
PLIR 8630
Statecraft and International Security

Todd S. Sechser
Gibson #S-284
tsechser@virginia.edu

Spring 2010
Monday 7:00-9:30PM
Gibson #S-342

Description

This is a seminar devoted to examining prominent research in political science about tools of international statecraft. The course is designed specifically for graduate students intending to write a dissertation or thesis in the field of international security; all others should see the instructor before enrolling.

Objectives

1. Evaluate recent social science research about the use and effectiveness of instruments of diplomacy, statecraft, and foreign policy.
2. Build a cache of potential research proposals upon which to draw when selecting a dissertation or thesis topic.
3. Prepare for the comprehensive examination in international relations by gaining familiarity with a broad class of international security literature.

Requirements

1. *Readings.* The course will succeed only if students read all assigned readings prior to class meetings. Required books are available at the University of Virginia Bookstore; all other readings can be accessed via Collab. If you are off campus you may need to use the **UVa-Anywhere VPN** (instructions located at: <http://www.itc.virginia.edu/network/vpn>). For those who wish to follow up on specific interests later, most weeks' lists contains a few supplementary books and articles, denoted by [+].
2. *Class Participation.* Discussion constitutes the entirety of each seminar meeting; students must come prepared to offer critical thoughts on each of the readings.
3. *Research Proposals.* Eight times during the semester, students must prepare a one-page research proposal related to the week's topic. (Each student may choose three off-weeks.) Proposals should describe one puzzle raised by the readings or during class discussions and propose a brief research plan for resolving it. Proposals are due via email (in PDF or Word format) to tsechser@virginia.edu no later than **48 hours after each class meeting**. To encourage creativity, research proposals are not graded, but they are nonetheless a central requirement.
4. *Review Essay.* Beginning with the seminar on **February 22**, one or more students will prepare a review essay evaluating the week's reading. Essays must be no

longer than 3500 words and are due via email no later than **48 hours before the class** in which the readings are to be discussed. A good review essay will contain the following elements:

- a. **Critique the theoretical argument.** Essays should not just summarize the material. What are the independent, independent, and intervening variables? Is the causal logic plausible? Are there reasons the argument might be problematic?
- b. **Offer alternative explanations.** Are there other ways to account for the puzzle(s) identified by the author? Does the author offer a satisfactory logical or empirical rebuttal?
- c. **Assess the empirical evidence.** Are the cases chosen appropriately? Are the variables operationalized well? Might alternative tests be equally valid? If the author's data are available, can you replicate the results?
- d. **Discuss related literature.** How does this literature compare and contrast with other work on the subject? Is it an improvement?
- e. **Add value.** This is the most important and difficult element of the paper. Can you suggest new hypotheses, data sources, or research strategies?. Can the research design be improved? Suggest how we might move forward.

For a model of a nice review essay, see Jack S. Levy, "**Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems**," *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (October 1983), pp. 76-99 (available on Collab).

5. *Final Exam.* The final examination will be given on **Thursday, May 6** and will mimic the format of comprehensive exams: students will choose one essay question to answer in a two-hour period. The use of books and notes will be prohibited. The examination will be emailed to the class at 12:00PM and will be due via email to tsechser@virginia.edu by 2:00PM that day.

Evaluation

Course requirements carry the following relative weights:

Participation	30%
Review Essay	40%
Final Exam	30%

Readings

The following books are required and are available at the University of Virginia Bookstore. All other readings are available on Collab.

- Biddle, Stephen. *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Downes, Alexander B. *Targeting Civilians in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.
- Drezner, Daniel W. *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

- Gelpi, Christopher, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler. *Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Press, Daryl G. *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.
- Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Walter, Barbara F. *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts are So Violent*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Students should also become familiar with the following book if they are not already:

- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Schedule

0. Organizational Meeting (25-Jan-2010)

- [+] Walt, Stephen M. “**The Renaissance of Security Studies.**” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 211-239.
- [+] Kolodziej, Edward A. “**Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!**” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1992), pp. 421-438.
- [+] Baldwin, David A. “**Security Studies and the End of the Cold War.**” *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1995), pp. 117-141.
- [+] Betts, Richard K. “**Should Strategic Studies Survive?**” *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1995), pp. 7-33.

1. Threats and Coercive Diplomacy (01-Feb-2010)

- Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*, chapters 1-5, 8; skim chap. 6-7.
- Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, chapters 1-3.
- Fearon, James D. “**Rationalist Explanations for War.**” *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.
- Art, Robert J. “**Coercive Diplomacy: What do We Know?**” In Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003.
- [+] Thies, Wallace J. *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
- [+] Blechman, Barry M., and Stephen S. Kaplan. *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978.
- [+] Byman, Daniel, and Matthew C. Waxman. *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- [+] Cable, James. *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force*. 3rd ed. New York: St. Martin's, 1994.
- [+] Fearon, James D. “**Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.**” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577-592.
- [+] Freedman, Lawrence. *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- [+] George, Alexander L., and William E. Simons. *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. 2nd ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994.
- [+] Petersen, Walter J. “**Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom.**” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September 1986), pp. 269-294.

2. Reputation and Credibility (08-Feb-2010)

- Press, *Calculating Credibility*, chapters 1 and 5, plus one of the case studies.
- Mercer, Jonathan. *Reputation and International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, chapters 1-2.

- Walter, *Reputation and Civil War*, chapters 1-5, 8.
- Sechser, Todd S. “**Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power.**” *International Organization* (forthcoming 2010).
- [+] Hopf, Ted. “**Soviet Inferences from Their Victories in the Periphery: Visions of Resistance or Cumulating Gains?**” In Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- [+] Hopf, Ted. *Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.

3. Methodological Discussion: The Deterrence Debate (15-Feb-2010)

- Huth, Paul K., and Bruce M. Russett. “**Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation.**” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 1. (March 1988), pp. 29-45.
- Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. “**Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable.**” *World Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (April 1990), pp. 336-369.
- Huth, Paul K., and Bruce M. Russett. “**Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference.**” *World Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (July 1990), pp. 466-501.
- Fearon, James D. “**Selection Effects and Deterrence.**” *International Interactions*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 5-29.
- Nalebuff, Barry. “**Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World.**” *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 313-335.
- [+] Achen, Christopher H., and Duncan Snidal. “**Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies.**” *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), pp. 143-169.
- [+] Jervis, Robert. “**Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence.**” *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), pp. 183-207.
- [+] George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke. “**Deterrence and Foreign Policy.**” *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), pp. 170-182.
- [+] Huth, Paul K. “**Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates.**” *Annual Review of Political Science*, No. 2 (1999), pp. 25-48.
- [+] Huth, Paul K. *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988.
- [+] Signorino, Curtis S., and Ahmer Tarar. “**A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence.**” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (July 2006), pp. 586-605.

4. Air Power and Coercion (22-Feb-2010)

- Pape, *Bombing to Win*, chapters 1-3, 9, and one of the case studies.
- Watts, Barry D. “**Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies.**” *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/1998), pp. 115-171.

- Pape, Robert A. **“The Air Force Strikes Back: A Reply to Barry Watts and John Warden.”** *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/1998), pp. 191-214.
- Horowitz, Michael, and Dan Reiter. **“When Does Aerial Bombing Work?: Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917-1999.”** *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 147-173.
- Byman, Daniel L., and Matthew C. Waxman. **“Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate.”** *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 5-38.
- Stigler, Andrew L. **“A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO’s Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo.”** *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 124-57.
- [+] Press, Daryl G. **“The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare.”** *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 5-44.

5. Military Power and Effectiveness (01-Mar-2010)

- Biddle, *Military Power*, chapters 1-4 and 8-10.
- Brooks, Risa. **“Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars.”** In *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007, pp. 106-135.
- Farrell, Theo. **“Global Norms and Military Effectiveness: The Army in Early Twentieth-Century Ireland.”** In *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007, pp. 136-157.
- Rosen, Steven Peter. **“Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters.”** *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31.
- [+] Stam, Alan C. *Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

No Class: Spring Break (08-Mar-2010)

6. Nuclear Proliferation (15-Mar-2010)

- Sagan, Scott D. **“The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.”** *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 66-107.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. **“More May Be Better.”** In Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2003, pp. 3-45.
- Feaver, Peter D. **“Neoptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation.”** *Security Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 93-125.
- Karl, David J. **“Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers.”** *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-1997), pp. 87-119.
- Feaver, Peter D., Scott D. Sagan, and David J. Karl. **“Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers (Correspondence).”** *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 185-207.

- Seng, Jordan. “**Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear Powers.**” *Security Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 93-125.
- Beardsley, Kyle, and Victor Asal. “**Winning With the Bomb.**” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 278-301.
- [+] Feaver, Peter D. “**Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations.**” *Security Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 159-191.
- [+] Lavoy, Peter R. “**The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay.**” *Security Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 695-753.
- [+] Sagan, Scott D. *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- [+] Thayer, Bradley A. “**The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay.**” *Security Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Spring 1994), pp. 428-493.
- [+] Sagan, Scott D. “**Organized for Accidents.**” *Security Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Spring 1994), pp. 509-520.
- [+] Hagerty, Devin T. *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: The Lessons of South Asia*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998.
- [+] Knopf, Jeffrey W. “**Recasting the Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate.**” *Security Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Autumn 2002), pp. 41-96.

7. War Termination (22-Mar-2010)

- Fortna, *Peace Time*, entire.
- Walter, Barbara F. “**The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.**” *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 335-364.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. “**Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature.**” *World Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July 2000), pp. 437-483.
- [+] Walter, Barbara F. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.

8. Economic Sanctions (29-Mar-2010)

- Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox*, chapters 1-4.
- Pape, Robert A. “**Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work.**” *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90-137.
- Elliott, Kimberly Ann. “**The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?**” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 50-65.
- Pape, Robert A. “**Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work.**” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 66-77.
- Hovi, Jon, Robert Huseby, and Detlef F. Sprinz. “**When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?**” *World Politics*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (July 2005), pp. 479-499.
- Kirshner, Jonathan. “**Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art.**” *Security Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Summer 2002), pp. 160-79.

9. Civilian Victimization, Occupations, and Counterinsurgency (05-Apr-2010)

- Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War*, chapters 1-2, 4-5, and 7, plus introduction and conclusion.
- Downes, Alexander B. “**Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy.**” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 9, no. 4 (December 2007), pp. 420-444.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. “**A Logic of Indiscriminate Violence.**” In *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 146-172.
- Lyall, Jason M. K. “**Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from a Natural Experiment.**” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53, No 3. (June 2009), pp. 331-362.
- Edelstein, David M. “**Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail.**” *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 49-91.

10. Terrorism (12-Apr-2010)

- McCormick, Gordon H. “**Terrorist Decision-Making.**” *Annual Review of Political Science*, No. 6 (2003), pp. 473-507.
- Pape, Robert A. “**The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.**” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Spring 2003), pp. 343-361.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, and Eric S. Dickson. “**The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization.**” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 2007), pp. 364-381.
- Lake, David A. “**Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century.**” *Dialogue-IO*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 15-29.
- Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter. “**Sabotaging the Peace: the Politics of Extremist Violence.**” *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 2, Spring 2002), pp. 263-296.
- Abrahms, Max. “**Why Terrorism Does Not Work.**” *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 42-78.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Todd Sandler. “**Too Much of a Good Thing? The Proactive Response Dilemma.**” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 5 (October 2004), pp. 657-671.

No Class: Prof. Sechser at Princeton (19-Apr-2010)

11. Public Opinion and War (26-Apr-2010)

- *Special assignment:* Compile your three best research memos into a single file and email them *with your name removed* to tsechser@virginia.edu before class this week.
- Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War*, entire.
- Gartner, Scott Sigmund. “**The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach.**” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 102, No. 1 (February 2008), pp. 95-106.

- Gartner, Scott Sigmund, and Gary M. Segura. “**All Politics are Still Local: The Iraq War and the 2006 Midterm Elections.**” *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 95-100.
- Boettcher, William A. III and Michael D. Cobb. “**Echoes of Vietnam? Casualty Framing and Public Perceptions of Success and Failure in Iraq.**” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50, No. 6 (December 2006), pp. 831-854.

12. Review of Research Memos (03-May-2010)

- *Special assignment:* No later than **6:00pm on Friday, April 30**, please rank-order the research memos distributed in the packet (1 being the top score) and send your rankings in spreadsheet form to **tsechser@virginia.edu**.
- Readings this week to be distributed by the instructor.

[Updated: January 24, 2010]