THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

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Volume III
The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945

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6. The 1920s: The Economic Aspect

The Diplomacy of the Dollar

Any stable system of international relations must be built on economic foundations, and the situation in the 1920s was no exception. Indeed, given the devastation brought upon the European economies, no postwar order could be conceived that did not include an economic agenda. How to restore the European economies and, through them, reestablish stable international economic relations was a key issue of the postwar period, the more so since, as noted earlier, the Versailles peace treaty had failed to address the issue squarely.

The Great War had cost Europe dearly; 9 million of its youths had died in war, another 20 million had been wounded, and more than $400 billion had been expended on battle. Inevitably, the European countries, victors and vanquished alike, suffered from a decline in industrial and agricultural production, which, combined with a severe inflation, caused social and political instability. Moreover, foreign exchange mechanisms remained confused. The system of multilateral trade and investment that had functioned before the war had been based on the gold standard and the principle of currency convertibility, both of which had been given up during the war and could not be automatically restored when the peace came. (Only the United States lifted the ban on gold shipments right after the war.)

Added to the chaotic picture were the issues of German reparations and the allied war debts to the United States. As seen earlier, Germany was called upon to pay reparations totaling as much as $33 billion, which its leaders and people alike considered an outrageous sum. The British, the French, and the Italians, for their part, were adamant on the reparations question because their postwar economic recovery appeared to hinge on such payments. At the same time, these countries had borrowed much from the United States after 1917. As noted earlier, their indebtedness during 1917–20 had exceeded $10 billion. These loans had been extended at 5 percent interest. The Americans expected interest payments to continue, as well as the eventual repayment of all debts. The Europeans, however, insisted that they could not do so unless the interest rate were lowered and, more important, until they received reparations money from Germany.

Thus developed one of the most serious disputes in postwar U.S.-European relations. The United States was opposed to coupling the reparations and debt issues, asserting that the former had to do with Germany's war guilt, whereas the latter was a purely commercial transaction. The Americans, to be sure, would be willing to lower the interest rates, and as a result of long negotiations throughout the decade, the United States and its wartime allies did come to some understanding, lowering the interest rate on British loans to 3.3 percent, French to 1.6 percent, and Italian to 0.4 percent. These concessions were not sufficient from the Europeans' point of view, however, for they still had to come up with the money, which they expected to obtain, at least in part, from the German reparations. Given the French-German crisis over the question, the formula of Britain, France, and Italy receiving funds from Germany and then using them to pay back the American debts did not work. With Americans continuing to insist that the wartime allies honor their obligations, there developed severe strains in U.S.-European relations. The French felt particularly hurt as they had suffered most from the war and believed they had sacrificed themselves for three years before the Americans bestirred themselves to come to their aid. The French, they said, had paid with their blood, whereas Americans were talking about money. Moreover, some in France calculated that the country had lent money to the Americans during the latter's war for independence that had not been paid back.¹ The dispute became very tense, and the Commerce Department in Washington even sought to forbid American private loans to France while the crisis lasted.

¹ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States (Chicago, 1976), 124–6.
Things reached a critical stage during 1923–4, with French and Belgian troops occupying the Ruhr Valley, Germans refusing to budge, Americans bitter over the European failure to honor wartime obligations, and no restoration of the system of currency convertibility having been effected. It was at this point that the U.S. government chose to step in and help alleviate the tensions. It would not act directly, for it judged that the reparations question did not concern the government, which had not signed the Versailles treaty, although the nation did intend to ask for some payment from Germany for war damages. The best approach, Washington officials believed, was to work through private bankers and businessmen, to let them take the initiative, with the government staying in the background, and approach their counterparts in Europe.²

This arrangement, an early example of "corporatism" or a system of state-business cooperation, worked very well. In 1924 three bankers — Charles G. Dawes, Henry M. Robinson, and Owen D. Young — were asked by President Calvin Coolidge to organize themselves as a commission to investigate German finances. They went to Europe and proposed a revised schedule of German reparations payments, which in effect would reduce the total amount Germany would be expected to pay. To enable the country to start reparations payments, the former allies would supervise plans for stabilizing German currency, including an immediate advance of foreign loans, of which the major portion consisted of a $110 million loan to be raised in the United States. American bankers had little difficulty making the loan, and thus the reparations settlement, known as the Dawes Plan, paved the way for stabilizing European financial as well as diplomatic affairs. Together with the settlement of the allied debt question, which was completed by 1926, the United States and the European nations were able to resume normal economic relations for the first time since the war.

As if to commemorate the occasion, more than twenty nations decided to reestablish the gold standard. More correctly known as "the gold exchange standard," the system lifted the wartime ban on shipments of gold, thereby restoring convertibility among different currencies. Their rates of exchange were more or less fixed through the medium of gold. That is to say, the value of a currency was determined by the price of gold in that currency, and its ratio of exchange with another currency would be the same as the comparative values of the two currencies in terms of gold. For instance, one ounce of gold was fixed at $20.67. In pounds sterling, one ounce would cost around 4.13 pounds. In other words, a pound was worth $5. This was the same as the prewar rate of exchange; both currencies were reinked to gold at "prewar par," as it is sometimes written. Such a decision did not take into consideration wartime and postwar inflations. Because dollars or pounds bought less than before the war, their respective values in terms of gold might also have declined. To restore the gold standard at prewar par meant, therefore, to try to combat inflation by making money dearer, and prices of commodities lower. This could produce a recessionary trend, resulting in shortages of capital and also higher unemployment. But in the mid-1920s such a policy appeared to be a better alternative to inflation. Exchange stability, it seemed, had to be restored if normal international economic transactions were to be resumed, and such stability appeared to depend on maintaining the value of each currency as much as possible.

For the United States such a policy did not bring about economic retrenchment since there was sufficient demand at home and abroad to keep factories in full operation, even though there was a chronic agricultural depression. And to the extent that the domestic economy did not grow fast enough, surplus capital could readily be invested abroad.

Indeed, American capital was the main sustainer of the international economic system during the 1920s, in particular after 1924. The role of American financial resources has sometimes been referred to as "the diplomacy of the dollar."³ The term signifies the fact that whereas the government in Washington refrained from active participation in world political affairs and was particularly sensitive about domestic opposition to working with the League of Nations, private

² The best study of U.S. policies toward the reparations and debt questions is Melvin Leffler, The Elusive Quest (Chapel Hill, 1979).
bankers, speculators, and others were anxious to make use of the opportunities presented for expanding their roles in economic transactions abroad. Starting with the 1924 loan of $110 million to Germany, American loans and investment overseas grew rapidly.

Foreign investments are usually divided into two categories: direct and indirect. The former refers to doing business abroad, for example by establishing factories and manufacturing commodities with capital one has brought; the latter alludes to the purchase of bonds, debentures, and securities; in other words, public loans and private investment in foreign countries. Both categories of investment grew in the 1920s so that, for instance, in 1929 alone American direct investment in Europe amounted to $1,352 million, and indirect investment to $3,030 million. Altogether, American funds totaling more than $10 billion were being sent abroad — this at a time when the nation's national income was about $80 billion. Given the size of the economy, the Americans could easily afford to engage in such investment activities.4

Whether, for the recipients of such funds, the continuous inflow of American capital in large amounts was a desirable development was seriously debated, but they really had little alternative, given the shortage of capital in war-devastated Europe and the fact that as late as 1929 the United States accounted for nearly 50 percent of the world's income. Clearly, as the countries of Europe as well as elsewhere sought to recover and develop economically, it was much easier to turn to the one source of capital rather than to generate funds internally.

In some such fashion, a relationship of financial interdependence was developing between the United States and Europe — and indeed the rest of the world as well. Europe was particularly important as the inflow of American funds enabled Germany to pay reparations to Britain, France, and Italy, and the latter, in turn, paid back portions of their wartime debts to the United States. The mechanism depended on the continued flow of American capital and on the understanding among these countries of the essential interdependence. It was not surprising that in 1929 a new arrangement was worked out for German reparations. Known as the Young Plan, after the American banker, Owen Young, who helped arrange it, the plan reduced the reparations to about $9 billion, to be paid in fifty-nine years with an interest rate of 5.5 percent. Combined with the various debt settlements the United States and the wartime allies had by then negotiated, the 1929 arrangement epitomized the spirit of cooperation and the pivotal role played by the dollar in international affairs.

American financial involvement in the Western Hemisphere was also extensive. In 1929, American direct investment in Canada amounted to $1,960 million, in Cuba and the West Indies to $1,054 million, in Mexico to $913 million, and in South America to $1,548 million. Nearly equal amounts were sent to these countries as indirect investments and governmental loans. Some of these were risky investments; in Argentina, for instance, there were so many business failures that the Commerce Department in Washington cautioned bankers against investing more money there.5 Still, these countries, too, could not have undertaken economic development programs without the massive infusion of American capital.

Although smaller in scale than American investments in Europe or the Western Hemisphere, there was also an impressive outflow of capital to Asia and the Middle East. American funds sent to Japan were instrumental in enabling the country to recover from the devastating earthquake of 1923, which destroyed much of Tokyo and caused property damage upward of $1 billion. The Ford Motor Company built factories and manufactured the first automobiles in Japan, and Americans also invested in Japanese companies in chemical, electronic, and other enterprises that were fast industrializing and urbanizing the country. In China, in the meantime, American investment was particularly notable in providing utilities and telephone systems in the larger cities. The Standard Vacuum Oil Company engaged in the refinery business in the Dutch East Indies as well as on the continent of Asia. Altogether, close to $1 billion was being invested in that part of the world on the eve of the Great Depression.

The 1920s were also notable because American business interests,

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with the strong backing of the State and the Commerce Departments, energetically entered the Middle Eastern oil fields. The region's rich petroleum resources had been mostly divided up into British, French, and Dutch concessions, but the Americans, sensing an urgent need to supplement domestic with imported oil (the development of the automobile made this a clear requirement), energetically entered the field. Supported by the government, they succeeded in getting the Europeans to agree to a redrawing of the oil concessions map so as to make room for American companies. The so-called red-line agreement of 1928 defined where these four countries would have primary rights for the development of oil fields.6

Outside these regions, Liberia and the Soviet Union may be mentioned as significant examples of American economic activities during the 1920s. In the African republic with close historical ties to the United States, the main target was rubber plantations. Rubber was needed for automobile tires, but its production and pricing tended to be controlled by Britain, which possessed rich rubber resources within its Asian empire, especially Malaya. The Firestone Rubber Company kept in close touch with the Commerce Department as it developed rubber production facilities in Liberia. In the meantime, the Soviet Union, despite its antимperialistic ideology, did not hesitate to turn to the United States for much needed capital. Although the absence of a diplomatic relationship meant binding legal contracts could not be worked out, this did not prevent American entrepreneurs and Soviet officials from concluding several business agreements. For instance, the Sinclair Oil Company obtained a concession to develop oil fields on northern Sakhalin; W. Averell Harriman invested in manganese mines; and, most famous of all, Henry Ford built tractor factories. Altogether, more than a hundred proposals for concessions in the Soviet Union were made by Americans from 1926 to 1929; in 1928 and 1929, there were fifty-four proposals, amounting to 26.1 percent of all foreign proposals during those years.7


If America's foreign investment was a major international activity of the 1920s, one that undoubtedly contributed to world economic recovery and development, trade also played a pivotal role. World trade had suffered an overall decline during the European war, and it did not recover the prewar level till the second half of the 1920s. This was due to several factors: the devastations the war brought the European countries; their loss of millions of productive workers (and consumers); the chaotic state of foreign exchange in the absence of a gold exchange standard prior to 1925; the development of "import substituting" manufactures in many parts of the world that would encourage domestic production and discourage foreign imports. In the overall picture of trade stagnancy, however, the United States was almost always an exception. Its export trade, which expanded spectacularly during the war, slowed down somewhat after 1919, but the nation was still the principal exporter in the world, providing Europe with much of the necessities of life as well as industrial equipment and less tangible items like Hollywood movies.

Although the United States also imported from Europe, trade balances were always in the former's favor. This reversed the situation that had existed before the turn of the century. What was remarkable about the postwar years was the declining importance of Europe as America's trading partner. Whereas during 1910–14 the European countries together had accounted for 62 percent of total American export trade and 49 percent of import, after the war the average annual rate fell to 45 percent and 30 percent, respectively. This last figure, indicating that less than one-third of American purchases now originated in Europe, had serious implications for the European nations. If they were to resume and expand their trade, as they had to in order to reconstruct their economies and pay for American loans, and if they could no longer count on as close a commercial relationship with the United States as before the war, they would have to try exporting aggressively to other parts of the world, such as the Middle East and Southeast Asia, areas of their colonial control, parts of which were now governed as League mandates. In such regions, too, however, Americans were keen on stepping in. The Open Door policy that had earlier been enunciated in connection with the China market was now energetically applied...
elsewhere, the Commerce Department taking the initiative for opening up what it considered to be closed doors.

American trade in the formerly European enclaves of the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia was still limited, but that in East Asia and the Western Hemisphere grew rapidly. Asia's share in American export trade increased from 6 percent before the war to twice that proportion after the war, and in America's imports, from 15 percent to 29 percent. Fully one-third of American exports were going to the countries of the Western Hemisphere at the end of the 1920s. These figures indicate that in trade relations, too, the United States was fast globalizing itself. World trade, on the whole, increased by only 13 percent between 1913 and 1929, whereas American trade more than doubled, and so one may well speculate as to whether global commerce would have expanded further if the prewar patterns of close U.S.-European trade links had been preserved. What is indisputable is that the penetration of world markets by American goods as well as capital and technology was providing a basis, the economic foundation, for the postwar international order.

Business Civilization

These economic activities, moreover, were sustained by an ethos, a mentality that played a unique role in the postwar world, in particular in the United States. At a League-sponsored world economic conference held in Geneva in 1927, for instance, the delegates recognized that international peace now depended on economic underpinnings. They set up a committee of experts to inquire into the commercial and financial arrangements best suited for achieving "understanding and harmony" among nations. Although the U.S. government did not participate in these activities, Americans certainly shared such a perspective. They developed what may be termed an idea of business civilization as the key to national and international affairs. To a nation weary of both geopolitics and an ideological crusade, the emphasis on economics was most welcome. Production, distribution, banking, and related business endeavors as a model of rational action and an inspiration to the whole nation and indeed the entire world — such was the philosophy of business civilization that underlay American foreign relations during the 1920s.

Herbert Hoover, Henry Ford, Walter Lippmann, and Reinhold Niebuhr, representing divergent backgrounds and engaged in different professions, may be taken as examples representing, each in his own way, this business philosophy. Hoover, secretary of commerce for eight years before becoming president in 1929, was a strong believer in private American initiatives — economic and humanitarian — that would contribute to a stabler and more prosperous world. What he termed "American individualism" relied not on governmental authority but on the self-interest and civic spirit of citizens who collectively would increase national wealth and make use of it for similar purposes elsewhere. Henry Ford preached the gospel of the new age of machinery, which he believed was promoting the cause of world progress. As he wrote, "Rightness in mechanics, rightness in morals are basically the same thing.... Just as a clean factory, clean tools, accurate gauges, and precise methods of manufacture produce a smooth-working, efficient machine, so clear thinking, clear living, square dealing make of an individual or domestic life a successful one, smooth-running and efficient to everyone concerned." Like Hoover, Ford believed that the United States had much to show other countries. Taylorism — after Frederick Taylor, who had disseminated ideas about efficient systems of production and of labor-management relations — symbolized the American way, but this was eminently exportable. As the industrialist noted, "foreign lands are feeling the benefit of American progress, our American right thinking. Both Russia's and China's problems are fundamentally industrial and will be solved by the application of the right methods of thinking, practically applied." It followed that "political boundaries and political opinions don't really make much difference. It is the economic condition which really forces change and compels progress."10

Lippmann and Niebuhr, among the most influential commenta-

8 Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago, 1965), 417–18.
9 Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (New York, 1922), 71.
10 Henry Ford, My Philosophy of Industry (New York, 1929), 35, 37–9, 45. On Taylorism, see Frederick W. Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management (New York, 1911).
tors on foreign affairs, likewise argued that a country like the United States, extremely powerful economically but reluctant to employ military force, was in the best position to define international order. Lippmann, who had been disillusioned by Woodrow Wilson’s failure to bring his visions of peace to fruition, now accepted the business orientation of American foreign relations and believed the nation’s economic ties to other countries might prove to be the glue that held the world together. Niebuhr, a young theologian with a keen interest in social issues, was more critical of corporate capitalism, but he too believed that the age of armament expansion and empire building had been replaced by a new “economic age” in which the “legates of our empire are not admirals or proconsuls, but bankers.” If, he wrote, “we do not support our economic power by extraordinary military force, then [we] shall learn to live in a world community and make those adjustments to the desires and needs of others which are prompted by prudence and conscience.”

All these comments reflected the widespread perception that economics, as opposed to traditional geopolitics, was becoming the dominant force in national and international affairs, and that the United States, as the leading economic power, was playing the most influential role in the postwar world. The idea that economic interactions brought about a more peaceful international order was not new; both Presidents William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson had espoused the same thing. Now, however, ideal and reality appeared to be coming closer through the diplomacy of the dollar.

Whether the “economic age” would really make the Versailles peace more durable would depend in part on the continued economic strength of the United States and in part on the latter’s willingness to heed “the desires and needs of others,” in Niebuhr’s words. Until the onset of the Depression in 1929, the first condition was clearly present, so the crucial question was the second, whether American economic policies served the interests of the world community. Did the United States pursue policies that tended to promote the further interdependence of the world economy, besides contributing to the nation’s own enrichment? Did it make use of the accumulated wealth on behalf of a harmonious, orderly international community?

Here the picture was mixed, and throughout the decade of the 1920s there was a tension between economic internationalism and economic nationalism. Historical judgment has not been very generous and tended to depict America’s economic policy then as having been self-centered, parochial, and shortsighted. As evidence, commentators have noted the wide gap existing between the nation’s professed Open Door policy and its protectionist tariff system. One may also add the restrictionist immigration policy in this connection. Both these policies made the United States less open to foreign goods and people than it might have been, given its dominating position in the world economy.

Protectionism was a Republican article of faith during the 1920s, as it had been before the war. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 revised upward the Wilson administration’s low rates on most imports, both manufactured and agricultural. It would be difficult to determine if this sort of protectionism caused world trade to grow rather slowly during the 1920s, but it is possible that America’s particularly large trade surpluses with regard to Europe were achieved because of the policy and that the high tariffs made the nation a net exporter both of capital and of goods.

To take a typical example, in 1928 America’s balance of trade was $880 million in its favor, and Americans sent some $970 million abroad as loans and investments, as if to help other countries pay for their trade deficits toward the United States. This situation was different from Britain’s before the war. Prior to 1914, London had been the financial capital of the world, lending and investing its funds in the United States and elsewhere. The recipient countries of these funds had been able to make payments on them through building up trade surpluses vis-a-vis Britain, which practiced a liberal commercial policy and tended to develop trade deficits with the borrowers. This was how Britain functioned as the economic hegemon and contributed to world stability, at least in the commercial and financial realm. After the war, however, the United States

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became a different sort of hegemon because of its protectionist tariffs. European critics, as well as those Americans who shared their views, argued that this was an untenable situation, making other countries, especially those in Europe, so much more dependent on the United States. The image of America as self-centered and insufficiently concerned with the larger picture emerged.

Defenders of the system, on their part, pointed out that there was nothing wrong with the arrangement; so long as Americans continued to send funds abroad, other countries could balance their books. Of course, these latter would have to pay interest and dividends on American loans and investments; in 1928, such payments amounted to $800 million. Was this not impoverishing America’s debtors? Americans would counter by noting that they were also spending money abroad as tourists (this came to $660 million in 1928), and recent immigrants from Europe were remitting substantial portions of their savings to the mother countries ($220 million). If these financial arrangements could have been made to continue, one might well have argued that this system was as effective an instrument of orderly international business transactions as the prewar British-centered system.

American protectionism was also justified by Herbert Hoover and other leaders in its own terms, as necessary both for the nation and for the world. They argued that global economic development depended on a strong American economy; and a high-tariff policy would stimulate domestic production, bring in additional revenue, reinforce the value of the dollar, and enable the country to function as the world’s banker. All this should be a welcome development not just for the nation but for the rest of the world. To such an argument, critics responded that America’s protectionism gave the impression to the world that, despite the evident lead the United States was taking in establishing an economically more interdependent world order, the nation was not yet fully committed to internationalism, at least not to the extent of paying attention to the “desires and needs” of other countries. By not adopting a more liberal trade policy, the United States, it was sometimes noted, failed to set an example to others. For they, too, instituted protectionist tariffs, with rates going much beyond the levels prevailing before the war. The result was fierce trade competition that did not promote the cause of economic internationalism.

Such criticism seems justified at least insofar as American trade with Europe was concerned. It must, however, be put alongside the generous debt settlements with Britain, France, and Italy, as well as the support of German economic reintegration through American loans and investments. It would be best to say that, as the postwar economic hegemon, the United States acted to promote European reconstruction but that there was a limit to its commitment to commercial internationalism.

The picture becomes even more complex when we consider the non-European parts of the world. Through its exportation of goods, capital, and technology, the United States played a key role in bringing them into the global economy. Countries beginning their modernization effort, such as Mexico and China, accepted, if they did not uncritically welcome, the American role. Their powerful antiimperialist rhetoric turned the nationalist leaders in these countries against the infusion of American funds, but by the end of the decade most of them had come to recognize that they could not do without them.

It is interesting to observe, in this connection, that even Joseph Stalin came grudgingly to admire American capitalism. In a pamphlet he published in 1924 (Foundations of Leninism), he repeated the standard Leninist argument that “colonial and dependent countries” must “wage a struggle for liberation” from “a world system of financial enslavement and colonial oppression” by a handful of “advanced countries.” At the same time, Stalin wrote, separate national economies and national territories had been integrated to create “a single chain called world economy,” out of which “true internationalism” might emerge, an internationalism of “national liberation movements.” Before the oppressed peoples of the world achieved such a goal, however, they should learn to combine “Russian revolutionary sweep” and “American efficiency.” This latter, he explained, was “that indomitable force which neither knows nor recognizes obstacles; which with its businesslike perseverance brushes aside all obstacles; which continues at a task once started until it is finished, even if it is a minor task; and without which
serious constructive work is inconceivable.” Such a statement in a sense accommodated revolutionary nationalism with the American business ethos and could, if needed, have provided justification to leaders in non-Western parts of the world for accepting goods, capital, technology, and management skills from the United States.

If, then, American economic influence was linking different parts of the world closer together, thereby creating a greater sense of global interdependence, there was a contrary trend as well: the new immigration policy of the United States. Both the 1921 and the 1924 immigration laws established a quota system on the basis of nationality. Henceforth only those from Western and Central Europe would be welcomed, and even they could not exceed the total combined figure of 150,000 annually. Immigrants from Eastern Europe would be severely restricted. Asians were excluded entirely. (The quota system, however, did not apply to Canada or to Latin America.) Such legislation, enacted by a nation that was the richest in the world, could not but impress other countries as narrow-minded and self-centered, an unfortunate impression given America’s active promotion of international economic interchanges on many fronts. For the countries of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, in particular, the near-total exclusion of their people from the United States was in sharp contrast to their growing commercial ties with the latter, as good an example as any of the tension between nationalism and internationalism in American foreign affairs.


7. The 1920s: The Cultural Aspect

Peace as an Ideology

Peace as a dominant idea was a distinctive feature of the postwar decade. This is not to say that there had been no forceful movements for peace or effective presentations of ideas of peace before then. Before the Great War, there had developed various strands of pacifism, ranging from traditional Christian conceptions to the more recent socialist formulations. In the United States, scores of peace societies had been established to organize the international community better to promote a stable, interdependent world order. And then, during the war, Woodrow Wilson and V. I. Lenin had emerged as spokesmen for two contrasting ideas about international affairs and propounded their respective visions of a world without war.

It was after 1919, however, that the idea of peace, of whatever shade of meaning, came to hold center stage in discussions about international affairs. We have already seen how potent were the drives for disarmament, outlawry of war, economic stabilization, and American capital movements, which together created an environment more conducive to peaceful interconnections among nations than to war and military preparedness. But the phenomenon had deep cultural roots as well and was sustained by intellectual developments in the 1920s. One might think of the ideology of peace at that time as a "hegemonic ideology" – the term Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist, began to use as he penned his thoughts in prison. According to him, a society was held together through a set of ideas produced, refined, and manipulated by its elites in order to maintain some sort of order and cohesiveness. These ideas were so pervasive that even those opposed to the elites

1 Antonio Gramsci, Letters from Prison (New York, 1989).