Sonal S. Pandya

 

Assistant Professor

Department of Politics

University of Virginia

 

spandya-AT-virginia.edu

 

Office: Gibson 262

P.O. Box 400787

Charlottesville, VA 22904-4787

(p) 434-243-1573

(f) 434-243-3359

 

Curriculum Vitae

 

Publications

2010.ÓLabor Markets and Demand for Foreign Direct InvestmentÓ International Organization 64:3 (Summer).

 

2009.ÓGlobal Financial Crisis of 2007: Our Waterloo or Take a Chance on IPE?Ó International Interactions 35:4 (with David Leblang).

 

Working Papers  

Democratization and FDI Liberalization, 1970-2000

(Supplemental Appendix)

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is at heart of global economic integration. It is the single largest source of cross-border capital flows and generates a large share of world trade.

Although today countries offer all manner of enticements to attract FDI this represents a dramatic reversal from the extensive FDI restrictions the prevailed in previous decades. I argue that democratization prompted FDI liberalization as leaders sought to curry favor with newly enfranchised voters, the primary beneficiaries of FDI inflows. The centerpiece of my empirical analysis is an original dataset on the incidence of foreign ownership regulations that spans over 90 countries between 1970-2000.  I estimate that, on average, democracies restrict six percentage points less of their overall economies relative to non-democracies. This finding is robust to several possible alternate explanations for liberalization including the exigencies of economic crises, the dictates of external creditors, and the influence of peer countries. Further, I confirm that countries do not replace formal restrictions with less transparent equivalents. Alternate measures of democracy and instrumental variable regressions using years of independence as an instrument for democracy address potential concerns about measurement and omitted variable bias, respectively. This paper provides the first systematic analysis of FDI regulation and fills a significant gap in international political economy research.  

 

French Roast: Explaining Consumer Responses to the 2003 Iraq War (with Raj Venkatesan)

 

Many International Relations theories rest on claims about individualsÕ responses to international events. To date, direct test of these claims have relied exclusively on survey data. We identify a behavioral response to foreign relations in AmericansÕ supermarket purchases during the 2003 US-France dispute regarding Iraq. Our weekly store-level sales data for 2500 supermarkets data span 2917 brands across twenty-two categories of common grocery products. We identify which grocery products that, to US consumers, appear to be French by virtue of a French-sounding brand name. Our difference-in- difference estimates show that in weeks that boycotts calls were more intense, the market share of seemingly French brands declined relative to other brands. We verify our interpretation of this finding. Robustness tests confirm no change in sales of French- owned trademarked brands, no flight to American-sounding brands, and that rising gas prices did not motivate consumption changes. Our study demonstrates the untapped potential of consumer behavior as a metric of political sentiment.

 

Deal or No Deal: The Rise of International Venture Capital Investment (with David Leblang)

(Supplemental Appendix)

A growing portion of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows takes the form of cross-border flows of venture capital (VC). VC investors supply financing and entrepreneurial expertise to new firms in exchange for equity. VC investors apply their business acumen to raise firms' value, and then sell their equity stake at a profit. Successful VC relies heavily on personal relationships, intensive monitoring, and implicit information about the local market. These facts make the emergence of cross-border venture flows puzzling. We argue that cultural ties between countries, especially the rise of high-skilled migration facilitate an international market for venture capital. Migrants bridge information gaps across countries by supplying implicit information needed to select foreign deals, and by advising entrepreneurs on the optimal business strategy for the local market. We derive a model of cross-border venture flows and test it with novel data on cross-border venture transactions covering 160 countries over the period 1980-2009. We find that US VC firms invest more frequently in countries that have large populations of skilled migrants residing in the US. In stark contrast to existing FDI research, we find that recipient countriesÕ political institutions have limited influence over the volume of venture capital deals. In this paper we highlight the international flow of entrepreneurship and innovation, a substantively important dimension of economic integration that political economy scholars have overlooked. Additionally, we demonstrate the diversity of FDI as a form of economic activity and correspondingly the need for more nuanced political economy models of FDI.   

 

Paper Borders: Occupational Licensing as a Barrier to Physician Migration  (with Brenton Peterson and David Leblang)

 

Amid otherwise sharp disagreement over US immigration policy there is an apparent consensus on the merits of skilled migrants. Occupational licensing regulations (OLR) of skilled professions suggest otherwise. We examine the effects of US statesÕ licensure requirements for foreign-trained physicians on state inflows of migrant physicians. Using original data on state licensing regulations between 1986 -2010 and detailed migration data we show that states that require longer periods of supervised practice receive fewer migrants. This finding is robust to controls for the supply of physicians, co- ethnics, and physician co-ethnics and fixed effects for year, origin country, and destination state. This research identifies a form of domestic regulation that is a de facto barrier to the cross-country mobility of human capital. Our findings also identify a possible source of physician shortages, a significant stumbling block to universal health coverage.