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EMPLOYMENT

University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA
Assistant Professor, Department of Politics

EDUCATION

Stanford University, Stanford, California
Ph.D. in Political Science, March 2007

• Dissertation: Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in International Crises.

Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa
B.A. in Economics, Political Science, and International Relations, May 1999

• Summa cum laude with University Honors.
• Senior Thesis: Open Secrets: Explaining U.S. Missile Technology Exports to China.
• Phi Beta Kappa, 1998.

PUBLICATIONS

Refereed Journals

• Are Soldiers Less War-Prone than Statesmen? Journal of Conflict Resolution 48:5 (October 2004), pp. 746-774.

Chapters

• September 11, 2001. In John G. Geer, ed., Public Opinion and Polling Around the World. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO (2004).
  • Reprinted in David Skidmore, ed., Paradoxes of Power: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Boulder, Co.: Paradigm (2007).

Conference Volumes

• South Asia and the Nuclear Future: Rethinking the Causes and Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation. Center for International Security and Cooperation & the U.S. Army War College (2004).
• Intelligence and Prediction in an Unpredictable World. Center for International Security and Cooperation & the Eisenhower National Security Series (2003).

Opinion

• Nuclear Stalemate in South Asia. Boston Globe, March 23, 2000.
• Pakistan Coup Underscores Nuclear Dimension. Defense News, November 15, 1999.
• How to Live With the Bomb. Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1998.

WORK IN PROGRESS

• Power, Risk-Taking, and the Probability of War.
• How Organizational Pathologies Could Make Nuclear Proliferation Safer.
• War, Realism, and Brutality in Thucydides.

GRANTS AND AWARDS

1. University of Virginia
   Faculty Summer Research Grant ($5,000), 2007
2. Phi Beta Kappa, Northern California Association
   Graduate Scholarship, 2006
3. Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute, Washington, DC
   Graduate Fellowship, 2005-2006
4. Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation, Stanford University
   Richard A. Goldsmith Writing Prize in Dispute Resolution, 2004 & 2005
   • 2004: For the paper “Can Civilian Control of the Military Help Resolve International Disputes?”
   • 2005: For the paper “The Hegemon’s Curse: How Military Power Exacerbates International Crises.”
5. Stanford University
   Graduate Fellowship, Department of Political Science, 2000-2005
6. Center for the Study of the Presidency, New York
   Research Fellowship, 1997-1998
7. Harry S. Truman Scholarship, 1998

FELLOWSHIPS

1. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University
   Postdoctoral Fellow, 2007-2008
2. Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland
   Visiting Scholar, 2005-2006
3. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
   Predoctoral Fellowship, 2004-2006
4. Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
   Predoctoral Fellowship, 2003-2004
5. Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation, Stanford University
   Graduate Fellowship, 2003-2004

REFEREE

• International Security
• International Studies Quarterly
• Journal of Conflict Resolution
• Blackwell Publishing

TEACHING HONORS

• School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University
  Centennial Teaching Award, 2004
• Department of Political Science, Stanford University
  Award for Excellence in Teaching, 2002

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

• American Political Science Association
• International Studies Association
• Midwest Political Science Association

INVITED TALKS

• Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago
  
  • Reputation Effects in Crisis Bargaining: A Model and Some Hypotheses.
    May 8, 2007.
• Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
  
  • Compellent Threats and the Paradox of Power.
    December 8, 2005.
  • The Hegemon’s Curse: Commitment Problems and Compellent Threats.
    February 10, 2005.
• Department of Political Science, Stanford University
  
  • The Hegemon's Curse: Compellent Threats and the Paradox of Power.
    Workshop in International Relations, November 8, 2005.
  • Deterrence Theory and Dr. Strangelove.
    Guest lecture, May 1, 2003.
  • Missiles, Bureaucracies, and Adversaries During the Cold War.
    Guest lecture, August 8, 2002.
• Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation, Stanford University
  
  • Secrecy and Strategy in International Bargaining.
    April 15, 2003.
• Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Chapel Hill, North Carolina
  
  • Winning Without a Fight: Power, Appeasement, and Compellent Threats.
    New Faces in International Security Conference, September 15, 2006.
• Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland
  
  • Compellent Threats and the Paradox of Power.
    March 16, 2006.
• Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University
  
  • Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Military Aggressiveness Debate.
    May 19, 2003.
• Foreign Policy Association, Los Altos, California
  
  • The Merits and Menace of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
    February 23, 2004.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

• American Political Science Association
  • The Hegemon’s Curse: Compellent Threats and the Paradox of Power.
    Philadelphia, upcoming, September 2, 2006.
  • Why Can the United States Deter but Not Compel?
    Washington, DC, September 1, 2005.
  • The Passive-Aggressive Debate: Military Biases and the Use of Force.
    Philadelphia, August 29, 2003.
• Midwest Political Science Association
  • How Organizational Pathologies Could Make Nuclear Proliferation Safer.
    Chicago, April 7, 2005.
• International Studies Association
  • Reputation Effects in Crisis Bargaining: Power and the Likelihood of War.
    Chicago, March 3, 2007.
  • How States Win Wars: Agendas for Research.
    Montreal, March 19, 2004.
  • Can States Make Credible Commitments in Secret?
    Montreal, March 17, 2004.
  • The Military Effects of Civilian Control.
    Portland, March 1, 2003.
• International Security and Arms Control/International Security Studies
  
  • Military Power and Compellent Threats: Lessons for the United States.
    Denver, October 29, 2005.
• Society for Military and Strategic Studies
  
  • Organization Theory and the Proliferation Debate.
    Calgary, February 14, 2003.

WORKSHOPS

• Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research
  George Washington University, June 2003.
• Institute on Qualitative Research Methods
  Arizona State University, January 2003.
• Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy
  Cornell University, July 2001.

COURSES

• University of Virginia
  • Research Seminar in Statecraft and International Security [Graduate]
  • Introduction to International Relations
  • Strategy, Conflict, and the Causes of War
• Stanford University (Lecturer)
  • Victory and Defeat: How States Win Wars

RELEVANT EMPLOYMENT

• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC
  Junior Fellow, Non-Proliferation Project, August 1999 – July 2000.
• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC
  Intern, Office of the Undersecretary for Policy (International Security Affairs), May – August 1999.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC
  Research Assistant, Political-Military Studies Program, May – August 1998.
• Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Alexandria, VA
  Research Assistant, Middle East and North Africa, May – August 1997.
• U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC
  Office of Congressman James A. Leach, July – August 1997.

[May 15, 2007]