of the Embassy and with utmost secrecy stop over for twenty-four hours in Switzerland to confer with Prentiss Gilbert. My Charge ship was one of the strangest in American diplomatic history as except for a few minutes at nine o'clock every morning I was never at the Embassy, but always in attendance on Ambassador Dawes at the Ritz. After an initial brisk exchange of views concerning the Foreign Service, of which the Ambassador had with a few exceptions a poor opinion, we got along beautifully and I enjoyed the assignment. From the outset it was perfectly clear that the Ambassador didn't want my views even if I had been in a position to offer any that were worth while. My role was that of a sympathetic listener and in that capacity I learned something about what was going on and even more about Greek and Roman history to which the Ambassador constantly referred to illustrate the proceedings in Paris. I had only one bad time and that was when the frightful possibility presented itself that Ambassador Edge might return from leave before Ambassador Dawes had left for London. The latter had informed me most emphatically that he would not make the first call. I was of course perfectly aware that if an incident took place the Department would blame me. Fortunately, Ambassador Dawes left on the 'Golden Arrow' at noon and Ambassador Edge arrived on the boat train at 2 P.M. The first thing he asked me was: "Where is Ambassador Dawes?"

Chapter Ten

THE STIMSON

DOCTRINE

The League had decided to send a commission of inquiry, and Stimson gladly concurred, but early in December 1931 the secretary began to wonder if the Kwantung Army would remain stationary while the investigation went on. [If the Japanese sent troops to Chinchow in South Manchuria where there was no pretext for the few Japanese residents to request protection, it would constitute, Stimson believed, a clear-cut act of aggression against Chinese sovereignty. It would break solemn treaties—decisive proof that Japan had committed an international crime.] Would some sort of immediate counteraction then be necessary? How many months would the Lytton Commission need to make its investigation and present its report? Meanwhile what counteraction could Stimson devise? Obviously only such diplomatic devices (the secretary would insist upon calling them weapons) as would not provoke Japan to war. He was not sure what he could do, but he was already turning over in his mind a diplomatic doctrine, a device, a negative formula: nonrecognition of the fruits of aggression.

Dr. Hornbeck told the secretary early in December that the powers would either have to "put up or shut up"—the Japanese were suspecting that the West did not mean business.

THE STIMSON DOCTRINE

a brake on world pressure against Japan, had proved futile. With the capture of Chinchow it was apparent that despite League remonstrance, mild American objection and warning, and setting up of the Lytton Commission, Japanese appetite had improved with eating. It did not help when Hornbeck truthfully told the secretary of state that Chinchow was like the last dish in a set of dishes—that the secretary had watched Japan break dish after dish, and why should he now become so angry when the Japanese broke the last dish? Stimson nearly lost his temper. Hornbeck feared for a while that the chief of the Far Eastern division might “receive his walking papers.” After some time the secretary cooled down and turned his mind to the diplomatic device, the state paper which would carry his name into history.

4. Undersecretary Castle advised waiting to see. Memorandum to Stimson, Dec. 5, 1931, 793.94/3117.
5. The supposedly “sound” fiscal policy of the Wakatsuki cabinet was soon proved—at least in currency matters—erroneous, for dropping the gold standard made for great and successful changes in the structure of Japan’s foreign trade. In the case of raw silk, unfortunately, foreign demand proved inelastic, but a general equilibrium was restored by the rise in exports of manufactured goods, including products which under previous price conditions had sold abroad scarcely at all, but for which demand proved elastic at the new range of prices. G. C. Allen, Japanese Industry: Its Recent Development and Present Condition (New York, 1940), p. 10.

7. Interview with Hornbeck, Jan. 4, 1932.
9. Far Eastern Crisis, p. 92. Stimson was a much different individual in taste and background from Bryan, and he should have felt keenest embarrassment in joining company with a pacifist and composer of words, the erstwhile “boy orator of the Platte.”
giving a great deal of assistance in the war and the Allies expected more. Then, too: "Fifty years from now there won’t be any China. Some of its provinces may continue to exist as independent states, together or separately, but there will be no Chinese nation as there is now." 10 Rebuffed by the powers, Bryan had turned to unilateral action. When the then counselor of the Department, Robert Lansing, suggested a note of nonrecognition of any Japanese treaty infringement upon Chinese sovereignty, little needed to be done except to send Lansing’s draft to the White House for the consent of President Wilson, which was quickly forthcoming, and then cable the note. “In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of Japan and the Government of China,” Bryan announced, “and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy.” 11

“Filing a notice”—this is the phrase that Bryan used privately to describe his note. 12 No responsible person in the American government in 1915 regarded nonrecognition as other than a weak and temporary expedient. Even the harassed Chinese gave it slight attention. The Japanese foreign minister airily dismissed it as “impudent.” Bryan’s busy mind then had turned to other more pressing problems, especially American neutrality toward

Germany and the Allied powers. A German submarine torpedoed the Lusitania on May 7, 1915, four days before the note went off to Japan, and in the resulting crisis Bryan broke with Wilson and resigned.

Seventeen years later Stimson filed his notice, and made it the pivot of American foreign policy.

He had been thinking of a doctrine of nonrecognition as early as November 9, 1931, when President Hoover suggested it in cabinet. 13 Hoover had toyed with the idea of withdrawing Ambassador Forbes from Tokyo, or proposing to Japan and China a viceroy for Manchuria, but by early November he had come to believe that the “main weapon” should be to announce the nonrecognition of any treaty extorted from China by force. When Stimson discussed Hoover’s proposal with Department officers there was incomplete enthusiasm, Hornbeck dissenting, but the secretary believed that if all nations announced nonrecognition it would exert a potent effect. 14

Acquiring the idea of nonrecognition from President Hoover in early November 1931, Stimson a month later was ready to expound the subject by cable to Ambassador Dawes, then in Paris, for the edification of European diplomats. 15 After consulting various members of the Department, he gave up this scheme in favor of waiting for the Japanese occupation of Chinchow, which occurred on January 2, 1932.

At the State Department that morning Stimson revealed to Ambassador Claudel what he had in mind, nonrecognition, and spent the rest of the day on the golf course and showing movies to friends at Woodley. After retiring he grew restless thinking of Manchuria; and at six o’clock the following morning he arose with his mind clear on what he wished to do. He went downstairs

13. Stimson diary, Nov. 9, 1931. On the diary margin Stimson later penciled, “First germs of nonrecognition.”
14. Ibid., Nov. 9. “Hornbeck had advanced the rather common idea in the Department that this remedy didn’t amount to anything because we had tried it in 1915. But there the situation was wholly different as I pointed out. Under present circumstances, particularly if the disavowal is made by all of the countries, it ought to have a very potent effect.”
15. Ibid., Dec. 2, 3.
and Stimson, although finding his adviser's alternate wording a little weak, did consent to soften the note. A form at last appeared which seemed to satisfy everyone. The chief of the Western European division, J. Theodore Marriner, said the tone now resembled Lord Curzon at his best. The note was short, and to the point:

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, nor to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

Undersecretary Castle suggested notifying the members of the Nine-Power Treaty group so that they could send similar notes. Stimson thought this a good idea, although he had based his note

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17. Stimson diary, Jan. 4, 1932. The two men talked about various subjects for almost an hour and a half, chiefly the possibility of a new bank crash.
18. Lindsay had replaced Sir Esme Howard in March 1930.
20. Hornbeck sought in vain to convince Stimson that nonrecognition would not work because the world was full of rascals. Interview of Jan. 4, 1952.
22. FR: Japan 1931-41, I, 76.
on the Kellogg Pact and not the Nine-Power Treaty. Consulted by telephone, Hoover also agreed.

The great day arrived, Thursday, January 7, 1932. The secretary had Hornbeck send off the notes, and conferred with all the ambassadors and ministers representing the parties to the Nine-Power Treaty. He began with Debuchi, "who took the shot with the pleasant stolidity of a Japanese." "The Chinaman, Dr. Yen," did not give much expression one way or the other, although Stimson believed Yen had reason to be pleased. Reactions of the other diplomats appear to have been diplomatic. They did not give the secretary reason to believe that his new policy might prove unsuccessful.

The first inkling that matters were amiss came the same day the notes went out.

At a dinner that night at the Czechoslovak legation Ambassador Claudel told Stimson that Briand, requesting the British to join a protest against the capture of Chinchow, had met with refusal: the British foreign secretary, Sir John Simon, found the moment inopportune. Evidently the British government would not go along with Stimson and send a supporting note of nonrecognition to Japan.

This development did not worry the secretary of state. He had hoped that a nonrecognition doctrine would—to use Washington's words at the Federal Convention in 1787—raise a standard to which the wise and the honest might repair, the event being in the hand of God. But he knew that disorders in India and a continuing financial crisis at home were plaguing the British, and he did not especially blame them when, as he discovered within a few days after January 7, 1932, they sought to "play it safe" in foreign policy, acquiring the benefits of an American diplomatic move without taking any risk.

It was only when the Foreign Office allowed the London press

24. Simon had replaced Lord Reading in November 1931.

on January 11, 1932, to publish an unenthusiastic official communique that Stimson became considerably irritated. The British announcement, dated January 9, bore no mention of preserving the territorial and administrative entity of China, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or nonrecognition of the fruits of aggression. It dealt with the single problem of Anglo-Chinese trade relations. In a lead editorial published the same day the London Times undertook to supply affirmative interpretations of the communiques' omissions. The British government, the Times explained, had "acted wisely" in refusing to follow Stimson, for it was not the "immediate business" of the Foreign Office to defend the administrative integrity of China until that integrity was something more than an ideal ("It did not exist in 1922, and it does not exist today").

Actually, the Foreign Office had not intended its communiqué as a rebuff to the United States. The communiqué was a faux pas of British diplomacy, and Foreign Office officials later openly admitted as much. It had received only the slightest attention at the Foreign Office. Sir John Pratt, who then headed the Office's Far Eastern section, later revealed that the permanent officials had drafted and approved it in haste at 1:00 P.M. on Saturday the ninth, just before getting off to their week end holidays. They did not realize until the following Monday that it read like a rebuff to America. Stimson afterward would remark that a slightly different version of the published communiqué, dated the ninth, did not get to him until the twelfth. This also was a result of the week end habit: the British ambassador in Washington presented the aide memoire at the State Department on Monday the eleventh, and Stimson, off on a long week end, did not see it until Tuesday.

In later years much misunderstanding arose over the British
reaction to Stimson's announcement of nonrecognition, for it came
to be a popular belief that the American secretary of state in
January 1932 had made a definite offer to restrain Japan, and
Britain had refused the offer. There was, in truth, no offer of any
kind in January 1932. Stimson had gone ahead on his own, to
announce nonrecognition, and had not solicited support. Before
sending the note he had merely read it to the British and French
ambassadors, asking them to communicate his intention to their
governments. He did not ask reply but "waited for results." [28]
The ambassadors did not receive copies of the note for trans-
mission until after it had gone out to China and Japan. Such was
the "offer of co-operation." Sir John Simon a month later, during
events leading up to the so-called Borah Letter of February 23,
1932, did refuse immediate cooperation with Stimson under the
terms of the Nine-Power Treaty, but this was something entirely
different from the British response to the doctrine of nonrecog-
nition. [29]

Official British disinterest in his note pained Stimson greatly,
and the answer of Japan, given January 16, 1932, was far worse.
Its veneer of elegant irony thinly covered a base of solid insolence.
The nonrecognition note, the Japanese Foreign Office assured
Stimson, had received the most careful attention in Japan. Re-
affirming the policy of the Open Door, "a cardinal feature of the
politics of the Far East," Japan regretted the unsettled conditions
prevailing in China. Concerning the possibility that the Japanese
might be using improper means in Manchuria, contrary to the
Pact of Paris, "It might be the subject of an academic doubt
whether in a given case the impropriety of means necessarily and
always voids the ends secured; but as Japan has no intention of
adopting improper means, that question does not practically

29. See below, pp. 180–3. For this matter of Stimson's "offer of
co-operation," see Pratt, War and Politics in China, pp. 226–8, 779–80; also
the interesting letter, perhaps by the same author, in Thomas Jones, A Diary
with Letters: 1931–50 (London, 1954), pp. 399–402. This question is thor-
oughly explored in Reginald Bassett, Democracy and Foreign Policy, A Case
History: The Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931–33 (London, 1954), pp. 5, 75–6,
83, 98, 116 ff.

30. After having sponsored the second Open Door Note affirming the
territorial and administrative entity of China, John Hay at the behest of the
War and Navy departments had approached Japan about the possibility of
an American coaling station at Samsah Bay in the Chinese maritime province
of Fukien. The Japanese government reminded Hay of his Open Door Doc-
trine, and the American secretary of state in embarrassment dropped the
subject.
31. "Rightly or wrongly we attached little importance to this démarche.
Non-recognition was a peculiarly American technique, the fruit of American
isolationism, and it was wholly out of harmony with the British tradition in
international affairs." Pratt, War and Politics in China, p. 226.
32. For this declaration see below, p. 183. It is perhaps worth noting that
nations of the world thereafter stood behind the nonrecognition of "Manchukuo." Japan, of course, recognized the new Manchurian state on September 15, 1932, and later Manchukuo exchanged envoys with the Vatican (1934), El Salvador (1934), the Dominican Republic (1934), Italy (1936), Franco Spain (1937), Germany (1937), Poland (1938), Hungary (1939), and Slovakia (1939). Russia recognized in 1935, incident to selling to Japan, nominally Manchukuo, the Soviet interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway. But in general, the League countries supported non-recognition, and Manchukuo during its thirteen years of existence remained rejected and almost friendless, a waif outside the family of nations.

3

What can one say in conclusion about the doctrine of non-recognition of the fruits of aggression, which was undoubtedly on Jan. 28, 1932, the Committee of Twelve completed a draft declaration on the Sino-Japanese dispute which made specific reference to the nonrecognition note of Jan. 7, and stated that it would be impossible for the League to recognize any settlement secured by methods contrary to international obligations. The president of the Council, Joseph Paul-Boncour, reported the declaration to the Council on Jan. 29. This episode, however, disappeared from view because of the general confusion caused by the Japanese attack on Jan. 28, 1932, upon Shanghai.

33. Russian recognition proved only slightly embarrassing at the Tokyo war crimes trial after the second World War. The trial sought to demonstrate among other things that Japan had broken the Kellogg-Briand Pact; Stimson's note considered nonrecognition inherent in the pact; to recognize the fruits of aggression (as did Soviet Russia) therefore constituted an illegal act punishable under the charter of the Tokyo tribunal. But such an argument was avowedly theoretical and legalistic and could serve no useful purpose, since no one was prepared to hale Russia into court. It did indicate the large amount of politics often involved in applications of international law.

34. The Stimson Doctrine unfortunately failed for Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Albania. The conquest of those nations by Italy and Germany received recognition by most of the states of the world. The Kellogg-Briand Pact fell into discard. When President Roosevelt raised the question of the Pact with Italy, anent the conquest of Ethiopia, Mussolini told him (according to FDR) to "go to hell." Dorothy Detzer, Appointment on the Hill (New York, Holt, 1948). p. 186.

Stimson's most memorable diplomatic step while secretary of state? Despite his final realization that the doctrine, under the extraordinary international circumstances of 1932-45, exerted little influence in maintaining the peace of the world, did such a principle contain anything essentially worth while for the practice of American diplomacy in less frenzied times? And even if nonrecognition could have no immediate effect in diplomatic intercourse, was it a contribution to international law, to the eventual reign of justice among nations?

First of all, a clarification. (The Stimson Doctrine applied only to boundary changes accomplished by force, whereas most questions of recognition concern changes of regime, not boundary.) It is easy to confuse these two quite different issues.

Stimson always maintained that his device of nonrecognition was something new in diplomacy, particularly if adopted by the nations of the world and made to include, in contrast to the Bryan note of 1915, not merely treaties but any "situation de facto" such as obtained in Manchuria in 1932. Yet it is difficult to see wherein the Stimson Doctrine was novel either in form or practice. The expediency of employing recognition as a diplomatic weapon had occupied the minds of diplomats for many years, without any clear consensus. Few subjects in international law had encouraged so much investigation. International lawyers had chewed over the question of recognition of new states and new governments, naissance et reconnaissance, until there was scarcely anything left to masticate. But the practice of states always prevented the scholars from reducing recognition to a few easy formulas. Usually recognition served as a diplomatic method of exerting pressure—an instrument of national policy—though procedure varied according to circumstance. This was particularly true of recognition of a state carved out of another state,

35. For Stimson's policy of political recognition in Latin America see below, pp. 218-20. Stimson abandoned in Latin America the moralistic recognition policy of Wilson.

36. This is the conclusion of Ross N. Berkes, "The Use of the Power of Recognition as an Instrument of Diplomacy," an unpublished doctoral thesis (1948) at the University of Southern California.
the situation Stimson had in mind, as opposed to recognition of a government involving no change of boundary. During the Peace of Amiens, for example, Great Britain in return for retention of Malta, immunity of Turkey, and French evacuation of Holland and Switzerland, had offered to Napoleon recognition of the Bonapartist Italian states. In American history notable instances of recognition as a diplomatic weapon were the independence of Latin America, 1800–30, the Texas question of 1835–45, and, of course, the recognition of Panama in 1903.

As one might have expected from the voluminous annals of American diplomatic practice, there were also precedents favoring codification of what later came to be labeled the Stimson Doctrine—or was it the Hoover Doctrine? Secretary of State James G. Blaine in 1889 had laid before the first conference of American states a proposal to prevent conquest: no state should recognize transfer of territory except after an arbitral decision. Years later came the Bryan note to Japan. Another declaration of nonrecognition occurred in 1911 when the American government informed Japan that it could “neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles” arising out of Japanese occupation and control of eastern Siberia, and could not acquiesce in any action taken by the government of Japan which “might impair existing treaty rights, or the political or territorial integrity of Russia.” Then, too, after the Paris Peace Conference the United States had refused to recognize Rumania’s conquest of Bessarabia from Russia. By 1932 there was still no clear American policy of nonrecognition of forcible territorial change. Expediency had dictated that practice be kept fluid.

It was not difficult to argue that nonrecognition of the fruits of aggression had generally proved an unrewarding means of diplomatic pressure, requiring a supplementary sanction to be effective. Japan, for example, had been put back in leash after the first World War not by virtue of Bryan’s pronouncement of 1915 or the declaration on Siberia in 1921 but through arrangements at the Washington Conference following an American threat to outbuild the Japanese navy.

39. “The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.”
40. If the Council failed to agree unanimously upon solution of a dispute, individual states concerned could take action; war also was permissible in any dispute declared by a party to be a matter of domestic jurisdiction.
than twenty eventful years, has considerable merit if looked at 
from the vantage point of an international lawyer. One of the 
best recent statements in its favor has come from Professor 
Hersch Lauterpacht, who like most writers on the subject—except 
a few pessimists such as the late Edwin M. Borchard—is an 
indefatigable seeker after precedents favoring the eventual world 
rule of law. “The instrument of nonrecognition,” Lauterpacht 
writes, “is admittedly an imperfect weapon of enforcement. How-
ever, in the absence of a regularly functioning international 
machinery for enforcing the law, it must be regarded as a sup-
plementary weapon of considerable legal and moral potency. It 
prevents any law-creating effect of prescription. It constitutes a 
standing challenge to the legality of the situation which results 
from an unlawful act and which, in relation to the courts of the 
non-recognising State, is a mere nullity.”

Despite this favorable view, students of American foreign policy 
writing under the deepening shadows cast by the second World 
War have been industriously removing the luster from the prin-
ciple of nonrecognition. Authorship of the note of January 7, 1922, 
has become something less than an unqualified historical asset. 
(KEG F. Kennan, in Stimson’s time an underling in the State 
Department, has reproached his one-time chief for too legalistic 
a view of international relations—too much concern with the 
“judicial tidiness of international life.” Kennan deplores the 
legalistic doctrinal approach to international problems. He 
of course would not agree with an earlier diplomatic practitioner, 
Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, who once gravely announced

New York, Longmans, Green, 1925–). I, 145. See also Malbone W. Graham, 
In Quest of a Law of Recognition, Berkeley, Calif., 1933; Percy E. Corbett, 
Law and Society in the Relations of States (New York, 1951), p. 109; Robert 
Langer, Seizure of Territory: The Stimson Doctrine and Related Principles 

43. American Diplomacy, p. 95: “... I see the most serious fault of our 
past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-
moralistic approach to international problems. This approach runs like a red 
skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years.”

that the best principle was to have none. [But the point is well 
taken that statesmen should not encumber themselves with too 
many fixed ideas and special schemes of thought. Principles, often 
serving to clarify, may also obscure and deceive; they may, further-
more, tie one’s successor’s hands against the unknown conting-
encies of the future.] 

[Kennan may have carried his point too far in inveighing against 
use in diplomatic negotiations of principles of a broad, moralistic 
sort. According to Kennan and such other recent students as 
Hans Morgenthau, a “realistic” foreign policy should divorce 
itself from moral injunctions, but in practice this is simply im-
possible, even if it were desirable. The analogy between the 
nation and the individual, by which a nation as a corporate body 
receives attributes of personality, is unavoidable; people are too 
accustomed to describing a corporate body such as a nation in 
moral terms, calling it just or generous or cowardly or unscrupu-
ulous—which is to say, treating it as if it were an individual.

Such manner of speech was in vogue long before Hegel announced 
that the state was the highest embodiment of morality. Woodrow 
Wilson utilized it to the utmost in his crusade during the first 
World War. “We are at the beginning of an age,” he told Congress 
on April 2, 1917, “in which it will be insisted that the same stand-
ards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong shall be observed 
among nations as among the individual citizens of civilized states.” 
When in July 1918 Colonel E. M. House was meditating on a 
possible league of nations, the first article of his draft ran as 
follows: “The same standards of honor and ethics shall prevail 
internationally and in affairs of nations as in other matters.”

The moral approach to foreign policy is rooted deeply in the 
traditions and thought of Western civilization, particularly in the 
main currents of American democratic thought.

for World Order (Denver, 1947), pp. 55–75.
45. Ibid., p. 58.
46. Ralph H. Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought, New 
York, 1940; 2d ed. 1956.
Stimson’s “moral approach” to international relations have usually condemned it because of the impossibility of its complete success. They overlook the lack of any acceptable substitute.

Morality in politics, a noble goal well worth striving for, has in addition a certain practical use in the workaday politics of democratic nations. If one is dealing with or between democracies it is extremely realistic to invoke high principle. There will always tend to be a high moral content in the policy of any democratic nation where diplomatists are directly responsible to their fellow citizens. Dexter Perkins has remarked that the mass of men in America are inclined to think that they know something about the conduct of foreign relations; generally, he believes, this mass will have opinions even on complicated subjects and tend to focus attention on easily remembered diplomatic slogans; hence the high moral content in American diplomacy.  

But it is unlikely that Stimson before promulgating his Doctrine made any calculation of the American psyche. Had he been a more reflective individual he might have done so. Not given to playing up to the foibles of the American people, he seems to have acted out of his own experience and preference. Skilled in the law, and a highly moral man, an aristocrat in temperament and in manner of life, he was the product in more ways than one of the late Victorian Age. An announcement of nonrecognition was for him a natural moral and gentlemanly thing to do. Japan would be left outside the moral code of the Western world, if she couldn’t act up to it.

The Stimson Doctrine, reflecting its author’s predilections, was in content unoriginal, in announcement hardly epoch making. In some ways it constituted a backward step in international behavior. It is curious therefore to observe the later rivalry between Stimson and Hoover over its authorship. Stimson liked the term “Stimson Doctrine,” for it had a ring similar to Monroe Doctrine, and Hoover’s secretary of state had a sense of history. But Hoover,


48. Undersecretary Castle remarked in his diary of Feb. 18, 1932, that “The President said a couple of days ago that for the coming election he must have too, wished to go down to posterity with a Doctrine, and for the 1932 presidential campaign he needed all the credit he could secure. “I have projected a new doctrine into international affairs,” he said in his acceptance speech of August 11, 1932. The idea of nonrecognition so attracted him that despite defeat in November he afterward asked some cabinet members to prepare testimonial letters on the subject, which they did, in the interest, as Hoover later put it, of “accuracy of historic fact.”  

50. Stimson, on the other hand, in his Far Eastern Crisis left authorship of nonrecognition uncertain. In his memoirs of a decade later, written after other laurels had come his way, he clearly gave Hoover credit. By that time the phrase “Stimson Doctrine” had become an accepted historic label for the American diplomatic note of January 7, 1932.

51. All the support he can get. He wants Stimson . . . to make a speech somewhere and proclaim this as the Hoover doctrine . . . It would hurt his [Stimson’s] feelings terribly to have this called the Hoover doctrine because he thinks of it as one very important star which history will put to his credit.”

52. See also Hoover’s statements in an interview in 1947 with Alexander DeConde, Herbert Hoover’s Latin-American Policy (Stanford, Calif., 1951), pp. 34–5.

53. There has been some debate over whether there were actually two doctrines, the Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine, the latter not embodying sanctions. See Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making (New Haven, 1946), p. 116 n. Richard N. Current in a lucid and carefully reasoned article, “The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine,” American Historical Review, 59 (1955–54), 513–42, has used the Stimson and Castle diaries to support this thesis. There is no question that Stimson occasionally pressed Hoover for sanctions, and in the Stimson diary there are random statements favoring sanctions. Even so, Stimson after outbursts of anger against Japan would cool down in realization that sanctions during the Great Depression were politically impossible. Hoover, having to give more attention than Stimson to political matters, was more steady in opposition to sanctions. Hoover was no pacifist, nor was Stimson as belligerent in 1929–33 as he became in later years. In reality the two men agreed far more than they disagreed, and it was only in the latter 1930’s that they began to differ radically over issues of foreign policy.