraub, supra note 10, at 11.

39.  Iguchi, supra note 4, at 9.

40.  See Stephen, supra note 33, at 88. "The commander-in-chief [Yamamoto] hoped that damage inflicted on American warships in Pearl Harbor would give Japan breathing space to take over Southeast Asia and to gird for a decisive showdown with the U.S. Pacific Fleet." Id.

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